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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-067 **CONTENTS** *5 April 1996*

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Albania: Berisha Addresses PD National Assembly *[Tirana TV]* 1
Albania: Anticommunism Seen as Democratic Party's 'Old Hat' *[REPUBLIKA 3 Apr]* 2

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Russian Ambassador Refuses To Accept Note *[Sofia Radio]* 3
Bulgaria: Nikolay Kamov Opposes Union With Russia *[24 CHASA 1 Apr]* 3
Bulgaria: Zhirinovskiy Backs Bulgaria Joining USSR-2 *[STANDART NEWS 2 Apr]* 4
Bulgaria: Implications of Defense Ministers Summit Viewed *[KONTINENT 5 Apr]* 4
Bulgaria: Paper on Need for Consensus With Russia Viewed *[PARI 4 Apr]* 5
Bulgaria: Zhelev's Desire To Join NATO Criticized *[168 CHASA 1-7 Apr]* 5
Bulgaria: Exclusion From Neo-COCOM Meeting Criticized *[KONTINENT 5 Apr]* 6
Bulgaria: Government Urged To Resolve Nuclear Issue *[DUMA 3 Apr]* 7
Bulgaria: Kozloduy Nuclear Reactors Reduce Output *[Sofia Radio]* 8
Bulgaria: Civil Defense Clears Up 'Red Mercury' Spillage *[Sofia Radio]* 8

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Weekly Analyzes Pros, Cons of NATO *[RESPEKT 25-31 Mar]* 9
Czech Republic: Survey Shows 42% in Favor of EU Entry *[DENNI TELEGRAF 2 Apr]* 12

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Meciar Interviewed on Hungary Treaty, Kovac *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 30 Mar]* 13
Slovakia: Officials Comment on Hungarian Treaty *[NARODNA OBRODA (DOKUMENT supplement) 27 Mar]* 14

HUNGARY

Hungary: EU Commission President Discusses Accession *[Budapest Radio]* 23
Hungary: Editorial Assesses Treaty With Slovakia *[NEPSZABADSAG 4 Apr]* 23
Hungary: Pros, Cons of NATO Membership Analyzed *[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 23 Dec]* 24
Hungary: Government Signs Agreement With Public Employees *[Budapest TV]* 29
Hungary: MSZP Official Evaluates Party Congress *[UJ MAGYARORSZAG 4 Apr]* 30
Hungary: Suchman Views MSZP Personnel Issues *[NEPSZAVA 4 Apr]* 31
Hungary: New Group Offers Alternative to Smallholders Party *[Budapest Radio]* 32

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Presidency Expresses 'Profound Regret' Over Brown Demise *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
B-H: U.S. 'Anger' Over Relations With Iran Viewed *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 30 Mar]* 34
B-H: Commentary on IFOR's Increasing Presence *[SVIJET 4 Apr]* 35
B-H: Negotiations Under Way for Release of POW's *[TANJUG]* 37
B-H: RS' Krajisnik Comments on Sarajevo, Dayton, Elections *[ARGUMENT 22 Mar]* 37
B-H: Karadzic Rejects Church's Asylum Offer on Mt Athos *[AFP]* 39
B-H: Kasagic, EU Envoy Discuss Reconstruction Priorities *[SRNA]* 40

B-H: Delegation Pays First Visit to Prison Camp in Serbia [*AFP*] 40
B-H: GDS President on Declaration for Integral Bosnia [*Sarajevo Radio*] 40
B-H: Koschnick Fears Croatian-German Military Cooperation [*Vienna DIE PRESSE 5 Apr*] 41
B-H: New EU Mostar Administrator Profiled [*Brussels EUROPEAN VOICE 3-10 Apr*] 41
B-H: HDZ's Cosic Interviewed on Federation, Elections [*VECERNJI LIST*] 43
B-H: Ex-PM Silajdzic Sees Dangers of Divided Bosnia [*Amsterdam ELSEVIER 30 Mar*] 44
B-H: Portugal To Wind Up Liaison Detachment in Bosnia [*Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS 30 Mar*] 46
B-H: Portugal's PM Given Cool Reception in Rogatica [*Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS 31 Mar*] 46
B-H: Spanish Troops Mediate in Exchange of Corpses [*Madrid ABC 3 Apr*] 47
B-H: Investigators Find Evidence of Srebrenica Execution [*Sarajevo Radio*] 47

CROATIA

Croatia: Tudjman Addresses Government on Plane Crash [*Zagreb Radio*] 48
Croatia: Government Declares 5 Apr Day of Mourning [*Zagreb Radio*] 48
Croatia: New Ambassador to U.S. Views Relations [*VECERNJI LIST 29 Mar*] 48
Croatia: Tudjman Receives Polish FM Rosati [*Zagreb Radio*] 50
Croatia: Granic, Polish FM Sign Cooperation Protocol [*Zagreb Radio*] 51
Croatia: Granic, Albanian FM Discuss Relations, Kosovo [*Tirana Radio*] 51
Croatia: Granic, Albania's Serreqi View Balkans, Kosovo [*Tirana TV*] 51
Croatia: Serb Refugees in Baranja Hold Meeting [*Beli Manastir Radio*] 52
Croatia: Baranja Serbs Oppose Reintegration [*TELGRAF 3 Apr*] 54
Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Commemorate 1992 Battle [*Beli Manastir Radio*] 55
Croatia: TANJUG Says Croatia Preventing Serbs' Return [*TANJUG*] 56
Croatia: GLOBUS Poll Shows Tudjman Popularity Waning [*GLOBUS 29 Mar*] 56

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Recognition by Belgrade a 'Question of Days' [*MIC*] 58
FYROM: Miljovski Reports on Negotiations With EU [*NOVA MAKEDONIJA 3 Apr*] 58
FYROM: Liberals' Motion To Dissolve Assembly Defeated [*MIC*] 59
FYROM: National Convention Presents Goals [*Skopje National Convention Program*] 59

POLAND

Poland: Defense Minister Reviews Talks in Moscow [*PAP*] 62
Poland: Press Reaction to Defense Minister's Russian Visit [*ZYCIE WARSZAWY 4 Apr, etc.*] 62
Poland: Article Says Steel Industry Earning Profits [*WARSAW VOICE 25 Feb*] 63

ROMANIA

Romania: Melescanu Reiterates NATO Adherence Goal [*JURNALUL NATIONAL 26-27 Mar*] 66
Romania: Tinca on Hungarian Entry in NATO Before Romania [*Budapest TV*] 69
Romania: Tinca Warns of 'Dangerous Extremists' in Hungary [*ADEVARUL 1 Apr*] 69

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Debt Exchange To Go Through Despite Serb Suit [*DELO 30 Mar*] 70
Slovenia: Negotiations on Physicians' Pay Fail [*Ljubljana Radio*] 70
Slovenia: Investment Societies Protest Privatization Gap [*DELO 29 Mar*] 71
Slovenia: Government Issues Denationalization Report [*SLOVENIA WEEKLY 2 Mar*] 71
Slovenia: Atlantic Council Discusses NATO [*SLOVENIA WEEKLY 2 Mar*] 72

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Parties Respond to Hague Tribunal's Criticism [*NASA BORBA 4 Apr*] 73

FRY: JUL President Comments on Mira Markovic, SPS *[NIN 16 Feb]* 73
FRY: JUL's Markovic Addresses Future, Society, Crime *[Belgrade Radio]* 77
FRY: Article Says Phone Contracts Awarded Without Bids *[EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 12 Feb]* 78

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Receives Delegation of U.S. Senators *[TANJUG]* 80
Serbia: Radical Party Leader Criticizes Hague Tribunal *[SRNA]* 80

Albania: Berisha Addresses PD National Assembly

AU0404205096 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 4 Apr 96

[Report by Sokol Terihati—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Terihati] The third national assembly of the Democratic Party [PD] started proceedings this morning. In the presence of 649 delegates from all over the country and hundreds of invitees, PD Secretary General Tritan Shehu opened the assembly.

Representatives from rightist European parties, European Christian Democratic Union [EUCD] President Alois Mock, and EUCD Secretary General Welle, took part at the assembly.

The president of the Republic of Kosova, Ibrahim Rugova, and representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Tirana also took part at the assembly.

President of the Republic Sali Berisha was the first to take the floor. The drafting of the new constitution, the solution to the national issue, complete privatization, putting the state at the service of the individual, the severe fight against criminality, reduction of taxes and unemployment, and the solution to the problem of housing were some of the major goals that President Berisha submitted in his speech.

At the beginning, Berisha made an analysis saying that the PD has come to its third assembly after honestly completing its historic contract with the Albanians and with Albania, having established a law-governed state, the market economy, and the country's integration in Europe, as well as signing the contract of the real national rebirth. The PD comes to this assembly as a party of the future and democracy, of the Albanian nation and Albania, as a party of the year 2000. It comes as the political force that avoided the blood-feuds, overthrew the most cruel communist dictatorship by a free vote, and marked the deepest historic victory in the ex-communist Europe.

The PD comes to its third assembly completely integrated into Europe, as a member of the EUCD and the Western European Union [WEU]—groupings of the parties of Churchill, De Gaulle, and Adenauer, who established and developed the big Western democracies.

The PD has already been renewed.

[Berisha] During the elections held last year, the PD renewed over 60 percent of its leaders at all levels, over 25 percent of the leading posts, and elected women and girls. The PD is determined at this assembly to fix its statute once and for all. The PD doubled the percentage of young people in leading posts. The regeneration of the PD, activating the most-efficient, reputable, and devoted people in its structures, constitutes a basic condition so that the PD will always remain a party of the future. During this process and by changing itself, the PD demonstrated its determination to change Albania. Long live the PD!

[Terihati] Talking about the PD's position, Berisha declared that the PD considers the coalition with the PS [Socialist Party] as high treason against democracy and as a devastating act against the country's future.

The solution of the vital concerns of the populace was the focus of President Berisha's speech. Although crime has been reduced by 45 percent and the rate is the lowest among the Eastern countries, we will by all means guarantee the calm and security of the individual and his property, Berisha continued.

A significant reduction of unemployment and taxation are the next goals, including the solution of the housing concerns. Regarding the latter, 10 billion leks will be invested, so that, through interest-free credits, young couples will be able to start life in their own homes.

Regarding employment, our goal is very ambitious, Berisha continued. [passage omitted]

Talking about foreign policy, President Berisha considered the solution of the Kosova problem to be a priority, obliging Belgrade to initiate a dialogue with Prishtina in the presence of a third party. [passage omitted]

[Berisha] That is why I call on all Albanians today not to allow socialism to occupy our future. This is a new time. It is the time of democracy. We want to move fast. We have no time to lose. We do not want a red light on our road toward the year 2000. Those who want to knock on the door of the new century should find it open. They should be confident in the future. Socialism is our past, it is a dead dogma. Socialism was a barbarism with a human face. That is why, today, from this rostrum, I invite all Albanians to reach the heights and the possibilities of the future. The future elections are not a question of power and government, but a question of welfare, employment, security for all of you, and the future, our integration into Europe, and the root and soul of our Western civilization.

Future elections will disjoin history. They will determine our future, that of Albania and the nation in general. That is why we must vote and win for ourselves, for the future of our children, and for the nation in general. With our free vote, together with Albania, we should march confidently toward blue spaces of the year 2000. All will win with us! Albania will win with us! Long live Albania!

Albania: Anticommunism Seen as Democratic Party's 'Old Hat'

AU0404120896 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 3 Apr 96 pp 1-3

[Commentary by Gavrosh Levonja: Anticommunism—The Democratic Party's Old Hat]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday Shkoder and all of Albania honored the memory of the four martyrs of democracy who were killed five years ago during the protest demonstrations against the results of the 31 March elections that gave the victory to the then Albanian Workers Party.

As in earlier years, the most senior officials of the ruling party and the state used the occasion to wave the banner of anticommunism. The speeches by Berisha, Arbnori, and others who took the rostrum at the rally to mark the occasion were pervaded by anticommunism from start to finish. However, after the passage of five years, the overwhelming majority of Albanians are tired of words, promises, and especially slogans, and put more faith in deeds. You can shout against communism day and night and beat your breast about not allowing the communists back into power, but if these words are not accompanied by action, nothing terrible will happen to those who were in power until recently.

On the contrary, the shouts and slogans of Berisha and Arbnori about the communist danger and the communist's plans to dismantle everything have a quite different effect on people of the right and on genuine anticommunists. Real anticommunist forces find in the lectures of the Democratic Party [PD], filled with anticommunist slogans just like those of five years ago, justification for their critical stance toward the inadequate struggle the PD has waged against communism. To talk against communism and the danger of its return when you have held power for four years means either that you have no clue how to combat communism or you have no wish to do so.

If what right-wing forces have long been asking for had been put into action, communism in Albania, despite the roots it established during 50 years, would now be more a relic than a favorite argument for speeches by members of our government.

It is paradoxical that, five years after the demolition of the monuments to the dictator, one still comes across appeals and petitions addressed to the government calling for his posthumous punishment. It is intolerable that, after four years in power, those in charge of the state have still been unable to identify and punish those responsible for the 2 April massacre in Shkoder, after a series of pompous promises that served only as ladders to power.

You cannot claim to have combated communism when senior officials of the communist regime, blind instruments of the dictatorship, grow fat while exploiting the property whose legitimate owners are recognized by laws that you have proposed and approved. The worst is that such weeds as corruption, nepotism, and tendencies toward monopolies, which are all based on the abuse of power, grow up in this field littered with vestiges of communism.

As a result, speeches filled with a spirit of anticommunism sound false in the mouths of those who with their deeds have done so little to defuse the communist danger. Many Albanians have now understood that the PD leadership is using anticommunism in order to cling to the power it won with the same catchphrase. Disappointed by the stand taken by the PD while in power, they are looking for an alternative that must accompany words with deeds to finally defeat communism. Only the right is able to offer this alternative. The right includes the sections of the population that were hit hardest by the criminal perversities of communism, and is able to perform what the PD could not to in the last four years. In this sense, the right too has its job of dismantling to do, in eradicating the twisted values of communism that the PD did not have the strength to uproot from Albanian soil.

Bulgaria: Russian Ambassador Refuses To Accept Note

AU0504134496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgarian Foreign Minister Pirinski has ended his visit to Greece and is now back in Bulgaria. Our reporter Vladislav Ostoich reports:

[Begin Ostoich recording] Mr. Pirinski assessed the talks he had in Athens positively. He said that it appears that after Easter the Greek Parliament will ratify the two agreements—on the water of Mesta River and on the new transportation links. Two mixed commissions will soon begin work in order to determine the location of the new border checkpoints and update the figures regarding the Mesta River water, so that the doubts about the amount of water that our country will make available to Greece will be eliminated.

Talks were also held on the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline.

On his return to Bulgaria today, Minister Pirinski provided additional information about his meeting with Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev on 3 April. The reason for the meeting is well-known. Mr. Pirinski said that it is unacceptable to include Bulgaria among the future members of the newly established community of the four CIS countries. There is no reason for this since Bulgaria is not a CIS member. President Yeltsin's statement could have negative consequences for bilateral relations.

In response Ambassador Avdeyev said that it is incorrect to doubt the democratic principles of President Yeltsin's foreign policy. He expressed concern about the anti-Russian sentiments among certain circles in Bulgaria. As far as the four-country-community is concerned, it is a new form of economic and humanitarian cooperation.

On these grounds, Mr. Avdeyev refused to accept the note that the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry has prepared. The note will now be submitted to the Russian Foreign Ministry by Mr. Miladinov, our ambassador in Moscow. [end recording]

Bulgaria: Nikolay Kamov Opposes Union With Russia

AU0404210396 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 1 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Nikolay Kamov, chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Commission, by Iva Petroni; place and date not given: "Our Entry Into a New USSR Is Impossible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petroni] Mr. Kamov, how do you assess Boris Yeltsin's statement about us joining a new USSR?

[Kamov] It is impossible. A sovereign state cannot be mentioned in a free context when the issue concerns reintegrating a community of states to which Bulgaria has never belonged.

[Petroni] According to Bulgarian MPs and politicians, the talks with the Russian Duma delegation and Zhan Videnov's meetings in Moscow probably provided some grounds for Boris Yeltsin to think this was possible. Is this true or not?

[Kamov] I would not have made such a connection.

[Petroni] Was the issue discussed or not?

[Kamov] It was not only not discussed, there was not even a hint of this.

[Petroni] The other day, President Zhelev accused the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] of betraying our national interests.

[Kamov] What is even more intolerable is that the Bulgarian president uses every possible occasion to place our country in a bad light; I even have the feeling that he takes delight in such chances, which is rather sad for the Bulgarian president. Before leveling such accusations against the Bulgarian Government, he is obliged to familiarize himself with the government's stance.

[Petroni] The president accuses you of wavering in your policies, claiming that your deeds do not match your words.

[Kamov] This is not the first time that Zhelev has accused us. I hope that this extremely unfavorable situation for Bulgaria will continue only for a few more months, until the presidential elections.

[Petroni] What reaction do you expect from the government to the "new USSR" idea?

[Kamov] I expect a very clear reaction, one that rejects any possibility of the kind the Russian president hinted at in his statement.

Bulgaria: Zhirinovskiy Backs Bulgaria Joining USSR-2

AU0504110696 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 2 Apr 96 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Zhirinovskiy: I Am Delighted by Yeltsin's Idea of Us Joining Up With the Bulgarians, as They Are Our Brothers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhirinovskiy is delighted by the idea of Bulgaria joining the new USSR; the Bulgarians are our religious and blood brothers, so we welcome them, Viktor Silatov, spokesman of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] in Russia and head of the LDP's ideological department, said in a special statement to STANDART NEWS.

We are ready to live together with the Bulgarians once they show the desire to join us, Vladimir Volfovich [Zhirinovskiy] is reported to have declared. However, the nationalist does not approve of the idea of the Baltic states acceding to the treaty on integration signed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Let the Americans feed the Baltics, these states are parasites and not needed by us, in contrast to the Bulgarians, Zhirinovskiy reportedly asserted. According to him, Russia has no need of the Caucasian republics either, including Orthodox Armenia. Let them live with Turkey, Zhirinovskiy is reported to have told his party comrades.

According to the notorious leader, Ukraine is the next former Soviet republic that will sign the union treaty. However, according to him, Rome has muddied the waters with the Catholic Ukrainians who live in three oblasts in western Ukraine. The country's overwhelming Orthodox population will soon win the upper hand and Ukraine will sign the treaty, Zhirinovskiy reportedly told his fellow party members.

Bulgaria: Implications of Defense Ministers Summit Viewed

AU0504090096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Apr 96 p 16

[Article by Plamen Kulinski: "Division Is Not the Best Policy in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the Balkan capitals vying with each other to come up with some new brilliant initiative for joint cooperation, Albania joined the list with its idea of hosting a meeting of Balkan defense ministers. It has not become clear whether Tirana was bold enough to send invitations to all the countries in the region, but on 1 April, no uniformed representatives from Bucharest or Belgrade were present at the meeting in Tirana's Palace of Congresses.

The absence of the Yugoslav defense minister was understandable because Kosovo is a thorn in Albania's flesh. However, his absence, as well as that of the Romanian minister, provided grounds to talk about a new division in the Balkans. Safet Zhulali, who hosted the meeting, thanked the participants in the forum for showing understanding that the term "southern Balkans," which was put into circulation, should not be interpreted in this manner. However, not all those attending the meeting appreciated this, because the forum developed from a regional one into a super-regional meeting. At one moment, even more embarrassment might have been caused if the reservations expressed by Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov had been accompanied by a polite rejection of the invitation to attend.

Pavlov, as Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski had also done previously, voiced his reservations as soon as the announcement was made of the initiative, which, as everyone knows, was inspired by Washington. Sofia's refusal to countenance a dividing up of the Balkans that excludes certain countries even prompted talk that the Bulgarian defense minister, like his Greek colleague, would not show up in Tirana. The motives for Yerasimos Arsenis' refusal to attend, although the official reasons given were similar to Pavlov's sentiments, were actually quite different—namely, the presence of his Turkish counterpart and, to some extent, the attendance of the defense minister of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

Nevertheless, at the last minute Pavlov, of course, flew off to Tirana with the Bulgarian Government's blessing and, what is more, made no mistake in doing so. Against the background of the general appeals for confidence-building in the region, the Bulgarian initiative for a defense ministers meeting in Sofia stood out because it proposed that all the Balkan countries should take part, as well as representatives from the European Union, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], the United States, and Russia.

The U.S. desire was to gather the Balkan defense ministers round the table so that they could reach an understanding about an insignificant little island in the Aegean. Had this happened, Washington would not have omitted to boast that the Tirana meeting was actually its idea, which is in fact the truth. However, this did not occur, and Tirana was left to carry the can for the meeting's lack of success.

Despite this, Perry apparently has not abandoned his desire to bring about a reconciliation between Athens and Ankara. He is tirelessly touring the world, pointing out the benefits of military cooperation to the United States' old and new friends and, if things go smoothly, [passage indistinct] that Romania and Yugoslavia strongly support the idea. While Greece is inclined to send Yerasimos Arsenis to a genuinely all-Balkan forum on cooperation in the military sphere, the Pentagon chief supported Pavlov's idea that this meeting should be held following the meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers that is scheduled to take place in June in Sofia. The initiative could not fail to be welcomed. What is more, Perry himself suggested that Sofia invite his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev. A further idea was to recommend that Ankara and Athens, as well as Belgrade and Tirana, establish telephone hot lines for use in case of need.

Bulgaria's idea of an all-Balkan forum to some extent answers the recriminations addressed to Sofia that it is constantly trying to establish axes of all kinds and is making its own contribution to splitting the Balkans. An example is the so-called Muslim axis that came to light after President Zhelev committed his country to the east-west transport corridor running through Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. Another example is the "Orthodox" north-south transport corridor proposed by Prime Minister Videnov, which is aimed at cutting the "Muslim" one.

Former math teacher Safet Zhulali, who is now the defense minister of the country of the bunkers, told his counterparts from the southern Balkans of an interesting incident he experienced when teaching in a grammar school. Many years ago, he asked one of his students what his dream was. The student answered that he only had one dream: to see an Albanian, American, Italian, and a Turk sitting together at the same table. On 1 April, the dream of this evidently fictitious hero came true. If Zhulali's Bulgarian colleague had been a teacher instead of a retired admiral, he might have recounted a similar story, in which the young man would have turned out to be even more of a dreamer, as he wanted to see a Greek, Turk, Serb, Croat, Bosnian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Russian, and American all sitting together round the same table. Perhaps this dream will be realized in Sofia.

Bulgaria: Paper on Need for Consensus With Russia Viewed

AU0404085496 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 4 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Milena Simeonova: "We Want Military Industrial-Cooperation With NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our country is interested in joint military-industrial production and in obtaining know-how on the standards that exist in NATO, the document on the talks on the framework of the intensified dialogue with NATO reads. The document was submitted to the National Assembly following cabinet approval on 28 March. We demonstrate special interest in cooperation in the sphere of the military infrastructure in the context of the Partnership for Peace, and would like to clarify the issue of NATO's eventual help in improving our military infrastructure, the document points out.

In the document, we raise questions related to the financial obligations ensuing from our eventual membership, the possibility for potential member states to participate in developing NATO's strategic concept, and the problems that could arise in connection with the nonproliferation treaty as a result of a decision to deploy nuclear forces on the territory of the new members.

According to the cabinet's position, the possibility for new members to impose unilateral restrictive measures on the nuclear weapons must be discussed. We also want additional information about the nature and form of the member states' participation in the Nuclear Planning Group. We emphasize the structure, deployment, and utilization of conventional forces on the territory of the future members. The document points out that the peacetime deployment of major forces in Central and Eastern Europe would hardly correspond to existing strategic conditions and needs from the point of view of costs.

Finally, the document stresses that Bulgaria has a justified interest in the dialogue between NATO and Russia, and expects this dialogue to eliminate the concerns Moscow has expressed in connection with NATO's expansion.

Bulgaria: Zhelev's Desire To Join NATO Criticized

AU0404141796 Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 1-7 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Vanya Shekerova: "Zhelev Has Demonstrated Greater NATO Zeal Than Solana"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO headquarters became the confessional where Zhelyu Zhelev confessed his love for and devotion to the alliance. The Bulgarian head of state demonstrated such an eagerness to join NATO that even General Secretary Javier Solana was embarrassed.

The high-ranking Bulgarian guest said that for Bulgaria it is unthinkable to join the EU without becoming a NATO member, or at least declaring our desire to become a NATO member. The Atlantic alliance officials were dumbstruck. And so were the Europeans. Solana nobly corrected Zhelyu.

From Brussels, Zhelyu engaged in a verbal duel with Russian Duma Chairman Seleznev, who was visiting

Sofia at the time. In Brussels, our head of state condemned the decision of the Russian Duma to restore the USSR and hinted that coming together with Russia would dissolve the processes of democratization that have begun. Thus he put an end to the process of warming bilateral relations with Russia. Already upon arrival in Bulgaria, Genadiy Seleznev described our president's statement as hasty and expressed the suspicion that he had not read the document at all. Afterward, he clearly and distinctly declared that Russia was opposed to NATO's expansion.

Our man obviously became mad with rage. He named, one after another, all the opponents to Bulgaria's membership of NATO to Solana. He said that a debate was being conducted in Bulgaria on the issue of NATO membership, but the socialist government was trying to protract the issue and was beating around the bush. However, Zhelev intimated to Solana that even in the Democratic Left there were people who differed from their government on NATO membership. Their number is growing, Zhelev said, and generally, "time is working for us." He paid no attention to the assurance of the NATO chief that the decisions of the Russian Duma had no influence over Brussels' positions.

Zhelev did not stop his effusions even after he was directly told that Bulgaria did not have the money to bring itself to such a shape as to enable its admission into NATO. Totally seriously, Zhelev assumed that if a propaganda campaign on our membership in NATO, similar to the mass privatization campaign, were conducted in Bulgaria, 80 percent of Bulgarians would become committed NATO supporters. However, the propaganda campaign on mass privatization is being financed by international financial institutes. Our leader admitted that no one would pay for a propaganda campaign to promote our membership in NATO.

At his news conference in Brussels, President Zhelev was asked why he depicted our country in such dark colors. Our head of state said that it was better to tell the truth because everyone was aware of it.

It appeared that the European Parliament wanted to know why two journalists had been arrested in Sofia. Zhelyu told them that in Bulgaria a special parliamentary commission was imposing censorship on our radio and television.

He could not stop himself and also told Europe that our government could not cope with crime.

It is true that there are cretins in our country who beat up diplomats. However, this sounds different when written in a newspaper, as opposed to being mentioned by the president during an official visit abroad.

A Russian diplomat was also beaten up in New York. However, President Clinton does not tell everyone that the FBI is incapable of coping with drug dealers and the serial killers.

Bulgaria: Exclusion From Neo-COCOM Meeting Criticized

AU0504105196 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Apr 96 p 16

[Commentary by Petur Bochukov: "Why They Do Not Want Us in the Neo-COCOM"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To be able to manufacture arms is almost as important as to be able to use them because in the final analysis weapons are used by the one who wants to impose his will or defend his interests. The situation is somewhat more different with arms production because th[illegible]volves no bloodshed. Nevertheless, here also the [illegible] who produces or sells arms can exert influence and impose his will without using the articles he has produced. In addition, he can also earn good profits.

Guided by this maxim, the governments of the great powers never transfer their arms production to companies in other countries. The defense industry is always subject to national policy. The money allocated for defense, that is, for arms production, creates jobs, whose preservation is of crucial importance for the voters. It is hardly necessary to give examples of how the voters behave in Denver, Chicago, Essen, Coventry, Krasnoyarsk, or Sopot and Kazanluk. Accordingly, arms production is not only an economic issue, but also relates to politics. This is even more true of the arms trade.

In recent years, following the end of the Cold War, the world arms market has suffered great setbacks. Arms orders have declined. In the United States, France, and Great Britain alone, 1.5 million jobs have been lost in the last five years. At the same time, the weapons that governments want to purchase are ever more advanced and accordingly more expensive, which ensures even bigger profits for the producers and traders. This is the reason for the severe competition in the international arms markets, which in recent years have shrunk dramatically for small producers like Bulgaria.

These are some of the facts that have determined the long-standing importance of COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls], the institution that NATO set up in 1949 to prevent the transfer of important military technology to the Soviet Union, China, and their allies. COCOM was dissolved in March 1994. However, the need for certain rules, a measure of control, and more transparency in the arms trade and transfer of high technologies has remained. For this reason, last December in the Dutch town of Wassenaar, 15 NATO countries (all of them except Iceland), plus Russia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, signed an agreement to form a new control body for the export of arms and modern technology that may be used in the arms industry. Later, 11 more countries, including Romania, joined them in two stages. Bulgaria failed to find a place in this new club, even though our country complies with the main criteria for membership.

In Vienna on 2 April, a meeting opened with delegates from the 31 countries that had signed the Wassenaar agreement and wanted to establish a new system for controlling arms exports. Bulgaria, which has the support of 30 of these countries, is not included among the founders of Neo-COCOM. The United States was the only country to oppose Bulgarian participation, probably because of the suspicion that we are selling military and special products to "problem states," or perhaps because our military production represents competition. There may also be other reasons, such as the interests of certain arms producers beyond the ocean. In any case, this provides a lot of work for our diplomats, who should remind their opposite numbers that the old COCOM was no hindrance to our good arms production.

Bulgaria: Government Urged To Resolve Nuclear Issue

AU0304144496 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 3 Apr 96 p 7

[Article by Veselka Marinova: "Nuclear Energy is Bad Egg"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From time to time the West applies pressure to Bulgaria to close the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, if even gradually. They even offer us free coal and electricity. The trouble is that they do not say how long the "free lunch" will last and what we shall do afterward. At the same time, experts from West and East take turns in organizing seminars and trying to convince us that their offer is the best. They do not say a word about closing the nuclear reactors. On the contrary, they are fighting tooth and nail to acquire the right to rebuild and modernize our operational nuclear capacities and to construct new ones. Naturally, they do not say a word about the fact that for them is not just a matter of proving professional skills, but also of making money and acquiring markets and influence. While the Russians try to convince our experts from the position and with arguments of individual, although famous institutes, which, mainly because of their financial problems are trying to get a piece of the action, the West has again joined forces. The Siemens and Framatom European nuclear giants are proposing a European solution, hinting that this is the road toward Europe. The U.S. firm Westinghouse is also promising money, as a loan of course, but hides the fact that it is trying to penetrate Bulgaria because it no longer has a chance of building in the United States.

While we reject the Russian reactors, the Western experts are saying that they could do something for Bulgaria, but together with the Russians. In addition, they do not conceal the fact that this is not only a result of taking Russian interests into consideration, but because the Russian designs are of a high quality.

There is no money, one has to be patient—generally, this is how one could paraphrase the outcome of another environmental seminar recently organized by the Americans. They were supposed to teach us how to introduce environmentally clean technologies for burning coal.

At the same time, the nongovernmental environmental organizations are protesting loudly against the present and future development of our power supply. However, they do not propose a specific solution and answer to the question of how our population and economy would exist if our electricity is switched off. Neither do they tell us where to find the money for environmentally clean projects.

The Bulgarian experts are listening, but they do not understand anything. They cannot grasp the most important thing—do we want the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant to function or not, and should we construct the Belene Nuclear Power Plant or not. It is a fact that this year's budget once again does not contain any funds for the nuclear safety of Kozloduy. For the time being the responsible institutions prefer to listen to advice from all possible directions, but it appears that they do not have the guts to adopt a categorical decision. This is probably a matter of money or concern about the social dissatisfaction that any decision will produce. Nevertheless, when they feel the ground burning under their feet, they will have to adopt a decision.

The truth is rather simple, and should not be the subject of international or internal debate. It would be good to spell it out before parliament begins its debate on the country's energy strategy. It is the government and parliament that must decide whether we will construct nuclear reactors or not. This is because, after all, somebody must assume responsibility for adapting our current and future nuclear reactors to the requirements of international safety standards, and because someone must guarantee that in five or 10 years we will not be living in darkness and looking for money to build a candle-making factory.

The Russians, Germans, Frenchmen, and Americans who came to our country to present the offers of their companies and institutes for the reconstruction and modernization of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, are nice, even very nice people. In economic affairs, however, things are not decided on the basis of sympathy, but on the basis of technologies, equipment, and the money the companies in question ask for, or better offer. Therefore, the decision regarding the future of our nuclear power supply can have only one basis: It must not be based on human sympathy and antipathy, or the ad hoc political situation in our country or abroad. Even less should it be based on the personal interests of a particular man, group, or organization. This is because the fate of the Bulgarian power supply and economy is at stake. And so is the fate of our children.

Bulgaria: Kozloduy Nuclear Reactors Reduce Output

AU0404132496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A turbine in the No. 4 Reactor Unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has been shut down on the orders of the central control room staff. This action reduces the output of the 440-megawatt reactor by 50 percent. Due to lower electricity demand, the output of the 1,000-megawatt No. 5 reactor has also been reduced to 80 percent, thus providing savings in nuclear fuel consumption.

Our correspondent Veronika Pantaleeva reports that the Nos. 1, 2, and 6 Reactor Units are operating at maximum capacity. Planned maintenance work continues on the No. 3 Unit.

Bulgaria: Civil Defense Clears Up 'Red Mercury' Spillage

AU0504070596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At 1600 [1400 GMT] today, the Civil Defense Department in Sofia received a tip-off regarding a spillage of red mercury ["zhivak"] in the Lyulin housing subdivision. Residents of Apartment Block 611 noticed the spillage and telephoned the Civil Defense Department. The red mercury had been spilled throughout the block, the Civil Defense Press Service announced, according to BTA.

A team of operatives from the Civil Defense's No. 1 Rescue Detachment collected about 200 grams of red mercury, and the contaminated area was treated with sulfur. The cause of the incident is not known.

Czech Republic: Weekly Analyzes Pros, Cons of NATO

AU0204144496 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 25-31 Mar 96 No 13 pp 9-11

[Article by Jaroslav Spurny: "Hope To See You Soon in Brussels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The defense forces of post-communist Europe do not have at their disposal the capacities necessary to be able to react to registered security risks, says U.S. military theorist D.N. Nelson. His British colleague James Sherr goes even further. According to him, in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc—in view of their structure and type of training—it is not possible to talk about real armies at all. He is right: For example, the army of the former socialist Czechoslovakia was nothing but cannon fodder (that is, human meat whose task was to fall in the first clash of an eventual conflict) in the Kremlin's strategy and it was established accordingly. It is not easy to change this situation. And, even if it is possible, there is still the warning from the experts, who claim that no small state today is capable of bearing the costs of effective defense on its own. This is the main technical reason why we, along with the other countries of eastern Europe, need NATO. Of course, whether NATO needs us is another question. The alliance's representatives have long been answering it evasively; only the meeting in Prague between U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the representatives of the 12 applicants for NATO admission has provided a specific signal. Namely, experts familiar with what goes on behind the diplomatic scenes are taking it as a sign that the alliance will "as a start" protect the central European region in Poland and the Czech Republic.

A Decision Will Be Made in December

Everything seemed simpler after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. The communist system had disintegrated, and all of the Soviet Union's former satellites had set out on a path toward democracy. Philosophers spoke about the "end of history" and politicians about a "new world order." A number of people were convinced that an enlarged NATO would form the nucleus of this order in Europe. It just seemed a matter of a short period of time until the North Atlantic alliance would accept the East European countries and thus create a kind of global defensive umbrella for the peaceful continent.

The euphoria, however, soon wore off. It became apparent as early as 1991 that it would not be so simple to have a new era free of friction and conflicts. Serbia unleashed a war in the Balkans, the Soviet Union collapsed under the intermittent barrage of machine guns, and nationalists in central Europe awoke from their slumbers. They soon chalked up the partition of Czechoslovakia and problems for the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania. The alliance started to be very cautious. All of its representatives agreed that there was no need to hurry with enlargement and that the whole operation—if it takes place at all—really has to be well thought out. The encouraging statements in the speeches of Western politicians were replaced by diplomatic coolness. The Partnership for Peace, proposed by U.S. President Bill Clinton at the beginning of 1994, became a specific expression of this. Instead of open arms or at least clear conditions for the serious candidates, NATO merely tapped politely and noncommitedly on the shoulders of all of its "former adversaries."

Of course, the applicants also went through somersaults and shifts in their views. For example, Czech political representatives formulated a range of proposals from disbanding NATO through self-confident declarations about our impending and "almost certain" membership in it all the way up to serious considerations on what in fact can be done on behalf of our admission into the alliance. Only now, in the past few months, have our efforts taken on the appropriate potency. It is high time—the NATO states should determine who could get into the alliance and when in Brussels at the end of the year. Czech politicians have decided to influence the verdict in our favor by making a mass diplomatic offensive.

Defense Ministry officials met with the NATO countries' ambassadors at the end of January beginning of February. What is expected from us was discussed. Amending military legislation, guaranteeing the protection of classified information, changing the army's structure, and many other things. At the same time, a group concentrated around Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas, which is drafting the documents for NATO, started its work. The Czech Republic, like all the other applicants, has to draft its own vision, why it wants to join NATO, what it expects, what it is offering, how it is preparing itself. Our politicians and military experts have to work hard; they should have the material together within about two months. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana will make an official visit to our country then and our plans have to be submitted to him. The alliance's representatives will convene in Berlin in June for a preliminary meeting and everything will most likely be resolved in Brussels in December. The applicants will probably find out in January which one is to be the lucky new addition and when.

Trump Cards

The most recent and, for the public until now, classified study by the RAND Corporation, drawn up for the Pentagon, actually takes into consideration the prospect that the alliance will be enlarged by the Czech Republic and Poland. The way is not closed for the other countries—including Hungary—but their current stock is not high. What has our republic done to deserve such confidence?

According to Chris Donnelly, a special adviser to NATO on central and eastern Europe, peaceful coexistence among its individual members is one of the alliance's priorities. From this point of view, Hungary has found itself on the margin of interest, first and foremost, because of its problems with its neighbors. On the other hand, in the imaginary ranking of applicants, the Czech Republic has the most positive points. According to the experts, western Europe is continually aware of Russia's instability and the expansion of the so-called strategic foreground toward the East also puts important, but fitting distance between it and Moscow. Our country is appreciated by Western states for its political withdrawal from the Eastern power. Western countries' lingering respect for the strong army of the First Republic and today, maybe, the myth of our scientific-military potential, the absence of Oleksy-type affairs (of course, the mistrust aroused by the suspicion that former Polish Prime Minister Oleksy was involved in spying had an impact on the whole of eastern Europe), and especially the engagement of Czech troops in foreign missions play into our hands.

Our unit's engagement in the Kuwaiti war—half forgotten by the Czech public—meant more to Western states than we realize, at least, it appears so from a number of NATO studies. At that time, by our deeds and not words, we made it clear to the world for the first time where we want to be. The deployment of Czech observers under the UN banner—for example, in Angola, Mozambique, or Azerbaijan—should not be dismissed. Despite a few affairs and punch-ups, the deployment of the Czech unit in Croatia has been well received—by the Canadians, for example—and praise has also come from the British, who now command us in the IFOR [Implementation Force] units. Western commanders appreciate our troops' ability to improvise and the fact that they can take care of themselves—this is apparent from meetings of the command staffs in Bosnia and Croatia. Indeed, this is not diplomatic praise, but a generally accepted fact. For example, the Hungarians sent a sappers unit to Bosnia equipped only with automatic weapons on the condition that the U.S. units would provide it with heavy hardware. The U.S. commanders refused, and the Hungarian mission turned into an international humiliation that resulted in a domestic political split.

At Six After the War in the Chalice Tavern

The aforementioned study, of course, does not mean that our entry into NATO is a fait accompli. Arguments against membership being offered to us still predominate on the scales. The study is only a study; a number of other factors will count in Brussels. One of the most important is the development of the international situation. Here, the analyses repeatedly mention China: Both the current "exercises war" against Taiwan and the continuing nuclear tests testify to the aggressive nature of the world's most populated state. A number of NATO experts consider Russia's role as a counter-pole of China to be a stabilizing factor. If Beijing steps up its aggression, Russia will become virtually the most important factor for protecting peace in the region. It is possible that the West would then step back from NATO enlargement toward the East and thus fulfill one of Russia's wishes.

As far as specific Czech shortcomings are concerned, the certain mistrust between our army and society bothers the foreign experts—at least, they said so at a seminar in Prague on the role of the armed forces. Internal reports also mention the "traditional astuteness" of the Czech citizen, who mostly relies on someone else to deal with the country's defense for him. If we leave aside technical backwardness, the quality of the people in command posts is another major problem for the Czech Army. Compared with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, we have replaced the most officers in senior posts. Despite this, the composition of our command corps is—from the point of view of NATO—unsuitable. Half of the main figures in the General Staff went to Soviet colleges and there are people in senior positions who held important functions under the communists. For example, the head of the Military Police, Major General Jiri Sramek, was the commander of the Mechanized Infantry Division prior to November [1989]—the way to his former function was provided, in particular, by his graduation from a military academy in the Soviet Union. The situation surrounding the former political instructors is gloomy. Immediately after November 1989, the General Staff was able to transfer at least 1,000 of them to other functions and to alter their documents to such an extent that, to this day, it is not known how many of them there actually were and where they are within the army now. At the moment, a not insignificant number of posts in our army, 273, are held by former military counterintelligence—the StB's [State Security] third administration—officers, for example, in Military Defense Intelligence. An eventual alliance with NATO would, of course, mean that Czech commanders will come into contact with important classified information. And, from this point of view, according to Western norms, all soldiers who graduated from academies in the Soviet Union or held important posts under totalitarianism present a "risk."

Military legislation is also very important for the alliance; the current government has consistently omitted to modify it. It is enough to cite one example: A citizen of the Czech Republic is not obliged to defend his country. The Defense Law does require him to do so, but the legally superior Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms guarantees protection for his life and health. Work on the constitutional law that would resolve the problem has been postponed for three years.

Generals From Eastern European Countries, Transform Yourselves!

Depression about the technical, personnel, or legislative shortcomings may, however, be cured by intensive work and changes can be made in the foreseeable future. As a matter of fact, even in this sphere, something good could come of it. The NATO experts are aware of our difficulties and are trying to offer us advice. Of the hundreds of accommodating proceedings, let us name the Czech-U.S. commission for selecting aircraft, the series of consultative meetings on computerized communications, or the number of short-term attachments offered for the education of our soldiers. The alliance acts in a similar fashion only with Poland.

However, it is more complicated to change the way of thinking of our soldiers, the majority of whom are still enslaved in communist strategic schemes. This way of thinking was, incidentally, also endorsed in the proposal—already rejected twice by the government—for our defense strategy: Its authors stubbornly perceive defense as the sovereign affair of the army and not the whole of society. At the same time, they overlook with indifference the security risks regarded in the West for some time as a new threat. We have no plan for so-called economic defense or for the corresponding and advanced protection of the civilian population. And, those things all the world's important secret services are occupied with are utterly dismissed in our national defense strategy: Organized crime and terror. Western experts require a perfect analysis and complete exchange of the most topical information in this sphere. At the same time, from a military point of view, which Mafioso has again swindled which bank is not interesting; rather, the endeavor by criminals to penetrate state structures and political posts is monitored. If this were to happen in the countries applying for admission into the alliance, military protection would be of no help to them—the state would be destabilized from within and the steps of the politicians would be incalculable.

Klaus' cabinet has finally acknowledged the problems and, two weeks ago, someone other than the military dealt with defense strategy for the fist time. The deputy ministers of defense, foreign affairs, the interior, finance, and industry met and commenced work on the anticipated "diplomatic offensive." The shift toward a certain forcefulness is obvious—the director of the Foreign Ministry's Security Department, Hynek Fajmon, for example, announced the end of diplomatic caution at the aforementioned seminar two months ago: "We have to draw up an analysis of the worst possible security situation that could arise, even at the cost of our neighbors taking offense during the discussion."

Adieu, Slovakia

Even though Fajmon did not say it out loud, it is obvious that he meant Slovakia. It is obvious from the current Bratislava government's steps that the country is not heading toward NATO and we have to consider the possibility that we will again become a buffer state on the border of two worlds. This is suggested by the pacts that Slovakia has signed with Russia: The agreement on intelligence cooperation or on the use of the Russian ciphering system. The Slovaks are conserving the communist army and whipping up the issue of the Hungarian minority, and Meciar's emphasis on the importance of Rassia as a friend is also hard to miss. Simply, we have to allow for the fact that our paths will diverge definitively and that, thanks to Slovakia's international political orientation, Russia may become a genuine threat to us: The bear will breath down our necks over the territory of our neighbor.

Thus, the main reason for the aplomb of Czech politicians: The fact that we do not have a common border with the countries of the former USSR, countries that are now within Russia's sphere of power and interest. Despite this, some important intelligence officers or politicians, including new Ambassador to Russia Lubos Dobrovsky, hold a moderate stance: It is necessary to view Russia as an active factor in European security and it is possible to reach agreement with the Russian democrats. James Sherr, quoted above, is of another opinion, however, and, as opposed to a number of Western politicians or military experts who feel the same way, he is willing to express his thoughts out loud: "In the effort to reach an agreement with Russia, it will make no difference at all if the negotiations take place with the nationalists or with those who share our values," claims Sherr. No matter who is in charge in Russia, domestic interests will—according to Sherr—always be far from European interests. That is, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians have reascertained that their empire—albeit crippled—is still alive. The Russian state cannot be held together without the assistance of imperialist means (viz. Chechnya) and these are being projected more and more into foreign policy. Russia's negative stance toward NATO enlargement was unthinkable just three years ago—for instance, Yeltsin's letter to the Polish Government that he agreed with the possible entry of our northern neighbor into the alliance bears testimony to this. According to Sherr, Europe will have two possibilities: Either problemtatic politicians like Yeltsin will sit opposite it at the negotiating table or people outright dangerous will sit there. The difference between the two categories is, however, gradually fading. Yeltsin has understood that his trump card with regard to the West is the threat. If you do not help me and I fall, worse will come after me. He is assured of Western assistance by means of this blackmail, but his rhetoric intended for domestic listeners often cannot be distinguished from that of the "worse" ones. And, the representatives of these truly dangerous streams of Russian politics? Two weeks ago, they drew conspicuous attention to themselves by their attempt to restore the Soviet Union.

There Will Not Be Another Meeting

Klaus' cabinet has said clearly several times that there is no alternative for the Czech Republic but full membership in NATO. The compromise suggested by Russia recently—the entry of the Eastern European countries only into the alliance's political structures—is unacceptable to us. We do not need more lofty words, but complete and responsible involvement. The willingness to fight within NATO forces and to provide its units with space on our territory to conduct their maneuvers forms part of this.

The meeting involving representatives of the 12 applicants for admission into NATO and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, which took place in Prague last week, was the latest operation in the campaign for the alliance's favor. The U.S. secretary of state had a difficult task: Not to offend any applicant, to give all of them hope, but, at the same time, to tell them diplomatically that they do not all have the same chance. Therefore, he spoke about NATO's gradual enlargement adding that the countries ready—according to various criteria—for entry must not become the victims of those who lag behind and he made it clear, to the Hungarians for example, that they have to resolve problems with their neighbors.

The first meeting involving the applicants was held in Warsaw 18 months ago; they should have met (without the preliminary setting of a specific date) in Bratislava after Prague. Not a word was said about the future meeting; according to diplomatic sources, Western countries are not very interested in going to Slovakia and, moreover, they consider another such meeting to be superfluous. NATO's Brussels headquarters is now placing emphasis on bilateral talks between the applicants and members and, first and foremost, on the quality of the so-called discussion documents in which the individual countries will document their interest in admission and their readiness for it.

There are nine months until the December meeting in Brussels and the envisaged scenario may still be altered by the presidential elections in Russia and later in the United States. A victory for a Russian radical may drastically speed up the entire process of NATO enlargement, a change in the presidential apparatus in the United States may somewhat slow it down. Indeed, according to the most recent statements by Javier Solana and U.S. politicians, the project is being reckoned with. Save that its name has been changed from the provocative "expansion" to "enlargement."

Czech Republic: Survey Shows 42% in Favor of EU Entry

AU0304125196 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 2 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "(drb)": "Supporters of the EU Have a Clear Lead Over the Opponents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Virtually one in six citizens of the Czech Republic is definitely in favor of our republic's entry into the EU. More than one in four rather support it (altogether 42 percent). Opponents of our entry account for only one-fifth (21 percent) of citizens.

This is clear from a survey conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IVVM), which polled 1,000 citizens over the age of 15 in March. Those who do not know or do not care account for just under 20 percent in both cases.

Forty-three percent of the respondents do not know about the advantages of this step and 11 percent think that entry into the EU will not bring us any advantages. Of the answers that—as opposed to the preceding ones—had some substance, economic advantages (20 percent) take the lead. They are followed by a range of advantages associated with integration into European structures and progress in prosperity. The respondents rated loss of identity (16 percent), economic problems and our economy's poorer ability to compete, and also the necessity of subordinating ourselves to EU norms among the disadvantages.

The communists (71 percent) have the greatest concern about integration; they are followed by the Sladekites and the Left Bloc (43 percent each) and the social democrats with 28 percent. The voters of the Civic Democratic Party (75 percent), the Civic Democratic Alliance (54 percent), and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (52 percent) are supporters of integration. Willingness to integrate increases with the level of education; age does not have much influence. Workers, as opposed to businessmen or other employees, do not give integration much support.

Slovakia: Meciar Interviewed on Hungary Treaty, Kovac

AU0404161496 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 30 Mar 96 pp 1, 5

["Exclusive" interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Viera Urbanova and Jergus Ferko at the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA editorial office in Bratislava on 28 March: "We Will Prevent Crossing of the Rubicon of the Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] From the Slovak vantage point, the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty has obvious shortcomings—it lacks, for instance, the moral aspect of reconciliation, i.e., a Hungarian apology for the Magyarization and occupation of southern Slovakia, and the question of the Slovak national cultural treasures that Budapest "borrowed" 100 years ago for the millenial celebrations and has to date not returned. Did the Slovak side bring up these issues in the talks? Are you planning to put these issues on the Slovak-Hungarian negotiation table in the foreseeable future?

[Meciar] It is possible to look at the treaty from different points of view. Undoubtedly it is an act that has its historical significance, it is a milestone, and therefore it evokes anxiety on both sides, in the Republic of Hungary and here. It also found, however, some positive response. There were several controversial points encountered in the discussion of the treaty: the border issue, the issue of the integrity of the territory, the issue of legal succession, the Gabcikovo issue, and the issue of comprehending the stand of the minorities and their loyalty to the state. In addition, several controversial points were determined in mutual relations in the economic sphere and forms of cooperation in the transition to a different model. Now, then, after the ratification of the treaty, we say that of the 10 then defined points of contention, there are nine left, and half of them have been settled. The historical claims, like Trianon or Benes's decrees, are gone. No doubt some politicians, Slovaks of Hungarian ethnic origin, will continue their attempts to cross the Rubicon of this treaty. It is important, however, that most politicians, Slovaks, not allow this crossing of the Rubicon, because it would mean a substantial deterioration in the international situation. International relations work against such a crossing of the Rubicon, and therefore this relationship and pressure must emerge in the nearest future.

Regarding what you said—yes, there was much talk about the issue of compensation, the return of national treasures, etc., but is not dealt with in a separate document of the treaty because the Slovak party submitted a list of these treasures once. The talks have not been turned down, but I believe no one seriously considered this issue. Therefore the talks concerning the return of our cultural heritage, which is our property, are still before us. We will have to face two "isms" in our relations. One is nationalism on the part of the Hungarian minority and some of Hungary's politicians, who transfer domestic issues to foreign policy in the form of nationalism in relations with all its neighbors. The other "ism" is the attempt to transfer the nationalist policy and whip it up so that it begins to touch the border of fascism, intolerance, disrespect, ethnic exclusiveness, and superiority. All this has been here, these were historical mistakes, and therefore the rejection of these extremes will be important for the future coexistence of the Hungarians and Slovaks.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] In February, you rather resolutely announced that four leading Slovak financial institutions will be privatized very quickly. It is the end of March and they are not in private hands. What is the problem?

[Meciar] The Slovenska Sporitelna (Slovak Saving Bank), the Slovenska Poistovna (Slovak Insurance Company), the VUB (General Credit Bank), and the Investicna a Rozvojova Banka (Investment and Development Bank) were to be privatized by the end of February. The privatization project was approved and adopted. A precondition for this approval, however, was the transfer of shares owned by the Czech National Property Fund (FNM CR) in the VUB to the Slovak National Property Fund (FNM), in exchange for shares that the FNM owns in banks in the Czech Republic. Everything was halted by the FNM CR, because the project depends on the settlement between all parties. To prevent any further delays because of the approach of the FNM CR, we intend to select individual objects, change the entire project, and not link it to all four entities at the same time, because it should have been basically four banks in four days. This time we intend to approach them separately, and a gradual, individual decisionmaking is to take place. This of course requires that the entire project be reworked. The preliminary agreements with the Czech Republic assume that the exchange of shares would require two days. As soon as we announced the bank privatization, the Czech side backed off from the agreement.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] According to the opposition press, the affair with Michal Kovac, Jr., is the reason why you do not receive invitations from important West European politicians. Is that true?

[Meciar] Let us make a little review. In 1995, I met with French presidents three times, twice with the

French prime minister, and I was received by the prime ministers of Spain and Portugal, and by the Italian president. Moreover, I have received the seal of honor in Bologne, the Order of the Knights of Malta—the highest honor any Slovak has ever received, it is a Christian organization—and I met with the Holy Father twice, and with the supreme representatives of the Vatican.... I could go on like this from state to state, everywhere I have been.... Their not visiting has nothing to do with our government but because of the head of state—presidents are invited by presidents. If the president of another state does not come, it certainly is not because of us. Moreover, it certainly is difficult to come to a country, where when a visitor comes to the president he will hear the president's laments, and coming to the government or the parliament, he hears something completely different.

So this is the reason, this situation brought about by the opposition around the president, the introduction of double morals—one way here, and another way there. After all, if any member of the government used 1.4 million korunas of the state funds on his private residence, he would no longer be in the cabinet. This double ethics does not help us, and harms the situation. Of course, if a state official is to come for a visit, and must choose—if he meets with one, he cannot meet with the other one—he will not come. The government is not responsible for this; however, the head of state is to blame. Where has he been invited, who has visited him, and who keeps in contact with him? The opposition is also to blame because they constantly lie to the people in western Europe, they lie to international political parties about the situation in Slovakia. They come then, investigate, and return home—everything is otherwise.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Is it necessary to come to terms with the fact that Michal Kovac will leave high politics only after his term of office ends?

[Meciar] I believe that the question is not whether or not the president will stay, but rather whether or not a certain type of ethics will stay, whether or not we will have a certain fairness in the approach to information. After all, the president accused the government of corruption in 1994, and could not prove the claim, and he accuses the government of criminal offenses in 1955, and cannot prove it, so one should ask where the minimum of respect for the human and civic rights of other people is. If the president holds an opinion, why should not a government member hold one? We are moving from the sphere of ethics to the sphere of respecting the human and civic rights of every man, including members of the government. Why should we be deprived of our honor for winning the elections? So the struggle continues. It is a struggle for the stability of the situation in the Slovak Republic, because the approach that makes the president into a leader of the opposition, who openly challenges the government coalition, is an approach that polarizes society. That is not a nonpartisan or impartial position that belongs to the head of state. Thus he enters politics from the position of the defense of morals and human rights, and joins one side in the struggle against the other, while utilizing the post of president. Thus everything moves in the sphere of law. If false information is published abroad about the work of the state and its structures, the work of democracy and the constitutional system in general is actually questioned, and it brings them to a position that makes us into a state of people who, as is were, just came down from out of the trees.

Regarding the reactions, I could understand such a critical stand on the part of the president if he based it on facts. If he fabricates it and artificially makes it up, it is just the more dangerous, and not not only for politics but for democracy in general. If it is published abroad, for instance, that the prime minister controls the prosecutor general, and the prosecutor general asks for an explanation only to learn that it is based on the fact that I called him back from his holiday trip abroad, and it is established that the prosecutor general did not go on any such holiday, then what is it? It is misleading information, published in the German press, that has been presented to us as such.

Slovakia: Officials Comment on Hungarian Treaty

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[Article by Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Slovak Foreign Ministry, and Jan Varso, director general of the International Law and Consular Section at the Slovak Foreign Ministry: "Whom the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty Does/Does Not Suit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The question of "Whom the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty does/does not suit?" is inevitably raised in the framework of the discussion conducted in the political, expert, and lay circles of both states, which, well meaning or with Schadenfreude, aware or unaware—but always for a purpose—underestimate or exaggerate individual parts or articles of the Treaty on Good Neighborhood and Friendly Cooperation Between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary of 19 March 1995. These opinions are based on the classical philosophical concept of relativism, according to which everything is relative and only that is absolute, everything moves within the framework of interdependent regularities and ceases to be valid once it is valid. In principle, one can question, based on this, any reality, and, on the whole, convincingly arrive at the conclusion, for instance, that the name of the treaty is less important than its concluding stipulations, although both these institutions are important for the treaty from a certain point of view, because—metaphorically speaking—without the former, the treaty would have no head, and without the latter no tail. Similarly, one could question or exaggerate other stipulations of the treaty that comprise its mutually joined parts, which, combined, form a functioning organism of the treaty. So, do these divergent—and frequently contradictory—opinions provide a satisfactory picture of the object and purpose of the treaty from the point of view of the content of its formulations, the hierarchy of the order of its individual institutions, and their legal connection?

The way out of this vicious circle lies in the generally recognized and internationally respected rules for the explication of treaties contained in the current interpretation bible of international treaties, i.e., the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (published in edict No. 15/1988 of the Code). This convention stipulates in Article 31, Paragraph 1 (the section on the interpretation of treaties) that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."

So, how should one begin to form an integral picture of the essence and purpose of the treaty that exacted a large dose of courage of the politicians and experts on both sides? Can one condemn the treaty just because it contains a reference to Recommendation No. 1201/1993 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly regarding the supplementary protocol on the rights of ethnic minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights? Is it possible to underrate a treaty that enshrines the inviolability and unchangeability of the existing Slovak-Hungarian border? These are only the two most-sensitive instances taken out of the context of the treaty, the purpose of which is to demonstrate—against the background of the Slovak-Hungarian burden of the past—how difficult it is at the end of the 20th century to lay new foundations for mutual coexistence and the infrastructure of reciprocal trust.

How do those people imagine the Slovak-Hungarian future, who—for reasons of historically indubitable wrongs committed in the past against the Slovak nation—would not even sit down with Hungary at the negotiation table? Have they ever reflected on the elementary fact that it is a neighbor, with whom we are connected by the objective coexistence in geographic space, and therefore also by the necessity to seek a modus vivendi? Is it un/natural if it is precisely a state, new on the map of the world, that endeavors to maintain good relations with its neighbors? Are they sufficiently aware of the Slovak Republic—as an independent and sovereign state—being able for the first time ever to talk with the Hungarian side as an equal partner and without an international dictate, and what would our forefathers have given for such a chance? Should one dis/regard here the analogical situations like the French-German, Polish-German, or Lithuanian-Polish historical reconciliations?

Given the unfortunate past and the strategic view of the future, it is quite natural to be concerned about the fate of the implementation of the treaty (a similar situation certainly exists on the Hungarian side) but a firmly stated timeless dilemma exists—between two neighboring states—on the political plane: Is it better to coexist without any basic rules of conduct, or (precisely to overcome the vestiges of the unfortunate past) to coexist on the basis of reciprocally and equally agreed upon rules? Which politician assumes greater risks—the one who engages himself in favor of the agreement, because of his reason, conscience, and conviction, or the one who a priori fights for a disagreement?

Three Correlations of the Treaty

We will attempt, within the framework of the question raised in the headline of this article—and without any interest in forcing our own conclusions on the reader—to present the treaty in its full context, which we consider of decisive importance in assessing its actual values.

The first such correlation lies in the link to the domestic political circumstances under which the treaty was negotiated.

Domestic Situation

The fall of totalitarian political regimes, the building of a democratic and legal environment, and especially the emergence of the independent Slovak Republic created the conditions in both states for beginning to present demands, claims, and expectations—from both official and unofficial circles—regarding the implementation of not-altogether-clear programs for the Slovak-Hungarian future. The new situation provided an opportunity for anyone, on the basis of a genetically encoded conviction or personal political ardor, to start testing "while still hot" the firmness of this new and still fragile "status quo." The first serious "sting" was the notorious statement of Former Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall that he is the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians, which—given the smaller official population of

Hungary—evoked a furor in the neighboring states, including the Slovak Republic. Nevertheless, the signal aimed at undermining the borders defined in the Trianon Peace Treaty of 4 June 1920 was thereby sent. This meant moral support for the politicians of Hungarian ethnic origin in the neighboring countries and the specification of strategic programs in the campaign for undermining stability in our geographic space with the goal of creating conditions for a change of the existing state borders. This program was "interpreted" for the Slovak conditions in the Komarno appeal of the representatives of the Hungarian minority of January 1994 (including demands for autonomy) with the goal of putting the democratically elected Slovak bodies—on which Hungarian ethnic politicians had and have their representatives—and, at the same time, "democracy" in the position of hostages for their demands; in other words, either these demands are satisfied and the Slovak Republic is democratic, or it is simply undemocratic. The absence of a "dam" that would regulate the floods of these boundless ambitions thus became nourishing soil for the extreme political forces both in Hungary and Slovakia. Is the treaty dis/advantageous for the players of this very dangerous poker game?

This flung-down gauntlet (it is irrelevant for historians that it was not Slovakia issuing the challenge) provoked such a reaction that it took aback even the initiators. The unification of Slovak political representatives and forces was only a natural and logical response to these tendencies. At the same time, it helped to look deeper into the Slovak-Hungarian history and emphasize the parallel with the analogous scenario before World War II.

International Situation

The second such a correlation is the international political situation at the time when the treaty was negotiated.

There are many people who claim that the Slovak Republic—within the context of the proceeding of the conference on the Pact of Stability in Europe—signed the treaty only under pressure from the European Union member states or the United States. Our representatives who took part in the negotiation of the treaty have repeatedly declared that no one has exerted any pressure on the Slovak Republic and that the text of the treaty was agreed upon only and exclusively on the basis of the interests of this state. On the other hand, however, it has never been denied that other states, in addition to the aforementioned ones, were also interested in the content of the talks on the treaty and unequivocally expressed their pleasure with its signing in Paris on 19 March 1995; one high-ranking U.S. diplomatic official even referred to it as the event of the year. Does it come as a surprise?

One cannot bury one's head in the sand before the fact that—from the macrogeopolitical point of view—the process of the partition of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in itself evoke concern in the international public because it was seen through the prism of the division "a la Balkans" with all its bloody consequences. It is not important now why some influential states have considered—and I believe they still do—the Slovak Republic to be the instigator of the partition of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Czech Republic to be its "victim," although the partition was executed in a constitutional and civilized manner and based on a mutual agreement. The important thing is that the Slovak Republic has been considered—incidentally or deliberately—to be the prime mover in this partition with a direct consequence of its difficult entry into the international community, and that even despite the diplomatic recognition of the Slovak Republic and its acceptance into international organizations. Does the promotion of ambitions and ultimative demands from a new state—on the part of the ill-wishers of the Slovak Republic and the extreme Hungarian political circles and their fellow players in Slovakia—require a stronger card in the hand? If we add to the above the ill-will-saturated "aristocratic internationalism" of the Hungarian lobby abroad (especially in international organizations), what were the prospects of a firm anchorage of the Slovak Republic within the international community? The crusades against Slovakia led by the Slovak politicians of Hungarian ethnic origin in the Council of Europe (about the alleged violation of the rights of persons of Hungarian ethnic origin) were effectively ensured and supported by the blue-blooded posthumous children of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the European Parliament (against the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project, for change); the truth was to be drowned in the framework of these propagandistically vociferous attacks that the rights and duties of the persons of Hungarian ethnic origin are regulated in the Slovak Republic in a better-than-standard form (for one), and that it was the Hungarian side that flagrantly violated its international legal obligations by its unilateral abrogation of the—legally valid, voluntarily and in accordance with international law—concluded treaty on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project (for two). No room has been found within this gangue of empty and bombastically tuned cries about Slovak nationalism for even a mention that Slovakia has never threatened anyone, and—although it was not easy—the Slovak people historically survived, and, together with citizens of other ethnic origin, attained the creation of the independent and democratic Slovak Republic. Given this context, whom does/does not the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty suit?

Furthermore, it would be impossible not to ask the question of significance of the treaty within the context of the global foreign political strategy of the Slovak Republic (and to that of the Republic of Hungary), which is based on creating the conditions for an integration into the Euroatlantic political, economic, and security structures. How should one react to either official or unofficial statements by the representatives of the European Union, for instance, NATO, or the Western European Union that the admission of new members is feasible only if that means a reinforcement of these structures and not their fission; in other words, bickering candidates have no place here, and either they resolve their problems (no one forces them to do so) or they face staying in the position of permanent candidates for membership in these structures. Given this correlation, for whom is this treaty dis/advantageous? It is unfortunate, and admonishing at the same time, that among those who reproach the government for signing the treaty are also representatives of the political parties in the Slovak Republic who are trying in Brussels to convince officials of these institutions that their only and sincere interest is the integration of the Slovak Republic into the Atlantic structures, while, on the other hand, it does not prevent them—based on very specific party interests?—from accusing the government of allegedly betraying our state and national interests by signing the treaty.

Legal Context

The third correlation concerns the international legal essence of the treaty regarding the institutions therein contained.

This correlation has been the topic of the most vigorous discussion, which is quite understandable as the treaty outlines a long-term political legal program of Slovak-Hungarian cooperation, and its implementation in practice will become the touchstone for building the Slovak-Hungarian relations on new foundations. Both parties were fully aware of this and, taking into consideration their respective national and state interests—and in accordance with their respective legal codes and international obligations—they focused on reaching an agreement that would mean a fundamental turn towards the establishment and development of good neighborly relations and friendly cooperation. In this respect—regardless of the hard-to-understand lack of close political or media attention on either bank of the Danube River—the essence of the treaty consists of stipulations that are to be an impulse and a platform for building new relations in all spheres of common interest between the Slovak and Hungarian bodies and legal persons and citizens of the two countries. This category includes consultations in the military sphere (Article 4 of the treaty), regular meetings between the representatives of the legislative and executive bodies (Article 5), mutual support in the integration into the Euroatlantic structures (Article 6), the development of cooperation in the fields of the economy (Article 7), science and technology (Article 8), the sphere of environment protection (Article 9), individual modes of transport (Article 10), in simplifying border crossing (Article 11), in culture, science, and education (Article 12), in health care and social security (Article 16), in consular and political work (Article 17), in mass media (Article 18), and in support for extragovernmental organizations (Article 19). Although these stipulations are not so lucrative politically and journalistically, the treaty is based on them, and the fate of the Slovak—Hungarian relations in the future also depends on them. Whom does/does not this broadly conceived cooperation suit?

The reinforcement of the international prestige of both countries certainly also belongs in the framework of correlations according to the international law because they both demonstrated their ability and capacity to reach an agreement without mediation by a third party. At the same time, they proved that they are aware of their responsibility for the fate and stability of this geographical space and—in their own interest, but also in the interest of their respective inhabitants—are capable of finding a common language to overcome even the seemingly unsurpassable hindrances and problems. The Republic of Hungary confirmed, for the first time ever on a bilateral and equal plane, the inviolability and unchangeability of the common state border; thereby, it promised, according to international law, that it will not, either domestically nor internationally, support any activities oriented towards the violation or change of this border. It is of particular importance for the Slovak Republic—as a new entity on the international scene—especially because voices calling for a revision of "Trianon" are still heard in some Hungarian circles. Thus the coming into force of the treaty takes away the fertile soil for casting legal doubts and forming assumptions and hypotheses regarding an alteration of the border, which—especially regarding the Slovak-Hungarian specific features in this region—are certainly not negligible. Whom does/does not the treaty suit in this context?

Within the framework of the context of international law, it would be impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that the issue of the legal status of the persons belonging to the ethnic minorities in the two states was the hardest nut to crack in the talks, and in its final form found expression of a disproportional length in the treaty. In its content, however, it does not exceed the framework of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and international obligations binding Slovakia.

In this most discussed issue, wherein now, after the "battle," almost everyone feels to be a general, we will attempt to analyze the context of the treaty on two fundamental planes—first on the procedural level and then on the qualitative level.

Procedural Criteria

From the procedural point of view, the Slovak party—in accordance with the practice and the valid international rules on talks between states—did not accept the invectives [as published—invektivy] from the Hungarian party that the politicians associated with ethnic minorities be also included in the talks on the treaty; the justification of this refusal—these were inter-government and not inter-party talks—is not important. The campaign, however, launched mostly by the Slovak political circles of Hungarian ethnic background following this refusal, was of a much greater psychological significance. The emotionally demagogic cacophony marked with the usual perfidy emitted by these politicians about the "talks about them taking place without them," only reveal their relations towards the Slovak Republic, in which they themselves decided to hold—from the ethnic point of view—a position of superiority. The Government of the Slovak Republic negotiated—in accordance with our constitutional regulations and international rules—to benefit the interests of this state and its citizens, including the citizens belonging to ethnic minorities, and that with the representatives of the Hungarian Government, which it apparently suits these citizens not to understand; moreover, it is, for them, absolutely irrelevant that the Slovak negotiators (also as their representatives) are very sorry about it, and the Hungarian negotiators grasped this very fast. On the practical plane, this refusal actually meant refusing the claims of collective rights based on the ethnic principle, which the Hungarian politicians and their Slovak fellow travelers wanted, in principle, to achieve. Whoever watched the live broadcast of the signing of the treaty in Paris on 19 March 1995 will certainly remember the question of one of the Hungarian correspondents to the then French Prime Minister Balladour why they did not also invite the representatives of ethnic minorities to the festive act. The tenor of E. Balladour's reply was that it is a matter of an inter-state treaty, which, according to the rules of international law, is negotiated by governments rather than by representatives of political or other groupings....

The second procedural correlation was, on the part of the Hungarian side, the submission of a draft "Agreement on the Guarantee of the Rights of Slovak Ethnic Minority Living in the Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian Ethnic Minority Living in the Slovak Republic and on Related Rights" dated 6 February 1995, which was to be appended to the basic treaty. The Slovak side formally rejected it, however, and did not even discuss it. It was a document of substantial length (a preamble and 21 articles with 42 paragraphs), based on the principles of Recommendation No. 1201 [/1993] of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, which included—for reasons of brevity—a very legible manuscript of the conclusions of the aforementioned Komarno assembly of the representatives of the Hungarian ethnic minority; the international terminology regarding the protection of the identity of persons belonging to ethnic minorities applied therein served solely as a cover to conceal the fundamental political demands aimed at impairing the integrity and political independence of this state. This procedural context is important for the comprehension of the negotiation points of departure of the two parties regarding the stipulations on minorities, and it also partly answers the question of the extent of the stipulations of Article 15 of the treaty.

The Quintet of Qualitative Correlations

Of course, the qualitative context in international law is much more substantial because it is of importance for the interpretation and implementation of the text agreed upon.

The first "collision" took place in the situation when the partner demanded that the treaty incorporate the right of ethnic minorities to form territorial and other autonomous entities, justifying it—allegedly according to a modern understanding of the definition of the status of minorities in the process of integration—by the need to protect their identity. The Slovak side replied that the integration of citizens within the framework of the state is needed first and, "at this lower level," it will become a test of the capability of the persons belonging to various ethnic minorities to communicate with each other in a broader integration grouping.

The second "collision" was the conflict of views regarding the Hungarian demand for implementing the collective rights of minorities, the goal of which was to openly create a platform in the treaty for Slovak politicians of Hungarian ethnic origin as "legal" representatives of these minorities. In practical terms, the result would be very simple—they would gain the exclusive right to communicate (interpret their own political ambitions?) to the official representatives of (their?) state and represent these minorities at international forums including the Council of Europe; thereby the treaty would provide them with a legal framework for establishing parabodies [paraorgany] of this state and formally justify the right to submit on behalf of the Hungarian minority "ethnicdisobedience-related" petitions to the legitimate bodies of the Slovak Republic. The Slovak side stated that it could result in chaos on our democratic political scene, because it necessarily gives rise to a problem: Which representatives of the Slovak political entities would thus gain an analogous mandate to represent the Slovak people? The essence of this question lies in the fact that collective rights—if the term at all corresponds to its content—can be referred to in a democratic state exclusively in connection with the representation of citizens-voters (collective?) by representatives of political parties at various levels of representative bodies; the creation of any differences between citizens in the possibility to elect their legal representatives means a preference for a single group, and thereby automatically discriminates against the others. Attempts to force oneself on the citizens in the post of a representative of their particular group—outside this legitimate framework—are called, in legal terminology, "pretendership," which is the seed of the creation of a fifth column in any state.

The third "collision" took place in relation to the norms and obligations enshrined in international documents (Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter b of the treaty), where the Hungarian party was not willing to give up the right to refer to the rules and obligations contained in Recommendation No. 1201/1993 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. First of all, they must be set right regarding the misconception that a mention of this document (and other herein named documents) means that this treaty renders it internationally valid; the text of the stipulations of Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter b refers explicitly only to the "norms and political obligations" enshrined in them as "legal obligations," and not to the entire documents (Recommendation No. 1201 is not and—from the point of view of known subsequent processes—never will be an internationally valid document. The Copenhagen document and the UN Declaration are of a internationally legal character, while only the Framework Agreement fulfills the criteria of an international treaty). The fact that the basic treaty does not assume the entire texts of these documents—according to the wording of Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter b—implies that under no circumstances does the treaty "transform" these documents into documents of international character, which is connected with at least two basic legal derivatives:

a) "using" the argument that—based on the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty—Recommendation No. 1201 entered into force in international law is a claim against any logic of international law—it was not adopted, i.e. it was rejected by the authorized body (Council of Foreign Ministers of the Council of Europe), and it was not adopted in this basic treaty either. To make it more easily comprehensible and for comparison, we say that, on the contrary, the two parties promised by this treaty that—in accordance with the text of Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter a of the treaty—"they will implement the Council of Europe Framework Agreement on the protection of ethnic minorities adopted by both parties and signed on 1 February 1995"; hence, the attempt at "bringing into the international law" Recommendation No. 1201—by referring to its mention in this treaty—is only a hopeful wish, and can be described as misleading;

b) the aforementioned implies also a fundamental impact on the interpretation of the individual stipulations of Recommendation No. 1201 (and other documents listed in Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter b), because "norms and political obligations" enshrined in them will and must be interpreted in the context of the object and purpose of this bilateral treaty, and not in the context of the aforementioned multilateral documents. Herein lies a fundamental difference from the interpretation of the Framework Agreement—included in the formulation of Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter a of the treaty—which, also for the purpose of this basic treaty, will and must be interpreted in its own context for the object and purpose of the treaty. One only needs to add that, in the course of the talks, the Hungarian party was agreeable to this stand of the Slovak party.

On the whole, however, the Slovak party also submitted several more compromise proposals and supplements to Recommendation No. 1201 to specify the extent of the implementation of the norms and political obligations therein included, with only one of them being acceptable—after a long bidding session—to the Hungarian side, and that is the one that eventually was projected into the treaty. The purpose is not to "muse" on whether or not the formulation: "respecting individual human and civic rights including the rights of the persons belonging to ethnic minorities" could be more pure or clear; it certainly would be worth considering, also from the point of view of the general grammatical interpretation—also with regard to the fact that an analogical supplement is not included in the other herein cited documents—whether this supplement in itself does not mean that the political obligations and norm therein included cannot be implemented in their full extent. Much more important is, however, that they must be "filtered" through the sieve of the Council of Europe Framework Agreement on the protection of ethnic minorities of 1 February 1995 (as it is explicitly formulated in the introduction of Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter b), which, in a manner of principle, prevents any claims of collective rights and the creation of autonomous structures on an ethnic basis.

Coming from these three "collisions," which—as became clear immediately upon reaching an agreement on the final text of the treaty by the prime ministers of the two states—even the Hungarian official circles began to interpret contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty, the Government of the Slovak Republic—even prior to signing the treaty—was forced to use a diplomatic route to deliver a statement to the Republic of Hungary. Therein, it rejects "particularly the interpretations by the Hungarian party, according to which the Slovak party adopted Recommendation No. 1201/1993 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in the sense facilitating the creation of autonomous minority self-administrations" and "emphasizes that it has never adopted or included in the treaty any formulations based on the recognition of the principle of collective rights for minorities and accepting the creation of autonomous structures on an ethnic basis."

The fourth correlation consists of the questions that did not get included in the treaty because the parties could not agree on them. Let us recall two symbolic but characteristic examples that reflect the entire atmosphere of the talks.

The Slovak party unwillingly accepted the "avoidance" of the assessment of the common past. The proposal that at least the interest of the two parties to overcome the burden of the past should be expressed in the treaty was not accepted by the partner, who refused to even discuss the misleading Hungarian mention taken out of the context of history about some surplus of rich experience from the millennium of coexistence. Finally, it was agreed that the treaty will not mention the development of mutual relations in the past, and their objectivization will be left to historians (e.g. within the framework of a mixed inter-governmental commission, the establishment of which, the treaty assumes in Article 15, Paragraph 6). An agreement was reached, however, in the orientation of the treaty towards the development of cooperation in the future.

The second "omitted" sphere concerns the succession of the Slovak Republic to the international treaties of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic regarding settling a conflict before the International Court (MSD) in The Hague.

It was a seemingly trivial problem regarding the dispute over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric project that concerned the formal termination of the validity of the existing political treaty, i.e. the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic of 14 June 1968, to which the Slovak Republic—on the basis of the Edict of the National Council of the Slovak Republic of 3 December 1992 (as well as all the other bilateral and multilateral treaties in effect after the Czechoslovak Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic)—succeeded. Namely, the Hungarian party originally insisted that the validity of the treaty of 1968 be abrogated as of 1 January 1993 (expecting that the "ideological factor" of the treaty would dominate its formal and legal aspects), which would result in general doubts regarding the succession of the Slovak Republic to the international treaties signed by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and, in extension, also to a negation of the foundations of the Slovak Republic in international law. In the final analysis, however, it was a purpose-oriented fabrication aimed at casting doubts on the Slovak succession to the Treaty Between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic on the Construction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Hydroelectric System of 17 September 1977, the validity of which—including the consequences of its unilateral termination by the Hungarian party—is the key issue in the dispute currently before the MSD in The Hague. The omission of the specific regulation of this issue in the treaty brought it to the level of a general regulation in international law, which cannot prejudice the decision of the MSD in The Hague and does not harm the interests of either party to the treaty. In this context, a note addressed to those who argue that there cannot be talks between parties to an international dispute regarding a treaty of this type: Disputes between states have been, are, and will be; it is important, however, how these states are able to deal with them. In the dispute over the hydroelectric project, the two parties—in accordance with the UN Charter—agreed on its peaceful solution, which only proves that the Slovak Republic honors its obligation and has no difficulties in protecting its interests before an expert and independent international judicial body, such as the MSD at The Hague.

The fifth, and last correlation is the agreed-upon tools and mechanisms, by means of which the—bilateral—evaluation of the implementation of the treaty is to be done.

The core of this mechanism is the stipulation of Article 5 of the treaty, which calls for the establishment of contacts between legislative bodies, creates space for the development of cooperation between individual ministries, and schedules regular annual meetings between the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the two states. These stipulations are of particular importance in Slovak-Hungarian relations for getting acquainted with each other's views and stances on various issues of common or particular interest and on specific and pragmatic cooperation. It is important that the "managers" of the two states, who bear the main burden of responsibility for the Slovak-Hungarian future and the fate of the population of this region, meet, because it is the fundamental prerequisite for overcoming the unfortunately continuing mistrust. The stipulations of Article 21 of the treaty regarding the conceivable different interpretation or implementation of this treaty are also based on the stipulations of Article 5. One only needs to note that, according to this article, the principally responsible representatives of the two states will decide on the line of interpretation and implementation of the treaty.

A Note on Hungarian Activities

Nevertheless, we cannot but make an observation regarding the campaign that the Hungarian official circles launched in the Republic of Hungary and in a part of the Slovak political scene in connection with the adoption of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Law on the State Language of the Slovak Republic. At the initiative of the Hungarian party, it even found its reflection in the diplomatic correspondence between the supreme representatives of the two states. It is unfortunate that such high-ranking officials of the Republic of Hungary let themselves be dragged into the dangerous game of interfering in the sovereign rights of another sovereign state, which have nothing to do with the Slovak-Hungarian relations and the treaty. Let us ignore the rational issue that each state is obliged—we underscore this (because this is not an issue of right)—to arrange for communication between its citizens in one language as it has an extraordinary influence on the everyday life and concerns of its citizens. These circles are obviously not worried about this, because otherwise they would have to ask the question of how a citizen from the northern part of this state—in his own territory and home—is to communicate at the offices, institutions, health care facilities, and schools in the south of the Slovak Republic. Alternatively, in an analogous situation, how are the citizens from the south of the republic (we fear that these citizens—as opposed to some politicians who absolutely do not care about their everyday fate because they only care for their personal gain and myopic interests—understand this very well) to communicate in the north of their native land, which the politicians, allegedly representing their interests, (hypocritically?) also claim? Thus, it is at least indecorous on the part of our southern neighbor to place the Slovak Republic in a position of a legislator of the type of Count Apponyi [not further specified] from the beginning of the century, even more so since the rights of the persons belonging to ethnic minorities in the Slovak Republic are guaranteed in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The ordinary citizens—contrary to certain boundlessly ambitious political mouthpieces of Hungarian ethnic origin—do not encounter any particular problems in their everyday life because of this. Whom, and also to what purpose, does/does not such a start serve in the implementation of the treaty that is not yet even in effect? The official reactions of the Slovak party corresponded to this elevated "also problem."

An analogical scenario is currently being launched by the Hungarian party in connection with the new territorial-administrative arrangement in the Slovak (we emphasize the Slovak, and not Hungarian) Republic, which is allegedly aimed against the persons belonging to ethnic minorities. We are not at all concerned with the essence of this arrangement, but with the fact that the discussion about it has absolutely nothing to do with the officials, politicians, and citizens of Hungary because it is completely and entirely an internal affair of this state and its citizens; it really is puzzling why some Hungarian politicians or deputies do not ask themselves the elementary question of how they would react if one of the officials of the Slovak Republic would officially comment, protest, or even contradict the treaty because, for instance, a certain territorial-administrative region—according to proposals, not yet accessible to him—does not correspond to his ideas. Just one more thing as food for thought regarding the Slovak language law and the bill on territorial-administrative arrangement—we do not completely understand (or it is concealed from us) why the Republic of Hungary has not yet protested against the use of the English language in the United States and Great Britain, or French in France (we have selected these "small" examples completely at random and without any (ill) design to interfere in the sovereign internal affairs of these states), although, according to our sources, a not-altogether negligible number of persons claiming Hungarian ethnic origin live on those territories; similarly, we have not registered a protest on the part of the Republic of Hungary against the administrative arrangement of these states regarding the Hungarian ethnic minorities.

The Slovak-Hungarian Convergence

Another mechanism and tool of the Slovak-Hungarian convergence is the creation assumed in the treaty of an inter-governmental mixed commission—the parts of which will be composed as needed—with the right to make recommendations (Article 15, Paragraph 6). This tool should be utilized—in the spirit of mutual understanding and trust—for the exchange of information and experience in the issues regarding the status of persons belonging to ethnic minorities in the two states. The purpose is certainly not to prejudice the orientation of the work of this commission, but the authors of the treaty assume that it should be composed of professional experts from the two states—historians, lawyers, experts in the sphere of culture and cultural monuments, church representatives, linguists—so they could exchange views and findings from the point of view of citizens-persons belonging to the Slovak ethnic minority in Hungary and Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia separately from the narrow political interests. Whom does/does not this aspect of the treaty suit?

Great concerns have been evoked in this article by the stipulation regarding the control of fulfilling the assumed obligations in the sphere of the protection of ethnic minorities, according to which one should "proceed according to the regulations of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which are binding for both parties to the treaty." It is necessary to observe two correlations here—on the one hand, the duty of the state to fulfill its contractual obligations according to the principle "pacta sunt servanda," and on the other, shallow politicking, propagandist "humbug" and psychological blackmail that have absolutely nothing to do with these obligations.

In the first instance, the treaty bilaterally confirms the obligations assumed by the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary—as members of the Council of Europe—in the already existing multilateral treaties, which they cannot discard whether or not it be regulated in a bilateral treaty. These multilateral international treaties in the sphere of human rights usually assume that the individual participating states will submit to the authorities defined in the treaty reports on the implementation of their obligations on the domestic scale. We can use as an example the Council of Europe Framework Agreement on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities (according to Article 28, it will assume international effect by the deposition of 12 ratification documents with the secretary general of the Council of Europe, while only four states—Slovakia, Rumania, Spain, and Hungary—made such a deposition from 1 February 1995 to the present and the others do not seem to be in a hurry), which, according to Article 15, Paragraph 4, Letter a of the treaty, takes effect for the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary on the day this treaty goes in force. According to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Agreement, "Within the period of one year after this framework agreement goes in force, the party to the treaty will provide the secretary general of the Council of Europe with complete information on the legislative and other measures aimed at the implementation of the principles defined in this framework agreement," which the secretary general (as well as other subsequent information) will submit to the Ministerial Council of the Council of Europe. The given example is a typical contractual obligation of the state submitted to an authorized body, i.e. the Ministerial Council, on which all the states are represented, which is—according to a consensus—the only one to make decisions on these reports.

In the other instance—according to the principle that "fishing is best in murky waters"—one operates and exerts misleading and generalizing psychological pressure, not based on any norm (usually and most effectively by means of media) in an obscure and anonymous manner like this: A certain representative of a European or world organization said that a certain state should do, or not do, this or that; it strongly evokes the spiritual legacy of the deceased Jozsef Antall, within the framework of which it is important to "set off" something in the air and someone might even catch on. Even an inattentive observer of the activities of the Slovak politicians of Hungarian ethnic background cannot but notice that the concept of their policy toward their own state is based on this, and their favored center and polite host is the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. With all due respect to this body and its activities—it plays a not-negligible role in the process of European integration—it has its place only and exclusively in the sorting out of opinions of various political parties and associations with the goal of submitting to the Ministerial Council—the "legislative" body of the Council of Europe—suggestions and recommendations for the preparation and adoption of international treaties. Without any interest in disparaging its important work, it is impossible not to observe in the context of its powers, and on this plane assess also the attempts at misusing its name for object purposes: Whom does/does not this mis/information suit? At the same time, only a little is needed to be un/able to differentiate between an obligation of the state according to international law and propaganda.

We certainly could list other correlations that have had and will have effect on the implementation of the treaty in practice. No one can predict today how Slovak-Hungarian relations will develop in the future because that also depends on the development of the global international situation. A comparison has been made several times recently between the signing of the Treaty on Good Neighborhood and Friendly Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary in Paris on 19 March 1995 and the French-German reconciliation in the 1960s. Let history be judge of this; it will certainly also fairly evaluate the responsibility and political courage of the governments of the two states headed by their prime ministers, Vladimir Meciar and Gyula Horn, and the parliaments of the two countries in seeking a feasible way out of the "musty" past.

Does this sound like something in dis/favor of their citizens and dis/satisfaction in the region?

Hungary: EU Commission President Discusses Accession

LD0404145396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1050 GMT 4 Apr 96

[Report on interview with EU Commission President Jacques Santer by Brussels correspondent Miklos Keleti; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] When the studies on the applicants and the recently started EU Intergovernmental Conference are concluded, a decision must be made at some point about with whom to start concrete accession talks.

President Santer first recalled that the schedule of the whole process was worked out by the heads of state and government of the EU states at their last meeting in Madrid and the same forum will make the decisions, too, taking into consideration the opinion of the Brussels commission led by President Santer.

Jacques Santer believes that talks can start with the first group of applicants six months after the end of the Inter-Governmental Conference. Thus, his words suggest that the commission is in favor of starting the expansion process with the three or four countries most ready for membership instead of with all the applicants simultaneously.

Even if the heads of state perhaps decline to undertake the political risk of selecting an elite group and instead begin talks simultaneously with all the applicants, they will be conducted strictly individually and the pace of the talks will be determined by the readiness level of the country concerned. [passage omitted]

Jacques Santer agrees that there is concern in Western public opinion regarding the EU's expansion, because the economic situation is not rosy on Europe's richer half mainly because of the frighteningly high unemployment. The president notes, however, that considering the whole of trade between the west and the east the EU has profited more from the association agreements than have the East European states because the EU has in fact gained markets. Thus, expansion is not just a one way street. [passage omitted]

I asked Jacques Santer if the commission regards the conclusion of a Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty as an entry condition or would Brussels be satisfied with the two countries' efforts for tackling their grievous differences through continuous negotiations?

The president began his answer by saying that the EU adopted the goals of the European stability pact, the most important of which is that the East-Central European countries should settle the problems of national minorities between each other with bilateral treaties. President Santer believes that there are positive steps in this area, including the Hungarian-Slovak treaty. He hopes that both sides will implement its stipulations in good faith.

He thinks it would be desirable to make a treaty with Romania, too. He concludes his answer by saying he hopes that all of these problems will be settled before entry.

Hungary: Editorial Assesses Treaty With Slovakia

AU0404163296 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Apr 96 p 3

[Editorial by Pal Lederer: "Not Strapachka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We could settle the issue by saying that it is not strapachka [Slovak national food] after all. But the issue is more serious than that. It is a fact that Prime Minister Gyula Horn made a rather good point when he said that, as far as he is concerned, Bratislava can even add the strapachka recipe to the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty if they want to. However, as shown by the Hungarian diplomatic note sent to Bratislava in the meantime, Horn's argument was not correct, namely that, irrespective of the additions, explanations, and interpretations, the essence of the Hungarian-Slovak treaty will not change. On the contrary! It makes a lot of difference. And then it had better be the strapachka!

Hungarian diplomacy would make a terrible mistake if it belittled the issue and pretended that nothing had happened and the first "big achievement" of the foreign policy declared as the government's success sector had not lost its brilliance.

The government is probably also aware of this already but, for the time being, they do not dare admit it to themselves even that, with the interpretative observations added to the basic treaty, the message of the Slovak parliament—and of Meciar personally as well—is that Slovakia does not intend to carry out the "historic" agreement signed with Hungary at all. Hungarian diplomacy is now trying to escape the problem by signaling that Hungary will not accept the ratification documents if they want to hand it over together with the addenda adopted by the Slovak parliament. This is a miserable dramaturgy, but there does not seem to be another way out.

It is a fact that any individual interpretation of the document contradicts the international law stipulations. However, only developed constitutional states bother with such things. The Slovak Republic is not such a country yet. Bratislava's free political circus show about the basic treaty, the language law, the law on administrative division, the modification of the state protection law, the limitation of the freedom of the press and of the electronic media, and other similar acts amply show this. This is the reality. The Slovak Government constantly pretends that they are the same as the other democratic countries in Europe, but they have a penchant for disregarding the rules of the game. Hungarian diplomacy should speak about this, rather than about strapachka, seriously and rather firmly at every possible forum and mainly in the course of contacts with the Slovak partners.

Despite all this, the Hungarian opposition is not right in urging the government to discard the basic treaty; we would probably not be able to sign a much better document that this with a different Slovak government either.

One of the foreign minister's favorite and appropriate sayings is that every treaty is worth as much as one succeeds in implementing from it. In my opinion, it is only a matter of time for the foreign minister to declare that, for the time being, the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty is worth nothing because Meciar and his followers do not intend to implement it at all. If this admission takes place, the Hungarian Government will have to review its policy toward Slovakia if it does not want to engage in ostrich policy. Its strategy, namely seeking the possibilities of a historic reconciliation, is correct, but the government must urgently change its tactics. We can only hope that the Hungarian Government can count on the support of those who suggested the system of Central European stability treaties, namely the French and generally the democratic states, because it is clear that, in the process of Hungarian-Slovak rapprochement, the Hungarian side has already done its share. It is also in their interest that Bratislava quickly find its way back into the main stream of European development.

Hungary: Pros, Cons of NATO Membership Analyzed

96CH0032B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 23 Dec 95 pp 109-113

[Article by Gyorgy Heimer: "Joining NATO: Is It Roomier Inside?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Public opinion in Hungary is rather divided on the question of joining NATO. Amidst the views voiced by numerous laymen, sometimes even experts have diametrically opposite assessments of the plan, which is by no means final for the North Atlantic military organization's eastward expansion. It is an open question how the very fact of membership would enhance the country's security and contribute to the much desired modernization efforts.*

Polish and American soldiers were unable to find their way on the basis of each other's maps at the NATO military exercise that was held in Poland in late 1994, and enlarged to include East European troops. Furthermore, the Polish officers did not speak English, NATO's official language; they entirely misunderstood the Americans and led their troops in the wrong direction. Thus the exercise, code-named "Cooperative Bridge," ended in chaos. That is what NEWSWEEK, an American news magazine, reported this summer about the exercise. Such misunderstandings in communication could happen also with the Hungarian Defense Forces [MH]. After all, the majority of the officer corps do not speak English here, either. And if Hungary eventually will really want to join the North Atlantic military organization, one of the first obstacles to overcome will be the professional soldiers' completion of the language courses offered by the NATO language schools that will soon open in Budapest.

Naturally, joint exercises will be essential to foster the new brotherhood in arms, but NATO's eastward expansion will not depend primarily on learning and practicing a few military idioms. All the less so because domestic public opinion in Hungary, just as in the other East European countries striving to join NATO, is viewing the rather controversial procedure for accession with mixed feelings.

According to an opinion poll conducted early this year—at the request of the Ministry of Defense—by the Marketing Center National Institute for Market Research, only a minority, 45 percent, of Hungary's population is pro-NATO. In Bohemia [and Moravia], according to a survey conducted two years ago by the local Public Opinion Research Institute, 58 percent of the Czechs would vote in favor of joining. Another survey conducted by yet another Czech polling organization, namely, the Independent Society for Social Analysis, revealed that 42 percent of the Czechs and Slovaks "sufficiently trusted" NATO, but 35 percent trusted it "not at all."

A marginal note to the divided views is also the 24-point protest proclamation that Hungary's pacifist Alba Circle issued on the occasion of the North Atlantic Council's Budapest meeting last May. The proclamation reads in part: "The region's security does not mean primarily the integration of military structures. There is no sufficient geopolitical, security-policy, or military reason for us to seek shelter under NATO's protective wings." Tamas Csapody, the chief ideologist of the Alba Circle that advocates nonviolence, subsequently published in KRITIKA his detailed arguments against NATO membership. Imre Mecs, the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] MP who is chairman of the National Assembly's Defense Committee, "can understand the author's anguished aversion," but labels Csapody's arguments as eclectic, coated with scientific gloss. In Mecs's opinion, Hungary's aspirations to European integration, including accession to the euro-atlantic security system, can be deduced only through strict logic.

Undeniably, a majority of the experts in the region support the policy of joining NATO, which in the meantime has been raised to the level of a plank in practically every government program in East Europe. The main advantage of membership is perceived in that, amidst the uncertainties in Europe after the cold war, the organization is a reliable military guarantee against external threats, and, at the same time, it is also a means of strengthening political and economic stability, as well as democracy, at home. That is what one finds in an analysis published by America's Brown University. Over a period of years, Brown—in cooperation with several European partner organization—had conducted in-depth interviews with security-policy experts from the countries of the Visegrad Group. The analysis concludes, among other things, that although the respondents did not perceive any serious threat against their countries, they nevertheless felt that events—especially in the former Soviet Union's successor states—could take an unpredictable turn, against which full-fledged NATO membership would be the only possible counterbalance.

Brown University's analysis reveals that, according to the experts from the Visegrad Group, NATO has always been more than a simple military alliance. Following the overthrow of the dictatorships in Greece and Portugal back in the 1970's, the North Atlantic organization played an important role in the establishment of democratic systems in those countries. The respondents felt that now, too, NATO could be one of the catalysts for democratic changes and economic reforms in the Eastern region. Every East European expert mentioned this advantage, but the Czechs and Hungarians ranked it in first place, definitely above purely military considerations.

From the experts' views on foreign and security policy it is also evident that they regard their countries as suitable for membership already now. A publication of Hungary's Research Institute for Strategy and Defense quotes from the Brown analysis that the Czechs consider themselves to be no worse than Iceland, which does not have armed forces. The Czechs also point out that, for a long time, an important NATO country such as France steered clear of the alliance's integrated military organization. Spain opted out of the integrated military organization. And, incidentally, Javier Solana, the Spanish physicist and foreign minister who was elected secretary general of NATO at the beginning of December, had been well known in the early 1970's as NATO's sworn enemy.

The North Atlantic Organization intends to expand at a time when its members want to cash in their peace dividend after the cold war—i.e., when they are reducing their armed forces and cutting their military expenditures. NATO's 65 commands, including the Brussels Headquarters, currently employ 18,000 persons and spend $244 million a year, out of a total joint budget of about $1.79 billion. In addition, the organization's infrastructure absorbs as much as $800 million annually. That too explains—writes America's WALL STREET JOURNAL—why John Sheehan, one of NATO's commanding marine generals, is urging structural changes—among others, more reliance on the private sector in the (weapons) procurement systems.

Amidst the many considerations surging in the background of eastward expansion, of course, all this is merely of episodic interest. The actual stake boils down to whether the Allies—the Americans, for instance—would regard the bombing of, say, Kassa [Kosice], or the occupation of the Trans-Tisza region by an enemy, the same way as if Brussels or Bonn had been attacked. For NATO is an organization for collective defense, as this is unambiguously stated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington in 1949: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Nevertheless, some things have become clearer in recent months about the conditions under which this (blood) sacrifice is undertaken. In an essay entitled "America, a European Power," published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS and reprinted also in the Hungarian-language periodical KULPOLITIKA, Richard Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state, dwells on restructuring the architecture of European security. In this essay he also argues that although Washington-led NATO itself is in need of restructuring, it nevertheless remains the only "institution" that can serve as a solid foundation of the continent's security system. Holbrooke is playing a key role in resolving the crisis in former Yugoslavia. In the final outcome, what lends credence to his words is the fact that the United States—after West Europe's lengthy inability to cope ended in failure—has taken the lead in bringing peace to Bosnia.

The NATO operation rhymes with the analyses which conclude that the purpose of NATO's expansion is to prevent the emergence of new "Bosnias" in East Europe. As THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE wrote in June, the Clinton administration would like to repeat the Truman administration's success when, with the help of a comprehensive security umbrella, the Germans, French, and Anglo-Saxons forgot their tribal differences and devoted all their energy to reviving their economies.

All this sounds nice. But the big question is: How much of these ambitious ideas can be realized in East Europe? The paper on eastward expansion (see box), which Brussels had announced in advance some time ago, but released only this autumn, does not say a single word on who would be admitted to the Atlantic Club and when, but dwells merely on the why's and how's of expansion. Commenting on this paper, the [Hungarian] Research Center for Security Policy and National Defense (BHKK) calls it more of an invitation to tender, rather than an analysis. According to the experts of the BHKK, in this paper the North Atlantic Alliance formulates its doubts regarding expansion on the one hand, and sets conditions on the other hand. Mainly as to "how the applicants will furnish proof that they have embraced the Atlantic Alliance's system of values and will act in the spirit of those values." In this "admission prospectus," the Hungarian analysts write, Brussels leaves wide room for different interpretations. That may be intentional vagueness, but it certainly will provide opportunity for bargaining when once Hungary, too, is invited for an entrance examination.

Another frequently recurring objection is that sovereignty would be lost once again. It is being said that we have barely withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact, and already the politicians are hitching the country to yet another military bloc. Actually the question here is prying into the range of problems concerning sovereignty and supranational integration. Peter Deak, the leader of the aforementioned BHKK, sees it this way: "The whole world is struggling in the threefold trap of self-determination, security, and intervention. It is undecided where the threshold lies in intervention, in undertaking sacrifices, and in defense of humanitarian fundamental values. It is undecided whether sovereignty is identical with independence or, as a matter of fact, places the latter at risk."

The point here is by no means merely an abstract dilemma of sorts. After all, it is not all the same whether Hungary, as a member of the alliance, is or is not obliged to accept nuclear weapons, for instance. Studying this problem, the BHKK came to the following conclusion in its analysis: The stationing of nuclear weapons in Hungary cannot be regarded as an absolute condition for admission. Among other reasons, because—the authors of the BHKK study write—all-out nuclear war is unlikely, and American operational or tactical nuclear weapons are not even included any longer in the respective orders of battle of NATO's European members. "The possible installation of nuclear weapons in Hungary would not add anything to the existing deterrent force," the analysis concludes. "It would be meaningless to keep nuclear weapons anywhere, without aiming them at some specific target country. Russia or Ukraine might come into consideration as a target country. These potential targets could be reached also by delivery systems stationed at earlier installation sites. New installations, notably on Hungary's territory, would therefore be superfluous."

Another recurring objection is that joining NATO would again lead to excessive spending on arms, beyond the country's means. According to Tamas Csapody's estimates, elimination of our lag in comparison with the military conditions for admission would require an additional expenditure of between 20-25 billion forints [Ft], over the approximately 80 billion planned for 1966. And between Ft10-12 billion more would be needed for reorganization and redeployment, in conjunction with reforming the armed forces.

So far, no official figure or estimate has appeared anywhere regarding how much of a burden NATO membership would impose on the Hungarian citizen. There is likewise no citable report on how much has already been spent in the interest of attaining accession. The only known figure is that, over and above their 1995 budget, the MH received Ft493 million, earmarked for the Partnership for Peace program. Military spending this year will be around Ft70 billion, which corresponds to approximately 1.5 percent of GDP. Meanwhile the NATO countries' military spending in the 1990's averages between 2 and 3 percent of their GDP.

There can be no doubt, of course, that accession will involve costs. In accordance with the obligations of membership, after all, it will be necessary to expand civilian control of the military, and the armed forces will have to be made suitable to fit into the NATO military system. That includes air defense, air traffic control, and information systems.

Actually, the most important "urgent task" at present is not the replacement of the MH's obsolete weapons with modern ones. That, incidentally, is something Brussels is not even demanding. If for no other reason, because it knows exactly how limited are the East European countries' available resources. A more pressing task is to lend substance to civilian control of the military, and of the Ministry of Defense in particular, claims an official of the ministry who wishes to remain anonymous. For without meaningful civilian control, it would simply be impossible to participate in operations that are the very foundations of NATO's activity. Finances, procurement of combat materiel, oversight of intelligence gathering, and personnel matters are all tasks for the civilian sphere, according to the alliance's philosophy and practice. Civilian experts, rather than soldiers or even diplomats, account for the bulk of the personnel at NATO Headquarters or on the 200 subcommittees. By contrast, military doctrine of the Soviet type had traditionally kept civilians away from the military also in Hungary. Even after the political system's change, not much attention has been devoted to eliminating this shortage of experts; and the few civilians who have managed to get into administering the military are unable to intervene meaningfully in the decisionmaking process.

[Box, p 110]

Gyorgy Heimer: 'Call-Up' Conditions

The North Atlantic Alliance has not yet decided to which countries it will send "call-up" notices and for when. In a paper drafted and approved this year, however, it has outlined very precisely all the conditions that applicants for admission will have to meet. The paper makes it clear that the admitted countries will be full-fledged NATO members, rather than second-class ones. They will enjoy the security guarantee specified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty ("an armed attack against one or more of the Parties...shall be regarded as an attack against them all..."), and they will have to contribute to their collective defense. Accession, the paper stresses, cannot weaken European security and cooperation, especially not the dialog between NATO and Russia, the evolving cooperation and partnership. Nor can accession weaken NATO's effectiveness, its established mode of operation, or the credibility of military deterrence. Disruptive new members burdened with ethnic conflicts are not welcome.

The detailed conditions for expansion are as follows:

—Collective Defense: New members will enjoy the advantages of collective defense, but will also have to contribute to it. They will have to participate in possible NATO missions (such as the present peace-implementation mission in Bosnia, or similar ones). They can be members of the integrated military structure (in which case all or a part of their armed forces will be under joint NATO command). Or they may remain outside the integrated military structure, in a way such that they participate in joint defense planning, in the planning of military operations, and in crisis management. Their participation in this last case may also be limited to a jointly defined partial area or mission.

—Joint Commands: Every new member must be linked somehow to one of the joint commands of NATO's integrated forces, although the possibility of establishing additional commands in new NATO zones cannot be excluded. The mode of linkage, and who is to be assigned to which existing command, will be decided in the course of the accession negotiations.

—Exercises: New members must participate in joint NATO exercises, so as to train for possible joint operations. They must regularly host exercises on their own territory and take part in exercises held abroad. It is not mandatory for them to station their troops abroad under NATO command, but they must ready their troops for deployment abroad.

—Nuclear Weapons: According to the alliance's strategy, nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of security and the most effective means of deterrence. New members must share this responsibility. (In other words, they must agree to the deployment of nuclear weapons if the need arises, and must participate in the work of the nuclear planning group.) In principle, it will not be necessary to station nuclear weapons on the new members' territory. But the paper does not exclude the possibility that the alliance, by mutual consent, might change the present disposition of nuclear weapons, if the circumstances change. And that could affect new members as well.

—Establishment of Bases, Stationing of Troops: In principle, this will not be necessary on the territory of new members. However, conditions must be ensured to make this realizable, should the need arise. New members must have suitably equipped and trained units to participate in joint defense activities. They must have a suitable infrastructure, rear services and logistics in place.

—Interoperability: This technical term means that NATO standards pertaining to organization and equipment must be adopted; the command structure must be harmonized at every level; and the (technical and personnel) conditions for communication must be put in place.

—Intelligence Gathering: New members must participate in NATO's intelligence work and in the cooperation between intelligence services. They must also "be capable of safeguarding secret information."

—Finances: Commensurately with their obligations, new members must help to finance the joint programs and institutions. "Membership entails not insignificant financial obligations," the paper warns. But it immediately adds that, in the first years, the obligations of new members might also be limited.

—Political Conditions: Only countries which have democratic political systems and which respect the principles of individual freedom, a market economy, and the rule of law may become new members. They must commit themselves to NATO's principles, strategic decisions, and search for consensus, without obstructing the established decisionmaking mechanism. And they must maintain actual and effective civilian control of their armed forces. This means actual parliamentary control that relies on knowledgeable civilian experts, as well as a civilian politician as minister of defense.

[Box, p 112]

Endre Babus: The Referendum Mirror

The Hungarian parliament is preparing "to put into cold storage" once again, in the coming days, a referendum initiative that seems impeccable from a formal point of view, yet is extremely dubious for political and moral reasons. "Do you want Hungary to be a NATO member?" inquired the Workers Party in recent months, while gathering signatures in the streets. And as the National Electoral Commission has established, at least 142,540 adult Hungarian citizens felt that this question deserves to be put to a national referendum. Nevertheless, even though the number of signatures supporting a referendum far exceeds the 100,000 threshold required by law, by now it is almost certain that the date for a peremptory referendum on whether Hungary should belong to NATO will not be set by 15 March 1996, the time limit specified by law. Pursuant to the decision that the National Assembly's Constitutional Committee adopted as an alternative last week, two draft resolutions will soon be presented to the plenum. One calls for holding, at an unspecified date, a so-called peremptory referendum that would be binding on parliament. The other draft resolution calls for holding, on 10 March 1996, a consultative referendum, the outcome of which would not be binding on the National Assembly in any way.

The arguments lined up against the initiative launched by Thurmer's party, especially the argument that a referendum would be premature, seem rather well-founded. It is also true that Law No. XVII of 1989 does not belong among the masterpieces of Hungarian constitutional law; for instance, the provisions on peremptory and consultative referenda are so perplexing that they provide practically unlimited opportunity for contrasting interpretations. Nevertheless, all the legal ingenuity, and the unanimous negative standpoint of six parliamentary parties, cannot obscure the fact that in the autumn of 1989 and the summer of 1990, on the basis of the same law, the scheduling of a peremptory referendum had been forced on the government—in part by the same political parties that now think it would be feasible to schedule at most a consultative referendum within the statutory time limit. No matter how great the aversion that an overwhelming majority of the public feels toward the "Reds" who are attempting to make political capital out of the issue of NATO membership. And no matter how false the controversial question sounds from the mouths of comrades who not so long ago had still been committed unconditionally to the Warsaw Pact, but are now demanding a neutral, nuclear-free Hungary. The fact still remains that parliament is preparing to respond to a political initiative with an answer that is dubious from the legal point of view. And it will not be the first time. The rule-of-law state's prestige was not enhanced, and faith in the law was undermined, already when the Smallholders' initiative regarding presidential elections was swept away (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 27 May 95).

Actually, it is a mystery why parliament should now be compelled to resort regularly to maneuvers that, to say the least, raise suspicion about strict adherence to the constitutional rules of the game. On 22 January 1993, in fact, the Constitutional Court offered parliament a solution with which similar cases could have been easily avoided in future. According to the court's decision, the Referendum Law had been enacted in the euphoria following the political system's change, at a time when the institutions of direct and indirect democracy had been deemed to have equal status. It was time, the court felt, to replace the law with a Referendum Code more appropriate to the needs of a consolidated republic. The Constitutional Court gave parliament until 31 December 1993 to enact such a code. A new law could not only have raised the threshold of signatures for a referendum initiative, which is relatively low by European standards. It could also have declared that now, as in most countries, parliament alone—rather than both the people's will and the National Assembly—is the depositary of popular sovereignty.

[Box, p 113]

Gyorgy Heimer: The Spanish Gambit

When Franco died in 1975, the most important foreign-policy aspiration of the forces that came on stage for Spain's democratic transformation was to dismantle the dictatorship that by then had been isolated for 40 years, and to link up the country with the rest of West Europe. But while Spain's political parties were practically unanimous in favoring Common Market membership as soon as possible, they were sharply divided in their views on NATO membership. During the first years of democratic transformation, a sort of tacit agreement evolved on defense policy: to leave alone the matter of the bilateral treaties with the United States that served as a protective umbrella, and not to put on the agenda for the time being the question of NATO membership.

This tacit agreement functioned well until 1981, when Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's center-right government included in its program quick accession to NATO, which it pushed through the Spanish parliament in October of that year. But the decision, adopted in parliament by a close vote, sharply divided public opinion in Spain, and the Socialists came into power in October 1982, not in the least on their anti-NATO program.

When Spain joined the European Community in January 1986, the government scheduled for March of that year a referendum on NATO membership. The government attempted to "sell" its referendum campaign, now tuned to Antlanticism, by pledging not to take part in the integrated military structure, to prohibit the installation and stationing of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil, and to reduce the American military presence. The outcome of the referendum, confounding the pollsters, was a pro-NATO victory. Against the approximately 52 percent of yes votes, the proportion of no votes was less than 40 percent.

The referendum closed a chapter in Spanish-NATO relations, and in 1986 Madrid informed the alliance's supreme decisionmaking body, the [North] Atlantic Council, that Spain too had conditions and could envisage participation in the military alliance only if those conditions were met. According to these conditions, Spain would be willing to participate in all NATO bodies but would stipulate that Spanish forces could not be deployed under NATO's integrated command, only under Spanish command and together with allied forces. The government thought these restrictions would take the wind out of the opposition's sails. Instead, the opposition accused the government of circumventing the referendum's outcome and plotting a secret military integration with Brussels. NATO circles disliked Spain's "impertinent" conditions but accepted them in the end. The experience of the past decade proves that Spain's participation in NATO has become a kind of model and seems readily applicable to future members as well.

Meanwhile, Spain's armed forces also changed considerably during the 1980's. The military has been placed strictly under the control of the executive branch. Modernization has given the armed forces new equipment, including F-18 fighter-bombers, equipment for electronic warfare, and the new tanks now in the order of battle. Furthermore, without going into details, also modern methods of training. All this is a peculiar twist of Spanish history. After all, the armed forces had been the Franco regime's most important means of repression, although their mobilization readiness had been rated by experts as hopeless. By international standards, military spending remained low throughout the 1980's, about 2 percent of GDP. Probably the trimming of the top-heavy command structure also helped to keep military spending low. The number of generals, for instance, was reduced from 520 to 280. At the same time, in the spirit of creating a professional army, the number of noncommissioned officers was increased considerably. The fact that direct contacts with officers of other NATO countries have enhanced the professional level of Spain's commissioned officers is also listed among the advantages Spain derives from NATO membership. But analysts regard as the greatest achievement the successful adaptation of the armed forces to the system of democratic institutions. However, opinion polls suggest that Spanish society has long remained mistrustful of the armed forces, saying that the new constitutional order was not to the liking of the commissioned personnel, privileged under Franco.

Hungary: Government Signs Agreement With Public Employees

LD2803223796 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 28 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government has signed a three-year agreement with representatives of trade unions, self governments, and employers on future cooperation. The social partners will jointly participate in work relating to the reform of state finances. According to the document, next year public employees' real wages will not decrease further.

[Unidentified correspondent] Prior to the government spokesman's regular briefing, a three-year agreement on public employees was signed by the member unions of the interest coordination council of budgetary institutions in the presence of Prime Minister Gyula Horn and several other ministers. The document was signed by 32 employees' and employers' trade unions, and then by Gyula Horn, too.

The prime minister attributed great political significance to the document because, in his view, since the change of system [1990], it is the first agreement between the government and the social partners that makes cooperation predictable for several years:

[Begin Horn recording] I am convinced that certain elements of this agreement can really contribute to strengthening social and political stability. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The agreement that concerns 650,000 people stipulates that public employees' real wages, following a 2-percent decrease this year, will not fall next year. The sides also undertook an obligation to cooperate in the creation and implementation of state finances reform. [passage omitted]

Hungary: MSZP Official Evaluates Party Congress

AU0404170696 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 4 Apr 96 p 6

[Interview with MSZP Deputy Chairman Bela Katona by "zmeskall"; place and date not given: "Katona's Views on the Economic Policy—The Government Is Keeping the Direction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At last weekend's Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] congress, Bela Katona came in second with 311 votes in the contest for the executive deputy chairperson's position behind Mrs. Magda Kovacs Kosa, and he was elected into the 15-member executive committee with 707 votes, as one of the three deputy chairmen. The composition of the executive committee has significantly changed. We interviewed Katona, who has engineering, economic engineer, and specialized economics qualifications, on how the personnel changes affect the party's and the government's economic policy.*

[Katona] I do not think that we need to change direction. The party specified the basic tasks two years ago in its election program, and we have not since changed them. It is the government's job to implement the goals. I do not believe it would now be fortunate for the party also to start dealing with economic policy issues. The party and the executive committee have to express their opinion when they believe that the government is diverting from the previously approved direction. This has not happened and I do not think that it will happen in the near future, either. Therefore, I do not think that the executive committee should now be dealing with economic policy issues.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] If no change can be expected, is it possible that we are making no headway?

[Katona] Not at all, we need to go forward. The country will not put up with another 12-percent reduction in real wages. We have a short breathing space and we have to make use of it in the country's interest. In addition to continuing the stabilization, we must create the economic conditions which are absolutely necessary for the growth of enterprises and the economy. This is guaranteed by the changed style the government has been following since the end of last year. It is preparing the concept of the state administration's reform with the help of experts and cooperating partners. In the two years before the elections, we must complete privatization, inflation has to be reduced, and a stable and comprehensible tax system has to be set up. We must bring in an equivalent amount of foreign capital to the current account deficit. In addition to drawing up the concept of the state administration's reform, it also has to be consistently implemented. The congress has now given authorization to the government for these goals and tasks. In the meantime, we must not forget about ordinary people living on wages and salaries who are putting up with the burdens of the transformation with exemplary patience. They understand and actively help its implementation. They must not in the future be exposed to measures which are not prepared, are anticonstitutional, and which have to be withdrawn after their introduction!

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] You also resigned from your position of minister after a government decision—the Bokros package—which was later declared partly anticonstitutional. On 30 March, before the election, one of the delegates said how would a person, who was unable to stand by the government's program as minister, be able to stand by the party program supporting the government in the capacity of deputy chairman or member of the executive committee. Nevertheless, three resigned ministers—Mrs. Kosa, Pal Kovacs, and you—are part of the executive committee. I could also mention Gyorgy Janosi who resigned from the position of state secretary and is now again deputy chairman.

[Katona] This question was also raised in many places before the congress. A large section of the membership thought that the two issues are not closely connected. The government has to function as a very united organization, and if someone has problems with some parts of the governmental work, then he should hand over his position to someone who can work together with the united team. This does not stop the resigning government member from identifying with the party's policies. This is very well proved by the fact that none of the resigned ministers left the party or conducted politics against the party. People can have different views on certain issues but we have unity on the basic issues.

Judging from the votes, this was also the opinion of the congress.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Is it possible that these people became popular precisely through their resignation?

[Katona] Current ministers, as well as the resigned ministers, became members of the executive committee; in fact, the chairman of the national committee is also a minister, Ferenc Baja. Therefore, rather than the resignation or lack of, what played a role in the elections were the candidates' political beliefs and how suitably they are considered to be able to represent the party.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] However, one of the ministers—Tamas Suchman—left the party and the parliamentary group precisely because he only received 302 votes for becoming an executive committee member, having the confidence of less than half of the 801 delegates. According to the prime minister, this is not a reason for withdrawing his ministerial commission because two other ministers—Imre Dunai and Peter Medgyessy—who are not members of any parties are also part of the government. What is the opinion of the parliamentary group and the MSZP executive committee on this? On 31 March, parliamentary group leader Imre Szekeres said that the 209-member parliamentary group will have to continue its work on 1 April, and this figure included the privatization minister.

[Katona] We did not deal with Suchman's announcement at the 1 April morning parliamentary group session. He did not participate in it and he did not officially announce his resignation to us. I am, of course, not saying that we need not take his intention seriously. It is up to the prime minister whether he wants to keep him as minister. As far as I know, he still has confidence in Suchman.

Hungary: Suchman Views MSZP Personnel Issues

AU0404154596 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 4 Apr 96 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Privatization Minister Tamas Suchman by Anna Dano in Marcali on 3 April: "Suchman: It Was a Mistake To Push out the MSZOSZ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On 3 April in Marcali, in his home area, Privatization Minister Tamas Suchman and Mrs. Magda Kosa Kovacs, Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] executive deputy chairperson, reported to the Somogy county MSZP chairmen on the events of last weekend's party congress. This is where Suchman would have explained the reasons for his withdrawal from the party and the parliamentary group, had he not since changed his mind and decided to remain in the party. Suchman gave an interview to NEPSZAVA before the closed session but he declined to talk about the details of his resignation and reentry.*

[Dano] You have been known for your heated, sometimes provocative statements, but you always remained loyal to Prime Minister Gyula Horn. Why did you now lose your loyalty?

[Suchman] Our relationship is not based on one governmental cycle, and it is not only in connection with governing. In a certain sense, this is a civil connection. I should obviously have taken into consideration that I also harmed Horn and the party with my steps. This was not my intention.

[Dano] To what extent do you consider your actions befitting a politician?

[Suchman] I do not consider them befitting a politician; they were human, rather than politician actions. Perhaps I can be forgiven for this.

[Dano] The atmosphere before the MSZP's November congress was rather tense; many people demanded personnel changes. These were postponed to March. Did the personnel changes reflect the wishes of those who originally wanted them?

[Suchman] At the Miskolc congress, the delegates obviously brought with them the national mood reflecting the economic situation, social tension, and the budget restrictions. At that time, this situation made many people believe that radical personnel changes were needed. The situation became more consolidated by March. This does not mean that the delegates agreed with all measures, methods, and their effects. There was a general wish that the chairman of the national committee and some other chairmen should be replaced. The majority of the delegates left the congress feeling that the need had been fulfilled.

[Dano] What were the reasons for the personnel changes?

[Suchman] Delegates from the provinces were dissatisfied with [national committee chairman] Ivan Vitanyi. In the case of personnel issues, the changes are always decided by the momentary situation.

[Dano] Was the situation the same in your case?

[Suchman] I do not wish to answer this.

[Dano] What changes do you expect from Ferenc Baja as head of the national committee?

[Suchman] I was against replacing Vitanyi, but I accepted the decision of the congress. I found the way he was removed wrong. The fate of a person, whose whole life is connected to the social democratic left-wing movements, should have been settled in a different way, not through this kind of public defeat. It was a mistake that Baja did not present his program at the congress. Although he has recently been making many visits to the provinces and he has conducted a campaign in his own favor, obviously the correct thing to do would have been to have a true and fair contest.

I find the national committee to be important in the party's life. It is always important for a party to organize the forum systems. I do not believe that the MSZP is simply an election party; its character as a movement is also important.

[Dano] What are your views on the fact that the MSZP's several important groups and platforms, or which are believed to be important—the trade union line, workers' faction, left-wing group, the Hajos group—did not get into the party's leadership?

[Suchman] The executive committee has to be united. There is no room for all the existing tendencies in it. However, it is true that the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions, our 1994 election ally, was unduly pushed out of the party's executive committee. The trade unions must be part of the party's center; therefore, their representatives should be in the executive committee. I hope that they can get adequate positions in the national committee. A social democratic party cannot be characterized by the fact that it forgets or replaces its allies.

[Dano] To what extent is the new executive committee identical to the future national list of the 1998 elections? Will it again be possible to come in at the top from the outside as Sandor Nagy did in 1994?

[Suchman] I hope that we will not have internal fighting. The year 1998 is still far away, and it is not at all certain that the list will be made up from the members who have now been elected.

[Dano] Is there any message in the rejection of the general deputy chairman's position or is this only a technical issue? What was the problem with the executive deputy chairman?

[Suchman] I do not think it was a good decision to reject the position of general deputy chairman. This function would have indicated that the party has to be led more actively even between two elections.

[Dano] Is it correct to say that those people who have recently made critical remarks about the party leadership and the chairman have been dropped?

[Suchman] The cases should be looked at individually, but I can remember that those who were left off the list do not particularly criticize the party or Horn. This was not the guiding principle.

[Dano] It has become known about the Hajos group that it requested a partial reassessment of the coalition agreement. To what extent do you agree with this and on which points can you see a possibility to do this?

[Suchman] In its statement, the Hajos movement formulated the party's insistence on true left-wing values. This was a valuable political statement and its closing thoughts should have been included in the party congress's documents in a prominent place. The statement is about the governing party's commitment and responsibility to the nation. I can only say it was a malicious rumor that, even before the document was completed, people quoted from it that we want to reassess the coalition agreement. This did not even emerge.

[Dano] The March Statement accepted at the congress—and Horn's speech, too—placed the emphasis on easing the social problems. In your view, is there a danger that we will use up last year's gains?

[Suchman] I am not one of those who accept [former finance minister] Lajos Bokros's work without criticism, but the stabilization program has many favorable effects. Therefore, the 1994 situation cannot be repeated. The economy can already put up with parallel processes; therefore, in addition to stabilization, we must deal with the issues of growth. I hope that Finance Minister Medgyessy has brought some changes in this respect compared to Bokros.

[Dano] What changes can you see in governmental work since Bokros's departure?

[Suchman] I have no reason to hurt my former minister colleague. I appreciated what he did but criticized his methods. The government sessions have been more relaxed since he left but this does not mean that Medgyessy is more lenient.

Hungary: New Group Offers Alternative to Smallholders Party

LD3103110796 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 31 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Smallholders of Hungary [Kisgazdak Magyarorszagi Szoevetsege] has just been set up in Zsombo, Csongrad County [southern Hungary]. The founders offer an alternative to the Jozsef Torgyan-led Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP-opposition parliamentary party]. Endre Reigl reports:

[Reigl] This day is a celebration for all those people who are Smallholders at heart, but who were forced to leave the FKGP because of Jozsef Torgyan's policy of exclusion, Chairman Jenoe Gerbovics told the rally.

As of today, all the Smallholder parties and organizations that oppose Jozsef Torgyan are members of the movement, which was recently registered at a court. The parties and organizations have not given up their independence. However, they work together to establish from bottom to top a new Smallholder association that works in a democratic way and which may offer an alternative to the Smallholders who are currently in parliament as early as at the 1998 elections, the chairman said. His words were echoed by the heads of the member organizations.

B-H: Presidency Expresses 'Profound Regret' Over Brown Demise

AU0404145996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed listeners, we have just received news that the 317th session of the Bosnian Presidency was held today. Presidency Member Ejup Ganic chaired the session.

The Presidency reviewed the founding of the Forum for the Federation and extended support to the United States' expanded involvement in the implementation of the Dayton accords; at the same time, the Presidency requested that all signatories of the documents and participants of the Dayton conference increase their efforts to implement the agreement.

Regarding the problems of refugees and displaced persons, the Presidency decided to debate the issue at the next session, based on progress reports to be submitted by the Republican and Federal Governments. The respective prime ministers and department ministers will be invited to attend the session.

The Presidency decided at today's session to rename the 4th Brigade of the 4th Corps, which is to be called the 4th Glorious Brigade.

Regarding the tragic plane crash that took the life of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown, the Presidency expressed profound regret and expressed its condolences to the families of the deceased and to the American people, the President, and the Administration.

The Presidency also reviewed other pertinent issues.

B-H: U.S. 'Anger' Over Relations With Iran Viewed

AU0204190296 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 30 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Zija Dizdarevic: "SDA and (or) USA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry is the next high-level official from Washington to visit Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to stimulate the peace process. Perry will particularly focus on current problems, among which the Federation tops the list. Of course, there will be talks on how to strengthen the Federation's defense capability.

One can assume that the Iranian mujahidin in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Agency for Investigation and Documentation [AID] will again be tackled, as these questions are seriously burdening the relationship between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United States.

Iran's Complex

Top military and political officials in Sarajevo persistently deny the existence of any Iranian nationals under arms in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Americans even more persistently claim that there are around 100 of them left. Their anger is great, and, among other things, it is reflected by the attitude that there will be no U.S. aid for defense until the last foreign solider leaves Bosnia-Herzegovina. True, according to their latest statements, the Americans agree that those foreigners who started families here and who are demobilized may stay. According to President Izetbegovic, there are around 50 such foreigners.

It is undoubtedly necessary to meet the peace accord requirement on the departure of foreign soldiers from Bosnia-Herzegovina. They, who so wholeheartedly helped us, will understand our position. However, the question is whether it is solely the implementation of the peace accord that prompted such a severe reaction on the part of the United States.

The animosity between the United States and Iran is a matter of elementary nature. Washington considers this country to be the major inspirer and organizer of terrorism worldwide. The latest massacres in Israel are being closely linked to Tehran. Clinton's democratic predecessor Jimmy Carter experienced a political fiasco because of the failed operation to rescue the American hostages in Iran. Washington holds a serious grudge against Iran. This has to do with fear that assumes almost paranoid features, which can easily be seen from NATO's search for mujahidin in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All in all, to the United States, Iran is a dangerous ideological opponent that endangers its global interests and even threatens terrorist actions in the United States.

On the other hand, at the time of inglorious trials to Izetbegovic, [Omer] Behmen and others, this group's ties to the Iranian theocratic authorities and their stay in Tehran were being mentioned. During the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran was our most persistent and reliable ally. The Iranians not only helped us with arms, but with political action as well. They mediated in improving relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo, and in establishing indirect contacts with Belgrade. Izetbegovic pointed out in his interview to FOCUS that Prime Minister Muratovic went to Tehran in order to adjust our relations with Iran to those of peacetime conditions.

Partisan Police

While expounding on this topic, it is certainly impossible not to recall Bakir Alispahic's departure as the head of AID. This occurred under pressure from Washington, given its suspicion that Alispahic was directly in charge of maintaining the Iranian connection. The Americans are even demanding AID's dissolution. They consider this security service to be a secret police that is completely controlled by the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], or rather they believe that AID is not the state police but a partisan police that maintains particular connections with the Iranian intelligence service.

It is obvious that the Americans are reserved towards Alija Izetbegovic. Basically, it is the same type of reserve held by the communist regime toward Izetbegovic when he was imprisoned. Both the Americans and the Europeans dread the possibility of a strong ideological and military infrastructure of radical pan-Islamism setting its foot in the Balkans. So far there has not been a single indication speaking in favor of this possibility, though.

The Americans believe that Izetbegovic alone represents no danger. After all, he eventually has proven to be quite a cooperative political partner. However, Washington fears the right wing in the SDA with a strong national and religious feature, that could (mis)use at a certain point of time its undoubtedly strong influence in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the police. That is, the Americans are looking with utmost skepticism at the SDA's monopolistic behavior and Izetbegovic's political domination, being particularly concerned about what a situation like the recent one, when he was hospitalized, could bring about.

During his stay in Sarajevo, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher found a way to meet with Silajdzic, who is no longer the prime minister or a party official. This, just like some other indicators, yields a conclusion that the Americans are quite fond of Silajdzic, to put it mildly. In political circles it is believed that Silajdzic enjoys their support in quite concrete terms as well.

American Choice

That the United States favors Silajdzic is quite understandable. He is the only Bosniak who is able to rival Izetbegovic. It is believed that he, if nothing else, can weaken the SDA's influence over the Bosniak people. The Americans will certainly support Silajzic's even greater aspirations, and that would be his determination to rally a strong opposition block around himself to act alongside the name of his party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. In all of this, one should not forget that the Americans do not support the option of a strong opposition bloc composed of leftist parties as a counterbalance to the national parties either. For this reason, as well, Silajdzic suits them most, as a man of the political middle.

B-H: Commentary on IFOR's Increasing Presence

AU0404203096 Ljubljana SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 4 Apr 96 pp 10-11

[Commentary by Djuro Kozar: "Gentle Invasion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Avdo Hebib recently complained to international mediator Christian Schwartz-Schilling about the Implementation Force [IFOR] and asked for his support in resolving misunderstandings. The essence of the complaint is that NATO's "implementation forces" are storming facilities controlled by the federal police. Moreover, recently in Bihac, IFOR on several occasions disarmed police officers for no reason whatsoever. Rasim Delic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff commander, voiced similar complaints when IFOR stormed the barracks named after Tito and known as "Marshall's barracks" ["marsalka"], from which they almost expelled the Bosnian Army.

Neither such nor similar criticism directed at the methods of this peacekeeping, but nevertheless foreign army on the territory of a sovereign state and UN member, seem to bother Admiral Leighton Smith or the IFOR commander on the ground. Since 20 December 1995, when it took over from the UN Protection Force, IFOR has proclaimed its mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina a top priority that cannot be limited or controlled by the Bosnians.

Several domestic analysts have already assessed that Bosnia-Herzegovina is an occupied country, but that none of the officials have said so publicly. Thus, the old truth that a state inevitably loses its sovereignty once a foreign army enters its territory is being confirmed in the region for over three months.

Bosnia as a Training Ground

IFOR's deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the largest concentration of a military force in Europe since World War II. IFOR comprises some 60,000 exceptionally trained troops from 32 countries equipped with state-of-the-art equipment. Their ground forces have tanks and other combat armored vehicles, artillery, and state-of-the-art surveillance equipment, while air and naval support is provided from the Adriatic.

This military force is not only strolling through Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is also demonstrating its lethal powers. IFOR artillery units toward the end of February carried out their first howitzer target practice with live ammunition. The long-range, 155-mm AS-90 artillery pieces fired three shells in 10 seconds. On this occasion, their targets were the minefields on one of the hills. We have learned, however, that this was just an introduction for a multinational maneuver that will take place at a new training location. It seems that all of Bosnia is about to become a large training area.

Mujahidin as Justification

NATO's show of force in Bosnia-Herzegovina has two objectives: first, it will test the firing and maneuvering capabilities of the multinational forces, and second, it will make it clear to the three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H Army, the Croatian Defense Council, and the Serb entity's army) who they are dealing with.

THE WASHINGTON POST published the news that over 1,000 troops of the U.S. intelligence service are stationed in northeastern Bosnia as support for the U.S. IFOR Headquarters in Tuzla. Two hundred CIA agents are among them. They are equipped with such sophisticated surveillance equipment that literally nothing can escape them—they see and hear everything.... Although IFOR spokesmen are saying that their powerful equipment is only used to bug and monitor military facilities, there are indications that they are expanding their activities, since curiosity is characteristic of every intelligence activity.

From the victim's point of view—Bosnia-Herzegovina was attacked and is thus the victim—it is quite logical that IFOR would monitor the aggressor, that is, the Army of the Serb Republic. All the more so as it is still technically superior, and war criminals and warmongers, who have installed a totalitarian regime, are still in power in Pale. IFOR, however, does not discriminate—they treat the aggressor and the victim in the same manner. In fact, they have lately been more courageous and active in the victim's domain, and have deployed special antisabotage units and even helicopter assault units on the territory of the Federation. Moreover, enough has already been said about IFOR storming a federal police camp in Dusine near Fojnica. But that is not all.

We should primarily look for reasons for IFOR's methods in the fact that the Americans, and not only they, are trying to clear the Federation of "mujahidin." These are "foreign forces" which include all those troops who are not from the local area. According to an annex of the Dayton accords, foreign forces include various advisers, instructors, and volunteer groups from neighboring and other countries. Since these forces should have been either withdrawn or repatriated—and it seems that this was not done everywhere—IFOR organized a systematic hunt on Islamic fundamentalists hiding in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bosnian Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic, in his first public address after being released from the hospital, said that it was absolutely untrue that some 200 "mujahidin" still resided in Bosnia. He added that about 50 demobilized; therefore, former troops of the "El-Mudzahid" unit were still in two locations in Bosnia. According to Izetbegovic, they are now civilians who in the meantime got married in Bosnia. We will just add that these foreigners have bought themselves a wife or two, and they have stayed in Bosnia because they have nowhere to go back to.

Since this is the way things are, certain Sarajevo officials wanted to employ these "friends of Bosnia," who love it to the last German mark, as local police instructors. These individuals were not satisfied with someone like Dragan Vikic teaching his extensive knowledge and experience to the police; they wanted the training to be ideological as well as military and police training, and they scored a point against their own state! And now they have IFOR breathing down their necks, checking under every doormat for foreign troops in civilian garb.

A Single Standard

IFOR does not need much provocation to become unpleasant in implementing its mandate. They have shown that they will not spare anyone. True, legitimate Bosnian authorities would like to see IFOR hunting down Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic with the same zeal used in looking for "mujahidin." The Hague Tribunal last year indicted Karadzic and Mladic for genocide and issued warrants for their arrest, but NATO has its own strategy and, despite everything, is sticking to it. If, while doing so, they occasionally step on someone's toes, they remain unfazed and put it all down to experience! And they have a one-year mandate here, with the possibility of extension in case of a tie.

Certain Sarajevo citizens are now greatly bothered by the fact that one can no longer see any Bosnian troops in the Federation capital, but only IFOR troops. According to the military annex of the Dayton accord, all units and headquarters were to withdraw 2 km from the separation lines. Since the center of Sarajevo is in this prohibited zone, the local army had to withdraw to the suburbs. That is why our troops can no longer be found in "Marshall's barracks," but neither can Serbian troops be found in Lukavica. Pale, too, has been demilitarized. That is why recent headlines in Sarajevo dailies looked rather curious: "Bosnian Army Withdraws From Sarajevo" or "We Defended Ourselves From the Chetniks, But Not From IFOR."

NATO's "implementation force" is trying to be objective and is trying to apply the same standard to everyone. The Bosnians will only believe this once they see Karadzic and Mladic in handcuffs. It seems that IFOR Headquarters are aware of this, and that is why they have announced that the criminals could soon fall into a trap, which means that the trap is being set, and thus the panic in the ranks of the Pale leaders' extensive security.

The peace mission comprising some 60,000 multinational troops is based on the Dayton accord. It has to be admitted that the legitimate federal authorities consented to the arrival of these numerous troops. At the time when this peace mission was being planned, the war was raging in Bosnia and the main goal was to stop the evil. Now, when peace has arrived, and the arming of the federal army (B-H Army and the Croatian Defense Council) seems increasingly certain, perhaps Sarajevo should initiate corrections to IFOR's mandate and should demand a decrease of its current number of arms and manpower. The status quo should not be allowed to go on for too long.

B-H: Negotiations Under Way for Release of POW's

LD0504100496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0946 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Apr. 5 (TANJUG)—Spokesman for the international high representative for Bosnia, Duncan Bullivant, has said talks were under way for the exchange of prisoners in Bosnia.

The release of all POWs is a requirement for the holding of a conference on the reconstruction of Bosnia in Brussels on Apr. 12 and 13, said Bullivant.

Our stand is clear: There is no conference without the release, Bullivant told the AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE news agency.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, there are still 88 prisoners held in jails in Bosnia.

Bullivant said Bildt's office for implementing the civilian aspects of the Bosnia accord would exert strong pressure on all sides (Muslim, Serb and Croat) to release the prisoners.

The three parties were bound under the accord to release all POWs by Jan. 19.

B-H: RS' Krajisnik Comments on Sarajevo, Dayton, Elections

AU0404170796 Belgrade ARGUMENT in Serbo-Croatian 22 Mar 96 p 4

[Interview with Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Bosnian Serb assembly, by Marina Lalovic; place and date not given: "They Have Taken Sarajevo, and Now the Problem of Brcko Follows"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lalovic] Mr. Krajisnik, are you feeling betrayed or disappointed by the solutions from Dayton, because you had different expectations and proposals that you had insisted on at earlier talks and had also proposed in Dayton?

[Krajisnik] The international community promised a lot; it promised us compact territories, a wide corridor in the Brcko area, access to the sea, and parts of Sarajevo. But it has to be said that we went to Dayton aware that pressure would be exerted on us. Sanctions were also one of the measures of coercion, even though this was never stated aloud. I did not sign the Dayton document. I have to say that I did not agree with the military aspects of the agreement. It did not define the role of the Implementation Force [IFOR], while our parliament also limited my rights and abilities, because there was a decision on who was able to approve NATO troop deployments in our territory and how that was to be done. The second reason why I did not sign the accord was the maps. We felt that we could have achieved a better solution, that is, better maps with the same percentages. With this, the international community created great problems for us. We thought that the agreement would enable us to organize the return of 100,000 refugees to their homes, while what happened in reality was even worse, that is, the accord created an additional 140,000 refugees. Besides, there is also the unresolved issue of our access to the sea and the betrayed hopes that we would be able to have confederal links with Serbia and Yugoslavia. Communications and territorial connections between parts of the republic have been cut in several places: The road from Lukavica (Serb Sarajevo) to Pale has been cut, as well as the road from Lukavica to Herzegovina at Trnovo. These are all solutions forced on the Serb side. But you have to know, although our delegation did not sign the document in Dayton, we took it upon ourselves to implement it, and there will be no problems with our side in that regard. We do not want to endanger peace, and any person in charge of the implementation of the accord will fulfill all of his or hers obligations. [passage omitted]

[Lalovic] Mr. Krajisnik, although you have singled out many deficiencies of the accord, it still appears that, at the moment, Sarajevo is the greatest problem.

[Krajisnik] There are two flashpoints in our republic: The issue of Sarajevo at the moment and the issue of Brcko in the future. At the Assembly meeting in which we discussed the Dayton accord, I demanded a clearer presentation of the problem. I said that without Sarajevo the whole of the eastern part of the republic would be hard to sustain. There must exist an administrative center to rally the citizens of the eastern part of the state and satisfy their needs. Without Brcko the state would be cut in two, and I do not have to tell you what that means. We shall have a lot of problems until the issue is definitely settled. Sarajevo is the most painful issue also because the settlement found for this city is, if I may say so, a crime against this people. Sarajevo is the capital of the Serb Republic [RS]. Sarajevo is its cultural center. Sarajevo used to be the second biggest Serb city in the former Yugoslavia. Sarajevo involves 30 percent of all industrial capacities in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, so it is not the same to have, instead of Sarajevo, a certain percentage of territory elsewhere. This means that the loss of Sarajevo is a terrible injury to us. That loss is irreparable. We did everything to keep the Serbs in Sarajevo, but the propaganda from the other side, assisted by the lack of interest on the part of the international community, compelled the Serbs to leave the city. Considering that the peace accord has created new refugee waves from Sarajevo, Konjic, Olovo, and Vukosavlje (Odzak), then I wonder whether it can be called a peace accord at all. Unfortunately, the Serbs in Sarajevo did not have enough strength to resist this last offensive, the media one, and struggle for Sarajevo. They lost the last battle for their city. It will be very difficult for me to get over this loss. However, the Serbs must be fully aware that, due to foreign pressure, they lost something that they will probably never be able to restore or make up for again. The Serbs were very fond of their city, and if somebody offered them Washington or Paris in exchange, they would still have chosen their own city. The Serbs left their city, and now the entire intelligentsia is scattered and dispersed all over the Serb Republic.

Reasons To Stay

[Lalovic] Admiral Smith, Carl Bildt, and his deputy Michael Steiner have admitted on several occasions that a great part of the blame for the exodus of Serbs can be put on the government in Sarajevo. However, lately, there have been more and more frequent accusations addressed to you and the leadership of the Serb Republic!

[Krajisnik] That is absolutely not true. Perhaps it would be even simpler to say that is a big and abominable lie. We did everything to encourage the Serbs to stay in Sarajevo, for many reasons. First, because they defended it militarily. Second, because we knew we did not have the capacity to accommodate such a great number of people. Therefore, we invested a lot of political work and propaganda in attempts to persuade the Serbs to stay in Sarajevo. But other, stronger and more powerful, factors wanted them to leave, and they did everything to drive them away. And now, in order to shrug off the responsibility, they are putting blame on us. Indeed, in terms of Sarajevo, we do not feel any guilt. Or rather, perhaps we are guilty of believing that something could be done for Sarajevo, that we were telling our people not to go, to stay, so now we are guilty in the eyes of our people because they did not leave earlier. I think everybody who happens to read this should decide for himself how much we are to blame, and whom we have harmed the most. Few people even wanted to know that we had passed a decree forbidding municipal authorities to issue residence permits or to take in refugees from Sarajevo, and at a certain stage the police were even preventing people from leaving the city, bringing them back home in trucks. We did all that with the intention of keeping the Sarajevans, of saving our city, because we believed that only if they stayed there, would we and they together be able to keep what was given to us by Dayton, that is, to struggle for our rights by political means. I am not inventing any excuses for myself and our leadership to justify our actions before our people, the Muslims, the Hague tribunal, or the international community. In Sarajevo, we are the losers. And our people know best where the truth lies. The people did not want to remain under the Muslim authorities. They wanted to obtain a minimum of rights. The Muslims did not allow that, and how the Sarajevo Serbs would have fared had they stayed is shown best by the latest events in Ilidza and all other municipalities where the transfer of authority has taken place. The Muslims now, in order to justify their actions, are addressing accusations to the weakest side, which is our side. I do no feel sorry or regret that our enemies are doing that, but we feel sorry at seeing such accusations coming from our own side, from our friends, who do not want to understand the situation and are closing their eyes to the truth. The whole world may put the blame on us, but we are innocent in the eyes of God. [passage omitted]

Karadzic and Mladic

[Lalovic] What are the institutions of the Serb Republic doing about the Tribunal in The Hague and the indictments brought against Serb officers, but also about the indictments brought so far against the leading people of the Serb Republic?

[Krajisnik] We are able to do very little about that, for a simple reason: Since General Djukic was indicted, even though he used to be a logistician in charge of logistical support for his army, then anybody may be indicted. It is very difficult to struggle against such an injustice. We can hardly resist such indictments. Each one of our meetings with the international community's representatives boils down to their question of why we do not cooperate with the Hague Tribunal, why we do not give them a list of the Muslims whom we have accused of war crimes. But that is not our way of fighting against the lies and propaganda aimed at us. We feel the Tribunal has to be above politics. It is difficult to accept the legitimacy of that court. In any case, in the eyes of the Muslims all the Serbs are guilty, and the Muslims are used to getting what they want from the international community. Now they have demanded that The Hague and the international community bring discredit upon and eliminate key Serb leaders so that they can choose proper Serbs as representatives of the Serb people, as they have so far, and then build with them a state that suits them alone. Therefore, our opponents, or now our partners in talks on the future state, will try to discredit any Serb who fights for the independence and statehood of the Serb Republic. For four years now, we have been passing a test before our people and our conscience. I do not want to say that I, or my political friends and fellow fighters, support crime and injustice. No. Everyone who is a criminal, who has committed a crime, has to answer for it. The law must be respected. But, in all of this, it is important who creates the laws, who brings charges against you, and who tries you. That cannot be the Muslim government. The practice that used to be pursued in Bosnia earlier, that "the same judge sues and tries you" [paraphrase of an old saying] is no longer acceptable.

[Lalovic] How do you comment on certain statements that the Serb Republic's leadership is in hiding and that IFOR is increasingly searching parts of the territory that are assumed to contain your hideout?

[Krajisnik] I think that everyone knows, at almost all times, the whereabouts of each one of us. Each Serb knows that, and members of IFOR know that as well. After all, we have never been in hiding, and our every step has been public. When President Karadzic was visiting Banja Luka, the media regularly carried reports on his visit and activities. The same thing applies to Gen. Mladic. He performs his regular duties, and so do I. The stories about our being in hiding are designed to belittle us and to discredit us.

[Lalovic] The Dayton accord has obliged all the parties to meet the set deadlines. So far, everything has been going according to plan. The deadline for elections has been set as well. However, one can frequently hear rumors that they will, perhaps, be postponed. Why?

[Krajisnik] The extension of the deadlines set for conducting the elections is forced and desired by people who believe that, as time goes by, our reputation and our contribution will slowly be forgotten, our weakness will prevail, and then some other party favoring reintegration will win the elections more easily. However, those who think so are wrong. Our people are able and know how to see through such intentions. They have suffered a lot, too much to easily forget and forgive again. The elections must be an expression of our people's will. I do not believe that any option that would return things to the starting point could win. This Serb state, established on 49 percent of the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the state of this people, the people that created it and fought for it, and the people will be able to recognize who wants to belittle their struggle, to nullify it, and make the Serbs forget about the price they paid for it. Each one of us fought for this state of ours in his or her own way: Soldiers in the trenches, women, the elderly, children. I do not believe that they will renounce their contribution to the creation and preservation of this state. It is true that there are many problems, some of them a result of the war and some a result of our lack of experience, but the truth is that we will be able to deal with them and resolve them only if we have a state of our own.

[Lalovic] Your answer introduces a new question. Does the Serb Republic have enough experts and skilled people to resolve all the problems it is facing right now?

[Krajisnik] For the time being, it does not. The Serb Republic needs experts, skilled people who will take part in its defense and reconstruction. Therefore, we have to do anything to keep people here, to allow them to see that they have a chance here, but also to bring back those who left, for whatever reason. [passage omitted]

B-H: Karadzic Rejects Church's Asylum Offer on Mt Athos

AU0504064996 Paris AFP in English 0335 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 5 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who is wanted on war crimes charges, has rejected an offer from the Serb Orthodox Church of sanctuary in one of its monasteries in Greece, the weekly MONITOR reported here.

The magazine, published in Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro, said the leadership of the church proposed that he become a monk in the mediaeval Shilandar monastery on Mount Athos, which enjoys extraterritorial status.

Karadzic, a trained psychiatrist, turned down the offer, saying that he intended to set up a private mental hospital with his wife, who is a doctor, and his daughter, a medical student, the report said.

No confirmation of the report could be obtained from Church authorities here or in Podgorica.

Karadzic is wanted by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

B-H: Kasagic, EU Envoy Discuss Reconstruction Priorities

LD0404163596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1256 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Apr (SRNA)—Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, held talks in Pale today with EU representative Doante Kiarini, on the establishment of economic cooperation based on donated funds.

"We have discussed certain economic problems in the Serb Republic about which I informed the EU representative in detail so that they can decide where and how to prioritize in helping the Serb Republic with its revitalization, reconstruction, and development," Kasagic said and added:

"The greatest problems are the road and railway network and telecommunications."

Kasagic stressed that the EU was doing its utmost to rebuild trust and establish certain economic relations between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

"We are not opposed to establishing certain relations with the federation, but we will demand that the Serb Republic have its own systems [not further identified]. We wish to cooperate with Europe and develop the market economy and modern technology," the prime minister said.

Kiarini said that he had been appointed the EU commission representative only recently and that today's visit was a protocol one to find out about problems in the Serb Republic.

According the him, the commission has identified priorities with the help of studies made by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; however, the priorities in reconstruction and repair should be identified by the Serb Republic government.

B-H: Delegation Pays First Visit to Prison Camp in Serbia

AU0504133296 Paris AFP in English 1312 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 5 (AFP)—A Bosnian Government delegation has paid a first-ever visit to a prison camp in Serbia where hundreds of Moslem men from eastern Bosnia are being held, the official BH-PRESS news agency reported Friday [5 April].

The three-member delegation returned to Sarajevo Thursday after making a two-day visit to the camp at Sljivovica near Uzice in Serbia, the agency said.

Some 276 Bosnian Moslem men are detained at the camp, the agency said. The majority were seized after the fall of the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa to the Bosnian Serbs in July last year, it added.

Amor Masovic, the head of the Bosnian prisoner exchange commission, said the camp was heavily guarded by Serbian police. Prisoners said that conditions had recently been improved but were still difficult.

Hepatitis was rife in the camp, the agency said.

Disabled people, young and elderly people were among those being held, it added.

Masovic and Amir Hadziomeragic, the minister responsible for relations with the UN and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), appealed to the UNHCR and IFOR to persuade Serbia to close the camp and repatriate all the prisoners.

The Foreign Ministry of rump Yugoslavia told the Bosnian delegation that all the prisoners would be returned to Bosnia if the UNHCR provided the means of transport and IFOR provided security, BH-PRESS said.

Recently, several hundred prisoners have been released from the camp at Sljivovica.

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, some 88 war prisoners are held by different former warring parties in Bosnia.

Masovic was unavailable for comment midday Friday.

The UNHCR in Sarajevo could not immediately say if it had received any requests to clear the camp.

B-H: GDS President on Declaration for Integral Bosnia

AU0404154996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Apr 96

[Interview with Ibrahim Spahic, Civic Democratic Party president and president of the Civic Forum's Executive Council, by Senada Cumurovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cumurovic] The Civic Democratic Party [GDS], and you yourself, Mr. Spahic, as president, are one of the 21 signatories of the Declaration for an Integral Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Spahic] [Words indistinct] a historic moment for Bosnia-Herzegovina, when, after over 30 to 40 various agreements pertaining to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the end of the war, and the peace process in the country, we can [words indistinct]. The state capital, Sarajevo, and the state itself, including all refugees and expelled persons, are the right place for deciding the future of the country. It is our opinion that the time has come for Bosnia-Herzegovia to openly address the issue of which forces are for preserving an integral state.

[Cumurovic] All those who support the idea of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina expressed in this way [words indistinct] to sign the Declaration. Mr. Spahic, will this be made possible for them?

[Spahic] First, all those interested in acquainting themselves with the text of the Declaration [words indistinct] can request a copy of the text by calling 38771/67-06-75, and second, they can send the text with their signature on it via the following fax numbers: 38771/52-58-78 and 55-36-26.

[Cumurovic] These are the telephone and fax numbers that the Civic Forum has put at the disposal of all citizens, institutions, political parties, and organizations throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and worldwide who support and wish to sign the Declaration for an Integral Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Koschnick Fears Croatian-German Military Cooperation

AU0504130696 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5 Apr 96 p 4

[Report by Erich Rathfelder: "Departure From Mostar: Hans Koschnick Criticizes Bonn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar—Is Bonn aiming at direct military cooperation with Croatia? Evidence is mounting that such cooperation is under discussion. However, it is unclear whether this cooperation would take place within the Western European Union or on a bilateral level. Hans Koschnick, the outgoing EU administrator in Mostar, explained the reasons for his resignation in an interview. Moreover, the behavior of the German politicians during the Dayton II agreement in Rome was not understandable. The German delegation no longer supported Koschnick's policy during this meeting in Rome at the beginning of March, in spite of the fact that he, Koschnick, fully endorsed Bonn's foreign policy on Mostar.

According to Koschnick, this decision only makes sense if Germany wants to support Croatian President Tudjman at all costs. This shows that military interests are involved. "If I also hear that talks are under way designed to ensure cooperation between the Bundeswehr and the Croatian Army, it is very easy to abandon the man in Mostar. Maybe this is the European division of labor within the alliance." Koschnick said literally.

On no account did he want to be an obstacle to the continued implementation of the Dayton agreement. However, even before the meeting in Rome, he had made it clear that he would resign if talks continued with those Croatian politicians who reject any cooperation with the EU administration in Mostar. European members of the conference did not take this criticism of the Croatian leadership's behavior in Mostar seriously. Thus, his resignation was only a logical consequence. If the Europeans and Germans had supported his position, a conflict with Croatia would have been unavoidable.

If Koschnick's accusations are right, a reversal in Germany's foreign policy is taking place. In the past, the German Government tried to avoid creating the impression that it is taking unilateral action in the Balkans. In Mostar, the EU administration's goal was to restore multiethnic coexistence in the united town. In addition, Germany's interest in the return of the refugees to the region also signaled support for the reconstruction of a united and democratic Bosnia.

B-H: New EU Mostar Administrator Profiled

BR0504084996 Brussels EUROPEAN VOICE in English 3-10 Apr 96 p 10

[Unattributed profile of Ricard Perez Casado, EU Administrator in Mostar: "Mostar's New Architect"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Seventeen years ago, Ricard Perez Casado brought a small revolution to Valencia. The long, dark era of General Franco's dictatorship had ended and a new generation of Socialist politicians swept into city halls all over Spain after the country's first democratic elections.

Henrique Salerno Galvan in Madrid, Pasqual Maragall in Barcelona, Frano Vazquez in La Corulla and Perez Casado in Valencia were the biggest drops in the ocean that engulfed even small towns.

Their mission was to bring the city administration under the control of the people, creating for the first time the notions of municipal services and of cities looking after their residents' needs.

"The new wave of mayors completely changed the relation of citizens to their cities," said an expert on Spanish affairs. "It had a major impact in Spain."

Perez Casado faced a huge job in Valencia, Spain's third largest city and an industrial centre with sprawling slums, but his experience as an architecture teacher and urban engineer helped him confront the task. Eight years after he left the mayor's office, he is still remembered in glowing terms.

The other remarkable innovation introduced by the mayors of Valencia and its sister cities was the concept of 'unity government.' Despite the Socialists' crushing victories over their opponents in electoral races from 1979 onwards, they were careful to include conservatives and other political parties in their municipal administrations.

Bringing Spain's cities out of the feudal age was so important, they felt, that politicians of all persuasions should be involved. Delicate consensus became an art under their guidance.

It is that experience which makes member states believe that Perez Casado can handle the job of administrator for the EU-run city of Mostar. There, he must bring Bosnian Croats and Muslims together, helping them to create a new environment in which they will share responsibility for the well-being and security of residents and where both sides feel the city is theirs.

But modernising a city is easier than rebuilding it, and bringing opposing political parties together to oversee municipal services is a far simpler matter than getting sworn blood enemies to share a territory that each side would like for its own.

Perez Casado recognizes the challenge and is starting to feel the pressure. The man chosen for this 'mission impossible' has aimed a broad smile at the cameras pursuing him recently and played down the enormity of his task by saying his predecessor has dealt with the worst of it. But between brave comments to the press, he has admitted: "I haven't slept very well recently."

Outgoing Mostar administrator Hans Koschnick may be sleeping more soundly now that a replacement is on the way, but he must have had more than a few nightmares over the past few months.

In January, angry Croats attacked Koschnick's house and ambushed his car, pounding on it while the beleaguered EU envoy sat helpless inside.

When Koschnick announced in February that he would resign as soon as he could be replaced, EU officials cast their eyes towards Sarajevo, looking at colleagues there who were already embroiled in the tangle, and whose experience in Bosnia might have prepared them for a job they knew would be physically as well as mentally draining.

However, Koschnick's car-rattling experience helped convince the first candidate to replace him that he did not want the job. Former Spanish Defence Minister Julian Garcia Vargas was the obvious choice, due to his extensive experience in Bosnia, and when he declared he was not interested, he was more or less pressured into finding someone else.

He and Maragall, Barcelona's mayor and president of the EU's Committee of the Regions, supported Perez Casado's candidacy and his star rose when Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli said, during an informal meeting with her EU counterparts in Palermo last month, that she and her colleagues hoped to find someone with mayoral experience.

"He will substitute lack of knowledge of the region with strong enthusiasm," said a Spanish diplomat, dismissing any suggestion that the lack of international experience on Perez Casado's resume might be a handicap. Those who know him say he is not only willing but eager for this challenge, and that he has the requisite strength of character.

The Valencian has shown he can stand up to authority if he believes it is wrong. His resignation from city hall in 1988 over an administrative disagreement with the region's powerful establishment is still cited as a measure of his strength and determination. The Socialist party was so strong at that time that to be outside it was effectively to be isolated. "The fact that he rejected a decision of the Socialist government tells us he is an independent thinker," said one observer.

Even when the politician became a businessman, Perez Casado continued to work in areas which had much in common with his mayoral pursuits, focusing on the services sector and urbanization and environment projects.

As a member of the board of directors of one of Spain's biggest banking consortia, the Valencia-based Bancaixa, during the last few years he has remained active in European organisations of municipalities and cultural activities promoting the Mediterranean region.

Perez Casado studied politics and sociology in Madrid before taking up economics in Valencia and at the Mediterranean University in Aix-en-Provence. He then returned to Valencia to teach economics and urbanism, subjects on which he has written extensively.

The Aix graduate speaks French, but—and this will be a severe drawback in Mostar—no English. To counter this problem, he has asked an English-speaking El Pais correspondent who is familiar with Bosnia to accompany him as his mouthpiece.

Perez Casado has also demonstrated an interest in bringing cultures together. As Valencia's mayor, he worked to arrange reunions of writers from countries bordering the Mediterranean and breathed new life into the Mediterranean Film Festival.

Furthermore, he arranged a treaty between the European Council of Municipalities and Regions and the Organisation of Arab Cities. That pact served as the basis for Euro-Arab city reunions held in Mallakesh in 1988 and in Valencia in 1994.

Perez Casado hopes that experience will help him to be a convincing mediator between Croats and Muslims. Koschnick, who tried to bring the two together in a joint police force and other projects, was constantly beleaguered by antagonism. His resignation was hastened when EU governments, giving in to Croatian pressure, overrode his plan to delineate Mostar's central zone—the one destined to be jointly administered by Croats and Muslims—for the purposes of forthcoming elections.

Still, with the war over (at least for now), the Dayton peace accord signed and Mostar's election map drawn and agreed upon by the parties concerned, the major obstacles have been overcome.

But many challenges still face the Valencian. Elections in Mostar will be closely watched as an indication of the chances of success for peaceful cooperation between former enemies in the rest of Bosnia.

Perez Casado has already hinted at his game plan and his strategy is a simple one: "to talk more with the people." The mayor universally described as an affable, hard-working man claims to be undaunted by Mostar's multi-ethnicity, accustomed as he is to the rich cultural tapestry of Moorish, Jewish, Gypsy and Catholic south eastern Spain.

He is also confident that his experience as a mayor will help in his new task.

"Administering is the easiest part," Perez Casado says. "The most complicated part is tending to the people."

Among his worries now are whether the NATO peacekeeping force's mandate, and even his own, will be sufficient to assure peace in Bosnia.

Perez Casado admits that he has not yet worked out how he will try to translate the peace accord into normal daily life. One way to help restore normality, he has said is to bring employment to Mostar. "People working are apt to be less violent," he says.

As soon as EU governments agree on how to fund Perez Casado's mission, which should happen in the next few days, the new administrator can pack his bags.

His tenure is, in theory, limited to this year. Member states have said they will extend EU administration of the city, originally scheduled to end in July, to the end of December in a bid to ensure that cooperative, democratic institutions are firmly established. But some officials have privately expressed doubts whether all that can be accomplished in 1996.

Just how quickly Perez Casado settles into his new job could be a decisive factor.

B-H: HDZ's Cosic Interviewed on Federation, Elections

AU0404154696 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 31 Mar 96 p 6

[Interview with Zdenko Cosic, secretary general of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Ivana Lovric; place and date not given: "They Exercise a One-Nation State in Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The intense political activity that has been going on these days concerning the organization of the cantonal and municipal authorities is the most apparent proof that the Croatian side has been implementing the obligations it undertook toward establishing the Federation. It is also the realization of political decisions made by the Presidency of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslim side sees the Federation a bit differently. It is a means toward achieving some other objective. We talked about this with Zdenko Cosic, secretary general of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina.*

[Lovric] How eager are the Muslims in the establishment of the Federation?

[Cosic] While on one side they have been evading obligations on the municipal level, they are rushing to take over authority on the county level, thus creating illusory progress, but there is no real progress. Not only are such actions not progress, but they are harmful to the totality of relations in the Federation. The best example is Sarajevo, in which they have been maintaining a one-nation state.

Recklessly Signed Agreement

We advocate and demand the return of the refugees, that is without question our interest, because the situation we have now is simply untenable, in that over half of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have in one way or another been removed from their homes. However, it must be clear that no paper or signature can represent an additional guarantee for and protection of the human and national rights, the property, or the very lives of the refugees. Until the practice of recklessly signing agreements and later on blocking them on the ground ends, we cannot talk about any significant return of refugees, and that is one of the crucial questions for the success of the Federation.

[Lovric] The events in Sarajevo have shown that the Muslims do not accept the Croatian side as an equal partner. What can be done to resolve the Sarajevo case?

[Cosic] Sarajevo is truly a symbol of human suffering and distress, but also a message on the untenability of insane ideas. With its hasty political moves the Muslim-Bosniak side has turned Sarajevo with all its positive attributes into its opposite. The president of the city assembly, Mr. Kupusovic himself, said in his resignation that such a policy would ruin Sarajevo.

The Sarajevo case discloses the intention of creating separate ethnic territories, despite the otherwise declared stands of the Muslim-Bosniak side. I am sure that it is precisely in Sarajevo that the illusions of those who want to organize the Federation exclusively according to their own wishes and measures will come to their destruction.

[Lovric] At one of the sessions of the HDZ Presidency, you made a decision on the gradual transfer of the functions of the executive authorities of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to the Federation organs of authority. Has that process already begun?

Federation Misinterpretations

[Cosic] That process is inseparably linked to the constitution of the cantonal authorities and to the application of the federal laws in general. It would be unimaginable to dissolve the authorities of the HR HB [Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia] if at the same time, a qualitative transfer of authority to the Federation organs, that is, to federal units, was not provided for. That would have undesired social consequences and would mean a fall in the living standard for all.

[Lovric] You have also made a decision to establish the HZ HB [Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia]. Could this community represent a guarantee for the Croats, if the Federation does not protect Croatian interests?

[Cosic] In its original spirit the Federation understands the protection of Croatian interests, too. We cannot talk at all about any kind of state union on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina that does not guarantee our vital national interests. It is true that we sometimes encounter attempts to interpret the Federation as an union of cantons. That is an attempt to consciously undermine the foundations of the Federation, and the foundation is its Constitution and the Washington treaty, which says clearly that the Federation is an union of two nations that organize that union in further administrative regions, which we call counties or cantons. Depending upon the readiness to accept those basic provisions, the role of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia will be determined. In short, if the Federation does not protect Croatian interests, there will then be no Federation.

[Lovric] Is the other side transferring its authorities from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Federation, or is it strengthening them?

[Cosic] Sometimes it is difficult to accept the construction of a project that destroys one's dreams about the creation of an imagined state-empire, in which one nation is the basic one, and all others are but the others...

Return From World of Illusions

There is an ongoing process in which the Muslim-Bosniak leaders are gradually descending from the world of illusions into the world called the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The thing that will be painful for some of them is the fact that this process started much earlier with the common people, who always pay the highest price for their leaders' illusions. When the process takes that direction, from down there upwards, then it has its price, and I am sure that it will be paid: Some will pay in the elections, some sooner, and some have already paid.

[Lovric] This year internal party elections have been scheduled. Have you started the preparations?

[Cosic] The preparations have already started. The main task in this period is to reach all party members and analyze their mood, as well as that of the Croatian nation in general, and make political and personnel desisions based on that.

[Lovric] Will the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina encounter serious opposition among the Croatian people?

[Cosic] Our program really does have an opposition, but the opposition does not have a program. The program of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ in any case understands the readiness to sacrifice and to fight for Croatian interests and Croatian identity in general in this area. Those who doubt that are already losers.

[Lovric] Recently, it has been mentioned more and more frequently that the HDZ seat will return to Sarajevo. Will the party with the whole of its apparatus return to the center of the Federation?

[Cosic] We already are partially in Sarajevo. We have been waiting for the Federation Government to vacate the HDZ facilities it occupied during the war. When they empty our offices, we will have a greater presence in Sarajevo, both in a physical and a political sense.

B-H: Ex-PM Silajdzic Sees Dangers of Divided Bosnia

BR0204133696 Amsterdam ELSEVIER in Dutch 30 Mar 96 pp 55-60

[Interview with former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Harald Doornbos in Sarajevo; date not given: "Muslims Must Not Shut Themselves Away in a Tiny Room"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The office of former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic (50) is about 300 meters from Grbavica. From this suburb of Sarajevo, Serb snipers brought death and destruction to the city's residents for four long years. Last week Grbavica was the last of five suburbs to be transferred to the Muslim-dominated Bosnian Government, as agreed in the Dayton peace agreement.*

After the transfer there remained no more than around 7,000 Serbs of the original 70,000, most of them old age pensioners. As soon as the Bosnian Government took full control of the district and raised the Bosnian flag, the Muslims returned to their homes from which they had been driven some four years previously to find most of them burned to the ground. The Bosnian authorities immediately renamed one of the main streets the "Street of Young Muslims."

Nobody in Sarajevo was sorry to see the Serbs leave. "We Muslims have had enough of always playing the tolerant, multicultural figures. It is time we acted in our own interests," said one Muslim who had just returned to Grbavica.

The war may be over and Sarajevo reunited, but little remains of the multiethnic capital. Haris Silajdzic knows that too. He only has to open his window: The proof lies in the street. Silajdzic looks out somberly. [passage omitted]

Silajdzic views the destruction of "his" Bosnia with sadness. "Everybody talks about integration, but what we are seeing is disintegration," he says. It was 18 months ago that Silajdzic resigned his functions within the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]. But he remained prime minister. In August 1995 he wanted to stop it all and leave the party. "It was immediately after the Srebrenica drama," says Silajdzic. "There was a parliamentary session in Zenica and the SDA refused to place Srebrenica on the agenda at the meeting. Thousands of men had just been killed and the SDA simply did not want to discuss it. It was then that I thought: Enough is enough." Silajdzic remained as prime minister until January of this year because he only wanted to stand down when the war was over. Until that date his only contact with his fellow ministers was through the media.

Silajdzic has now [illegible] to the Bosnian political arena with a new party. The party does not yet exist politically, but the name is well known: Party for Bosnia, or Stranka za Bosnu. Silajdzic has also received the backing of the Social Democrat mayor of Tuzla, and the Bosnian Social Democratic Party (SDP) is also thinking of backing him. Also unique is the cooperation with the Serb Liberal Party of Banja Luka, the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, and the Croatian Peasants' Party. As a result, Silajdzic is the only serious politician who is once again trying to bring the ethnic groups together within a single party.

[Doornbos] Is Silajdzic the new Tito?

[Silajdzic] I do not feel like it, but if that is what other people say, that is not a problem for me. What Bosnia needs is a free democratic party. Not left and not right. Mainstream Europe. Peace, stability, a normal life, reconstruction, and enough jobs. That is what people want.

[Doornbos] But the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], and SDA all claim to be democratic. So who needs your party?

[Silajdzic] We will be the only ones without the word democratic in our name. Because these so-called democratic parties opened more concentration camps in Bosnia than the Nazis during World War II. Karadzic's SDS is pure fascist, terrorist. They use democracy as a fashionable word. We must look at what people do, not what they say.

[Doornbos] Do you find it remarkable that Karadzic, a suspected war criminal, still rules in Pale?

[Silajdzic] I find it very strange. We are giving a lot of money to Interpol. Somebody steals an expensive clock in Amsterdam and is arrested in Madrid. That is how it works. Now we have two international organizations for Bosnia: the war crimes tribunal in The Hague and IFOR [Implementation Force]. But these two are not working with each other. That is not only remarkable but also illogical. I do not know why this is the case.

[Doornbos] When you claim that everybody is talking about integration, but what is in fact happening is disintegration, are you referring to the nonfunctioning of the Muslim-Croat federation?

[Silajdzic] There is no federation, we have just been talking about one for the past two years. OK, the federation stopped the war between the Bosnians and the Croats, but after that it failed to come into being. We still have two national areas which are divided by ethnic borders. They are ghettos. And there are still no mixed cantons. A federation of national ghettos seems to be what the leaders want. It is very easy to control your people under such circumstances.

[Doornbos] Who do you hold responsible for the problems within the federation, the HDZ or the SDA?

[Silajdzic] The HDZ is the instigator of this policy. We know that they tried to divide Bosnia and then control parts of it. West Herzegovina is a sort of expanded Croatia. They have the Croatian flag, Croatian police uniforms, Croatian telephone codes. That must not be allowed. Our relations must be based on respect for mutual sovereignty. That is not at present the case. The HDZ in Bosnia, which is the same as Tudjman's HDZ in Zagreb, is encouraging the creation of two national territories and not of mixed cantons. But the HDZ does not bear all the blame. There are also elements within the SDA who prefer a small Muslim state to a united Bosnia. That would be a catastrophe for the Muslims. They have demonstrated in the past that they are cosmopolitan, cooperative, constructive, and cultural. If they shut themselves away in a tiny room you will have exactly the opposite. You then have a homogeneous ethnic population which will probably be headed by radicals. That is the beginning of the end.

[Doornbos] You mean a Muslim state as third in line after Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Republic?

[Silajdzic] Yes. The aggressor in Belgrade created the Serb Republic. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a Croatian reaction to this. They simply want to divide Bosnia. Croats with Croats and Serbs with Serbs. And Muslims with Muslims. This will inevitably involve bloodshed. This is exactly what the Serbian regime has done: drawn the lines in blood. The problem is that the victim seems prepared to accept these lines. If the Bosnians now also agree to the division of Bosnia and are prepared to legalize ethnic cleansing and reward genocide, then I wonder: Why did we not do that four years ago? Then we could have made a deal with the Milosevic regime. Then we would not have had 200,000 dead and the country would not have been destroyed.

[Doornbos] So you want to reunite all the population groups. Are you not four years too late and 10 years too early?

[Silajdzic] No, because I am not going to work with the Chetniks or other radicals. Anyone who accepts Bosnia as the fatherland is welcome in my party. The Muslims will form the greater part as in Bosnia we are in the majority. But I cannot close my door on the Serbs or Croats or Jews who come to my support. Should I tell them that they are not welcome? No, because they are also Bosnian patriots. It is also their fatherland. You can only change that with blood and violence. And we have had enough of that.

B-H: Portugal To Wind Up Liaison Detachment in Bosnia

BR0404093196 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 Mar 96 p 13

[Report by Eduardo Mascarenhas: "Mass for Guterres"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo—Antonio Guterres will be in Bosnia for around eight hours today. He is coming, as he promised, to greet the Portuguese troops assigned to the NATO force, the IFOR [Implementation Force], and find out how the mission is proceeding. [passage omitted]

Guterres is coming to Bosnia at a time when changes in the national forces assigned to Bosnia are in sight.

The restructuring will affect not the operational battalion, which, despite rotation through relief and leave, will always keep its strength at 90 percent (as required by NATO), but the Liaison Detachment (with the IFOR) and the Support and Services Detachment (logistics).

In fact, according to what DIARIO DE NOTICIAS has learned, the Army chief of staff decided, as has already been made known to the defense minister, with the Armed Forces chief of staff's knowledge, that the Liaison Detachment will be wound up, and the Support and Services Detachment, which has been under Lieutenant Colonel Luis Krugg's command, will be reduced during this stage. The Support and Services Detachment, which in the IFOR is designated as an NSE (National Support Element), will also change its location of deployment.

The Portuguese NSE, which together with a similar Italian unit has been stationed in Vogosca among the ruins of a former Volkswagen plant, will soon be moving to another location, because the German enterprise has expressed its intention to recover that area to set up a vehicle assembly line there again. The Italian unit will accompany its Portuguese counterpart in the move.

The NSE's reduction will mean that all the Portuguese military personnel assigned to Bosnia will from that time come under the operational battalion's command. [passage omitted]

B-H: Portugal's PM Given Cool Reception in Rogatica

BR0404134396 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 31 Mar 96 p 12

[Report by Eduardo Mascarenhas: "Visit in a Cold Climate"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Rogatica—The atmosphere awaiting Prime Minister Antonio Guterres yesterday morning on his arrival in Rogatica was very different from the one which greeted Defense Minister Antonio Vitorino in late February. Portuguese officials said that on that day, despite the cold and snow, the local population "almost threw a party" to welcome Vitorino. Yesterday, even with the help of the mild temperature of a sun-drenched day, the atmosphere was still "very cold" in Rogatica, where he met with the commander of the Airborne Battalion of the Independent Airborne Brigade. So, whereas in February the population filled the streets of Rogatica, yesterday the streets remained deserted during Guterres' trip. He is the first EU head of government to visit Bosnia.

A few hours before the prime minister arrived, Rajko Kusic, commander of the Serb brigade stationed in the area, met with the military leaders of the Airborne Battalion at the Portuguese command post. Called a real "local Rambo" by the Portuguese, DIARIO DE NOTICIAS has learned that the atmosphere at the meeting with the Serb commander was somewhat tense. The visible result of the meeting was that, immediately after Kusic's departure, the entire area surrounding the buildings of the Portuguese headquarters was totally deserted.

When he arrived in Rogatica, the Portuguese prime minister met with empty streets. And even in the area around the buildings comprising the Portuguese headquarters, there was not a single curious onlooker, except four individuals in civilian clothing, who soon afterwards caused an embarrassing situation for Guterres.

After reviewing the troops he noticed these individuals and, taking them for local inhabitants, broke the rules of security and protocol and went toward them to greet them. However, despite Guterres' outstretched hand, the four Serbs refused to return the compliment, and just continued to stare at the prime minister, who then turned on his heel and entered the national headquarters.

Sources in the Airborne Brigade believe that these "onlookers" were in fact Serb observers and their attitude did not reflect any special animosity toward the Portuguese leader or his presence among our troops in Bosnia, but was a moment of tension between the warring parties and the Implementation Force [IFOR] as a consequence of IFOR's disarmament demands. The "relaxed atmosphere disappeared," some troops reported, when NATO tried to consolidate the Dayton agreements. [passage omitted]

B-H: Spanish Troops Mediate in Exchange of Corpses

BR0304150296 Madrid ABC in Spanish 3 Apr 96 p 25

[Report signed "S.I.": "Spanish Troops Involved in Exchange of Corpses"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Madrid—Yesterday the Defense Ministry stated that representatives from the IFOR [Implementation Force] Spanish Brigade supervised another exchange of corpses between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnians in the vicinity of the border locality of Podvelez last Monday. According to the Defense Ministry's communique, as part of this exchange, the Serbs handed over five corpses and the Bosnians two, belonging to soldiers who fell between 1992 and 1995. In addition to the Spanish troops, representatives of the Exchange Committee on both sides also took part.

This is the first time that this kind of operation, provided for under Article 9 of the Dayton agreements, has been carried out successfully since the Aragon Group became operational as a blue-helmet unit coordinated by the United Nations, following a dozen unsuccessful attempts and meetings.

The Defense Ministry also reported that all the international bodies dealing with policing issues—which since the Dayton agreements have been operating in the area under Spanish responsibility—met in Medugorje yesterday. The meeting was attended by representatives of the international police, WEU police, the official responsible for civilian matters in the Mostar area, and representatives of the Spanish unit, the Southeast Division, and the European Allied Command's Rapid Action Forces (ARCC).

B-H: Investigators Find Evidence of Srebrenica Execution

AU0504092496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hague Tribunal investigators have found evidence of an ethnic massacre in the vicinity of Srebrenica. They discovered blindfolds, boots, clothing, and strewn bones near a mass grave. This evidence corroborates survivors' stories claiming that, after the fall of Srebrenica, aggressor forces took thousands of men to a nearby hall, stripped them of everything, blindfolded them, and shot them on two fields.

Croatia: Tudjman Addresses Government on Plane Crash

*LD0404220696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 4 Apr 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman this evening chaired an extraordinary session of the Croatian government. Jasenka Dudic reports:

[Dudic] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa, Croatian government members, and officials of the president's office observed a minute of silence in memory of the late [U.S.] Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown, high ranking officials and prominent U.S. businessmen, the plane crew, and the two Croatian nationals, who tragically lost their lives in the plane crash.

The Croatian president again expressed his heartfelt condolences to U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith, President Bill Clinton, and the families of the deceased, and said:

[Begin Tudjman recording] The news of the tragic fate of the American mission was received in Croatia with profound sadness, primarily because of the loss of life — such a large number of respected U.S. businessmen and two of our nationals — but also because this visit by the high-powered U.S. delegation was supposed to have strengthened the friendly ties and partnership between the United States and Croatia on the economic plane. As you know, it was the intention of our government and of the entire Croatian public to establish the most comprehensive ties with the United States in this field.

As soon as I learned of this tragedy, I appointed a state delegation headed by the prime minister to visit the site and make sure that a complete investigation was carried out with the aim of establishing the causes of the accident. [passage omitted]

Our state authorities were on the spot and did everything they could to determine the true state of affairs and to facilitate further activities by both our and U.S. experts on determining the causes of the crash. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: Government Declares 5 Apr Day of Mourning

*LD0404203296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 4 Apr 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, chaired a special meeting of the Croatian Government in the presidential palace this evening. In connection with the tragedy involving the U.S. plane, tomorrow is to be a day of mourning in Croatia.

On the basis of Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, and Article 23, Paragraph 3 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Croatia, and Official Gazette No 41/90, 8/91, 14/91, 53a/91, 9/92, 55/92, and 29/94 — the Government of the Republic of Croatia, at a meeting held on 4 April 1996 and chaired by the president of the Republic of Croatia, adopted the decision to declare a day of mourning in the Republic of Croatia.

On the occasion of the tragic accident involving the U.S. plane in which Mr. Ronald Brown, the U.S. secretary of commerce; members of a high-ranking U.S. state and economic delegation; the crew of the plane; and two Croatian citizens were killed, 5 April 1996 is declared a day of mourning in the Republic of Croatia.

On the day of mourning all public entertainment shows are postponed. Other public sports events will begin with a minute's silence, while flags will be flown at half mast. This decision comes into force immediately. Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia.

Croatia: New Ambassador to U.S. Views Relations

*AU0504090196 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 96 p 7*

[Interview with Dr. Miomir Zuzul, Croatian ambassador to the United States, by Vladimir P. Goss; place and date not given: "We Will Remain America's Long-Term Partner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *There has recently been a "changing of the guard" at the embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Washington. An excellent diplomat, Dr. Petar Sarinic, was succeeded by another, Dr. Moimir Zuzul. Zuzul arrived the Washington political and diplomatic battleground from Geneva, where he was the Croat Ambassador to the UN and had attained the reputation of a skilled diplomat and negotiator.*

The change did not take place only inside the nice building on Massachusetts Avenue in which our embassy is located. The great changes in the American policy toward southeastern Europe conditioned by the signing of the Dayton agreement have been reflected on the political climate in Washington and, naturally, on American-Croat relations. In order to find out more about the post-Dayton phase, we turned to our post-Dayton ambassador in Washington, Zuzul, who gladly granted our request.

[Goss] Your Excellency, the American Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, recently said that American-

Croat relations are better than ever before. Can this also be noticed from your Washington perspective?

[Zuzul] I have already previously been witness to and a participant in the development of these relations, all the way to their establishment, to the Dayton agreement. I believe our relations since Dayton are in a qualitatively different phase. They have advanced to the kind of relations which countries call friendly and partner-like.

The Doors Are Open

[Goss] What is the basis of these relations?

[Zuzul] The basis of these relations is that America views Croatia as a short-term as well as a long-term partner in that part of the world. A partner regarding the political and security stabilization of the future in that part of the world. In order for this to happen, it was also clear to the Americans that Croatia has to go through certain steps, primarily in economic, and partially in political development. I believe that after the first evaluation there will also be a second one—to assist us in these steps.

[Goss] Therefore, your first impressions are very positive. Are there any particular points of interest?

[Zuzul] A number of them. First of all, what was most interesting from the point of view of a person who is representing a small country in a town with 180 embassies, was the way in which I was accepted. As they said here, I have broken the record in presenting my credentials to President Clinton. I presented them within five days. I was in the same group as the ambassadors from distinguished countries and countries friendly with America. They had been waiting over three and a half months, or the European Union ambassador, who waited over three months. This is a detail of protocol, but it shows that the doors here are open to us. I further emphasize the extremely successful visit of Defense Minister Gojko Susak, as well as the preparations for the visit of the U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown to Croatia. We worked on this together with the American side in a cooperative and partner-like manner.

[Goss] I recently spoke to General Jacques Klein, head of the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia], who on that occasion mentioned his cooperation with you and the work on acquiring a special loan from the World Bank for eastern Slavonia. How do you evaluate your cooperation with General Klein?

[Zuzul] My personal opinion is in absolute accordance with our official view. General Klein is an ideally chosen person for the task. He is a person who combines his diplomatic and military experience and has the energy and desire to bring about what was agreed upon. Our experiences are remarkably positive. He uses this energy not only in eastern Slavonia but also in Washington. As a result of his work, talks have begun with the World Bank regarding the possibility of a $125 million loan for the restoration of eastern Slavonia. I believe that these talks will be successful. It is important to note that this amount is not included in the amount that Croatia is principally negotiating for with the World Bank.

The Consideration of Minister Susak

[Goss] Talking of generals, reports have turned up of cooperation between the Minnesota National Guard [nacionalna garda] and the Croat Army.

[Zuzul] I do not have much information on that. Basically, the cooperation between the American and Croat armies deals with great advancement, which is strategically important to us.

[Goss] This was certainly aided by the visit of Minister Susak.

[Zuzul] Absolutely. Minister Susak was prepared and organized very well, and arrived during the phase when this step was possible. This visit was certainly very important and a big step in the sense of regulating these future relations.

[Goss] Is Minister Susak still receiving treatment in Washington?

[Zuzul] Yes. Minister Susak is receiving treatment at the military hospital in Washington. This was organized by the American Defense ministry, that is, Secretary of Defense Perry personally organized it. Minister Susak was offered the opportunity of having the entire operation done here, and I believe that the entire treatment points toward the fact that he is regarded as a very distinguished person.

[Goss] Can you tell us anything about his medical condition?

[Zuzul] According to the reports that I have seen, his development is positive. I believe that Minister Susak will soon be returning to Zagreb and resuming his duties. He probably will be able to greet Secretary Perry on the occasion of his visit to Zagreb.

[Goss] When will this take place?

[Zuzul] At the end of this month.

An Economic Undertaking

[Goss] Therefore before the visit of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown?

[Zuzul] Yes. We have been working on Secretary Brown's trip literally since the moment of my arrival. This was one of my first concrete actions. The invitation from Prime Minister Matesa was made earlier, and it was connected with the visit of the Vice President of the Croat Government, Jure Radic. We were met with open doors, with understanding, and readiness to cooperate. This primarily deals with an economic undertaking, with the U.S. Administration's attempt to assist us. Secretary Brown will try to convince some of the largest American companies to invest in Croatia.

[Goss] People are guessing whether Secretary Brown will be accompanied by representatives of these large companies or not?

[Zuzul] That is true. Some will arrive earlier, some will arrive with him, and some later. We are talking about large American corporations. We have agreed on the choice of these corporations with Brown and his team. We chose those that were of most interest to us.

[Goss] Let us come back to Secretary Perry. What is the nature of his visit?

[Zuzul] This is a tour of this part of the world which has been planned for a longer period of time. It is not a return visit for the visit of our minister of defense. That will take place at the end of summer or in autumn. As part of his visit, Secretary Perry will spend a day or two in Zagreb.

[Goss] What do you think of the Serbs "stoning" Ambassador Madeleine Albright in Vukovar?

[Zuzul] I believe that this is an incident that should not be seen as an indicator of the overall development of the reintegration process. There will be such incidents in the future. They did not change overnight. Talking of the entire development of the situation, especially after the Geneva meeting, I believe that there exists a realistic hope for a peaceful solution to the problem of eastern Slavonia.

[Goss] How long-term do you see the development of the American-Croat relations?

[Zuzul] We are creating more solid ties, which will remain partner-like even after America is no longer directly present in our part of the world. However, I am aware of possible traps [zamka] on this path. First of all in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The implementation of the Dayton agreement is one of the key points of U.S. foreign policy. It is no secret that they are counting on the positive role of Croatia in the implementation of the agreement. It is also no secret that our official policy is absolute support for the Dayton agreement. However, problems that obstruct the carrying out of the agreement often turn up. We must avoid these problems being linked to us, that is, we have to really carry out what we have agreed to. This is not always easy, but even Washington has concluded that Croatia is playing a positive role in this matter.

[Goss] Regarding this, the question of the cooperation of the Republic of Croatia with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia turns up.

[Zuzul] Cooperation with the court is one of the fundamental questions at this point in time. Not only regarding U.S.-Croat relations, but also overall, with the international community. I think that they believe the promises and assurances that we have made and given, but I am convinced that our country, which desires to become a proper member of the international community and is following the path of the development of democracy, has no other choice but to cooperate with the international community.

[Box, p 7]

Avoid The Situation Where Washington Would Have To Choose

The question of human rights is important in U.S.-Croat relations. These questions are often politicized, but we should never bring ourselves into the situation that America would have to choose between its position toward us and the position of European Union [EU]. The relations with the EU will have repercussions on the relations with the United States. The process which will in the future be carried out in Croatia will affect our relations with America, but I think that this effect will be increasingly positive in determining these relations. The relations will also be strengthened by the visit of the minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Granic, to America, which is planned for May.

Croatia: Tudjman Receives Polish FM Rosati

LD0504111396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 Apr 96

[Report by correspondent Zoltan Kapoh]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, today received Dariusz Rosati, foreign minister of the Polish Republic. During their talks President Tudjman said that, as Croatia is an independent state now and owing to historical and cultural ties between the two people, it is time to establish even better political, cultural, and economic relations.

The fact that the pope is Polish has also contributed to a better understanding and acceptance of the independent Croatian state by the Vatican, President Tudjman pointed out. [passage omitted]

In conclusion President Tudjman thanked Poland for its support, stressing that historically Croatia belongs to west and central Europe and wants close cooperation with countries from the Baltics to the Adriatic.

Croatia is in favor of the normalization of relations with other countries which emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia, but some attempts to draw Croatia into associations of the Balkan Danube or Adriatic [states] are unacceptable, President Tudjman said during today's talks with Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati.

Croatia: Granic, Polish FM Sign Cooperation Protocol

LD0504100096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, and Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, who has been paying his first official visit to Croatia since yesterday, today signed a protocol on cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Croatia and Poland. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Granic, Albanian FM Discuss Relations, Kosovo

AU0504071996 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Albania and Croatia express their readiness to strengthen bilateral relations — this was confirmed once again in Zagreb during a meeting that Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi had with his Croatian counterpart Mate Granic.

The top diplomats of both countries discussed the concrete fields of this cooperation and exchanged opinions on the situation in the region.

Minister Serreqi expressed the position of the Albanian Government on the Kosova issue, reiterating that the only way to resolve it is through dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade in the presence of a third party.

Both ministers emphasized the European orientation of both countries and their efforts to be integrated into European structures.

Croatia: Granic, Albania's Serreqi View Balkans, Kosovo

AU0404202396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After completing his official visit to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 3 April, during his stopover in Zagreb, Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi held a meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic upon the latter's request.

During the meeting the ministers discussed the further development of bilateral relations between the two countries and exchanged opinions about the situation in the region, the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the current phase of implementation of the Dayton accord.

Albanian Minister Serreqi pointed out, among other things, the position of the Albanian Government toward the Kosova issue, reiterating that the only way to resolve it is through dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade in the presence of a third party. Serreqi also underlined that this issue cannot be reduced to the level of human rights, but is related to implementation of the principle of self-determination.

Serreqi also stressed that, in principle, Albania is not against the initiatives within the Balkan framework that aim to strengthen peace and security in the Balkans. Serreqi pointed out that they should be carefully prepared to create the necessary climate for yielding results and proving successful.

The Croatian foreign minister expressed the viewpoint that the Croatian Government supports the strengthening of bilateral relations and does not favor the creation of regional associations.

Minister Serreqi also referred to the Albanian initiative for the Southern Balkan defense ministers meeting that was held in Tirana during 31 March and 1 April, considering it a contribution to intensifying security and measures for creating good faith in the Balkans.

Both ministers emphasized the European orientation of both countries and their efforts to be integrated into European structures.

After the talks the ministers gave a joint news conference.

Croatia: Serb Refugees in Baranja Hold Meeting

AU0504115196 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 1 Apr 96

[From the "Vise od Vesti" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The regular annual assembly of the Union of Serb Refugees in Baranja was held on Saturday [30 March] in Beli Manastir. We are bringing you an extensive report of the assembly. At the beginning of the session, Milenko Vucetic submitted a report on the work of the union and, among other things, said the following:

[Vucetic] Our union held its first session here in Beli Manastir on 12 April 1994, i.e. a little over two years ago. We were preparing for a regular session early in May 1995, but the fall of western Slavonia suspended the activities of all political organizations for the sake of defense preparations and our union, although there were no serious reasons for that, was not active during the most intense suffering of the Serbs in the Republic of Serb Krajina. [passage omitted]

At its constituent assembly, the union pledged to achieve most of our aims in cooperation with our official authorities and we have never deviated from that principle. But since some of our demands and parts of our program have never even been considered, some of its aspects have never been achieved. For instance, giving farmers land for cultivation, help during the first year of our defense by distributing petrol, seed, fertilizers, revising the temporarily assigned and unjust use of the housing fund, deterrence of crime and war profiteering, etc. I must say that those demands are now being fulfilled, although we made them two years ago. [passage omitted]

During our recent activities in the wake of the Erdut agreement and the Dayton accord, as well as the UN Security Council resolution on the Srem [Srijem]-Baranja district, we have had new problems that call for absolute unity among Serb refugees and displaced persons, as well as all the inhabitants of the district, in the political struggle for our goal, the destiny of the remaining Serbs in this relatively small area, which forms less than 5 percent of the territory of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia. It is common knowledge that the Serbs lived on and owned 34 percent of the territory in Croatia, as well as several hundred thousand private houses, apartments, and industrial facilities in western Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika, Dalmatia, Gorski Kotar, and towns throughout Croatia, as well as our district, whose future is now being discussed, not to mention the enormous value of the movable property that they left behind. It is not only the future of us Serb refugees in the Srem-Baranja district that is being decided, but that of all Serb refugees from the former Socialist Republic of Croatia, who are scattered all over Yugoslavia, the Serb Republic, European countries, and overseas. There are more than 600,000 of us now. We outnumber by a factor of 10 the Croats who have not yet returned to this area where we found shelter and started living a normal life after the maelstrom of war.

Serb refugees and displaced persons, together with the locals in the district, have set an example by accepting multi-ethnic coexistence in this area, regardless of all the harm that has befallen us from the Croatian state, about which the world talks a lot. We live here side by side, sharing the good and the bad of the now ended civil war, with Croats, Hungarians, Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, and other nationalities. We, the Serb refugees who have found shelter in Baranja, are aware that the houses and apartments that we temporarily occupy are not ours, that their owners are in Croatia. However, we are also proud that these houses and apartments are intact, while most of our property has been destroyed and very often by those who own houses here. [passage omitted]

We appeal to the international community, the United Nations in charge of the transitional administration and implementing the agreements, as well as the UN Security Council resolution, for responsible, unbiased, and honest behavior during their mission, while keeping in mind the following—the Serbs exiled from Croatia are just a small part of the Serb nation against whom the Croatian authorities, in only 50 years, have committed serious war crimes, genocide on two occasions.

An overwhelming majority of us, who have been expelled from our homes or forced to run for dear life, want to return, but collectively, not selectively. We do not accept that the Croatian authorities can make a selection and say who is allowed to return, for we and our ancestors have lived there for centuries. There is our property, our places of worship, our monasteries over 800 years old, our ancestors are buried there, there are our good and bad memories, and we cannot and will not ever give them up! Before we return, if those gentlemen respect the UN Charter on the rights of a man and citizen of the world, it would be fair and proper to create such a situation in Croatia, which, by the way, was recognized by those gentlemen before the problem of the Croatian Serbs was solved, which caused the war in Croatia. Consequently, they are responsible, Europe and the world, for the war in Croatia and it is now their duty, and we have to do everything through our actions and by exerting pressure on them, to make them solve the problem of the democratization of Croatia so as to pave the way for our return, because it is they who made Croatia into what it is today.

The rights to our language and alphabet, which should be accepted in the education system, to equal treatment in employment, and all the rights that follow from our work, such as pensions, disability benefits, the right to share ownership. [sentence incomplete as heard] We tend to forget that we spent our lives working in firms in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, that we created enormous industrial and agricultural facilities. Croatia privatized that property and distributed shares to Croats, but gave us nothing. Not only do we demand to be compensated for our private property, we must also be compensated with shares in the firms where we worked, which are being privatized. We are co-owners of those firms, even though we still do not have any shares.

Furthermore, we demand the rebuilding of our property, places of worship and culture that were destroyed, damages and compensation for the property of those Serb refugees who will not return, because they will return only voluntarily. [sentence as heard]

After the signing of the peace agreements, we demand the release of all those sentenced and the suspension of all legal proceedings against those accused of participating in the civil war, i.e. we demand full amnesty, because no one can be held accountable for that under the Dayton accord and the UN Security Council resolution. War criminals of both nations should be prosecuted under international control and according to international rules.

To secure absolute safety for those who will return, we demand international supervision on the ground in Croatia and the observance of all the above democratic rights for the Serbs in Croatia. We are aware that Croatia will do everything to prevent our return. Tudjman, the president of all Croats, said as much in Serb Benkovac just a day before leaving for Geneva to sign a new agreement on those and other rights for all nations on the territory of Croatia. In other words, not only did he say that he would do everything to prevent our return, but he also appealed to all Croats abroad to come back and settle in Serb areas in our Krajina, our homeland. That is why we refugees and displaced persons in Baranja, as well as throughout the Srem-Baranja district, will not move out of a single house in which we are temporarily accommodated until all the conditions have been met for our safe return to our homes and we reject any possibility of being put into reception centers to await the possibility of return. Such reception centers are actually Croatian camps, through which many of us have passed. Many never came back alive from those camps. We will therefore never accept that possibility.

We expect the international community, under whose supervision we will be living in the period that follows, to fulfill all that it undertook regarding the signed agreements. We are particularly adamant that the international community should soon organize visits to the villages and towns that we were forced to leave, in order to determine the chances of our return, with the mediation of international experts. We will not accept one-day trips, as they proposed at the beginning. We want organized visits, expert-guided tours of destroyed villages and towns.

Here with us today are our sisters, who visited Osijek on behalf of all of us two days ago. They are with us today. It is good that they went there, but all of us know that Osijek is not western Slavonia, that it is not Kordun, Banija, Lika, Dalmatinska Zagora, or Knin Krajina. We want to visit, but with the supervision of international observers and experts, those areas that are completely destroyed. When we talked to the international representatives, they told us off the record that they can also give us some good news, that there is no more torching of Serb villages and houses on the territory of the fallen Krajina, but that there is nothing left to burn anyway!

Representatives of the international community, under the influence of Croatian authorities, are offering us a so-called pilot program, the experimental settlement of refugees. We must be extremely careful about those proposals. It is unacceptable to us to have body-for-body returns, 20,000 Croatian refugees for 20,000 Serb refugees. Brothers and sisters, we must never forget, especially our negotiators, that there are 10 or 11 times more of our refugees and displaced persons than Croatian refugees. Nobody has the right to offer body-for-body, man-for-man returns. The return of 1,000 Croats is the equivalent of the return of 11,000 Serbs to the compact area. [sentence as heard] Nobody has the right to offer three villages in Krajina, one in Lika, another in Dalmatia, and one in western Slavonia, in exchange for three Croatian villages in the Srem-Baranja district. That is sending our people to be slaughtered by those who negotiate that way and who make such promises. [sentence as heard] They are not friends among themselves, let alone to us. We cannot accept such negotiators. We must not forget ourselves in this period. We cannot accept the dispersion of our refugees throughout Croatia, only a compact Serb area. As our citizens from Zadar said: "If you gentlemen want Bilje, and almost 28,000 Serbs had to leave Zadar, 24,000 Serbs must return to Zadar, i.e. as many as want to return to Zadar. In other words, 2,400 Croats in exchange for 24,000 Serbs — we will have it no other way! If they are prepared to accept such a pilot program, then we will negotiate with them. Everything else is a child's game that harms us and we can do without it.

In this period that sees the start of a difficult political struggle, I dare say we are fighting our last battle for our right to life and we must not lose at all costs, because we would lose everything, absolutely everything. We therefore have the right to demand unity and concord among all the patriotic forces and intellectuals of Baranja. Let us neutralize the war profiteers and criminals who instill anxiety and spread panic among an overwhelming majority of honest, decent people on this territory. If they want to leave because they have accumulated enough and have made enough money from the suffering of the Serb people, then let them go. Ninety-nine percent of us have nowhere to go and we will stay here until all our terms have been met by the Croatian authorities. [applause] The sooner those leave who have made our lives miserable over the past four of five years, the sooner we shall have happier lives albeit with an uncertain future.

We demand that the local Baranja authorities provide speedy, efficient, and honest housing revisions and that those who have come to Baranja and settled in more housing units than they used to occupy back in Krajina be evicted. We make that demand for our own sake first of all, as well as for the sake of all citizens who own houses and apartments in Baranja but occupy others' just the same. Furthermore, we demand that all refugees and displaced persons who sold or exchanged houses or apartments and have a place to live in the FRY immediately leave the houses and apartments that they are now using in Baranja, because they are speculators. They must go to houses that they obtained in the FRY. The houses that they now occupy in Baranja must be assigned to our brothers and sisters who still do not have a roof over their heads and live in the FRY. We must be adamant and insists on replacement of all presidents of neighborhood communities who are unable to be honest and straight in their district, for the greatest mistakes and wrongs are going on there."

Croatia: Baranja Serbs Oppose Reintegration

AU0504070096 Belgrade TELEGRAF
in Serbo-Croatian 3 Apr 96 p 16

[Report by Djoko Kesic: "We Want Serbian Authorities on the Serbian Territories, Our Army, and the Serbian Dinar. Nothing More and Nothing Less. If Not — Here Comes the Fourth Migration of the Serbs."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite some warnings by the military strategists from the West that the Srem-Baranja district could be the scene of an imminent new military conflict between the Serbs and the Croats — there will not be a new war on these territories, at least not within the foreseeable future. Namely, the Croatian political leadership speaks about "the imminent peaceful reintegration of the remaining Croatian territories," while the incumbent state offices of Serbia and the FRY inarticulately fail to deny these claims by Zagreb and chiefly speak about the conditions under which this reintegration could take place.

Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, commander of the Serbian Volunteer Guard, also hinted that a new military conflict is far away when he announced the withdrawal of his powerful units from the Srem-Baranja district at a news conference, adding explicitly that "the Srem-Baranja district has definitely been lost." While U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith claims that the reintegration of the Srem-Baranja district into the Croatian framework is only possible if the Serbs and the Croats enjoy absolutely the same rights, the Serbs from the remainder of the Republic of Serb Krajina are plagued by a big question — what will happen to them?

A circular by the coordinating committee for the realization of the conclusions of the local communities of the Srem-Baranja district, addressed to the FRY president, federal premier, FRY Assembly, the presidents of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, the republican assemblies and governments, Patriarch Pavle, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as the political parties in Serbia and Montenegro, also supports this theory. It says:

"Esteemed gentlemen!

"The reason that we turn to you on this occasion is the highly precarious fate of the Serbian people on the territories of the Republic of Serb Krajina (Srem-Baranja district).

"Not knowing what is in store for them — but scalded by the events of last August when the history of Serbianhood was disgraced, intentionally or unintentionally, in a matter of one or two days — the frightened people are justly contemplating the fate of the adult generation and the generation of those yet to be born.

"As representatives of the same people, a portion of the same nation, whose chances not only for progress and prosperity but also for the most mundane existence will close first, we ask for assistance.

"We ask for assistance, aware of the dilemmas that are weighing down each of our men every moment of their existence, beyond the generalized conclusion that we gained a lot and saved everything and triumphed in the victory regardless of the bitterness over the battles lost, which does not satisfy anyone.

"We are asking you because we secretly believe that not all is lost yet, that there is a way and the means to redirect the course of the events, and that, apart from your intention to help, there also exists the strength for it, the ultimate, concealed, primordial strength of an ancient and a brave nation, which is not mobilized haphazardly but in cases of the threat of physical and spiritual annihilation.

"Are we justified in convincing you of our feeling that, with the establishment of the enemy authorities on these territories, our community will suffer and be endangered? Can we aspire to be at least a feather in the wing without which there cannot be a successful and long flight?

"The people know but have nobody to turn to and tell them how difficult they find it. The people do not want to be under the Ustasha authorities, under the Ustasha knife. This is the pledge of us all, children and young, women and old men, workers and soldiers.

"We, esteemed gentlemen and our brothers, want the Serbian territories, our army, and the Serbian dinar. Nothing more, nothing less.

"If not, we are left to passively observe future tragic events befalling the Serbian people. Is this not the eve of the FOURTH MAJOR MIGRATION OF THE SERBS [preceding six words capitalized as published]?

"We assure you that, with your assistance, we have no intention of idly witnessing the disappearance of our peoples from its historic territory. How are we to overcome the fact that our enemies, armed with the pathological hatred for the Serbian people, promise and threaten daily to do everything, literally everything, to make us disappear once for all?

"We await with trepidation each meeting of our discordant negotiating team with the 'masters' of the Srem-Baranja district, Messrs. Klein and Galbraith. After each of these meetings, we listen to the same old story from the 'masters' of the district that 'this is the Croatian land and that all has been sorted out in Belgrade.'

"What cynicism, what a disgrace for the Serbian people.

"The people do not want to believe that 'everything was sorted out in Belgrade,' but they are justified in being confused because none of the official services denies the triumphalist statements of our 'friends.'

"Esteemed gentlemen and our brothers!

"The Serbian people want peace. But only a just peace. Any other peace kills the body and the soul.

"We assure you that if a just peace is achieved, any thought or need to leave our homes would disappear.

"Is it too late for a just peace?

"We believe not.

"It is our honor to greet you with respect."

Some replies did arrive at the address of the coordinating committee for the realization of the conclusions of the local communities in Vukovar but not the most important ones, we were told via telephone, with a request not to publish any names. TELEGRAF tried to find out whether the government discussed this letter in the cabinet of Prime Minister Kontic. We received a reply that all international negotiations on the Serbs across the Drina River are being conducted by President Milosevic and that the Federal Government is only concerning itself with the global international policy.

We were advised in the cabinet of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to search for the information in the information service of the Serbian Assembly. We were told in the information service of the Serbian Assembly that they were not familiar with the matter and had no comment on it.

Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Commemorate 1992 Battle

AU0404074696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Mar 96

[Report by Jovan Vlajkovic, including statement by Dosen, secretary of the Baranja Association of Soldiers — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On 3 April 1992, Croatia attacked the Baranja area. The intention was to have a large number of troops occupy the Baranja area in the early morning hours [words indistinct]. The situation was the most difficult in the Torjanci area, where 22 soldiers were killed on 3 April. Five of them were buried in a common grave at the local cemetery in Sivac.

The Baranja Association of Soldiers and Beli Manastir municipal assembly officials are going to visit this community in the Kula municipality on 30 March to pay their respects to the Serb soldiers who were killed.

[Dosen] The Baranja Association of Soldiers organizes the event every year to commemorate 3 April. [passage omitted]

Croatia: TANJUG Says Croatia Preventing Serbs' Return

LD0304145396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1153 GMT 3 Apr 96

["Pool" item by Vera Raskov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 3 (TANJUG) — Croatia continues to prevent Serb refugees from returning and has even relieved itself of accountability for the destruction of Serb property in Croatia by recently introducing amendments to its law of obligations.

This is in direct violation of the international obligations law.

The Croatian parliament recently abolished Article 180 of the 1978 law of obligations, passed when Croatia was part of the former Yugoslav Federation, under which the state was obliged to protect life and property of its subjects from terrorist actions and public demonstrations and compensate any consequent damage.

By amending the law, Croatia attempted to evade commitments stemming from Annex 7 of the Dayton peace accords, which explicitely says that all refugees have the right to have restored to them property they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.

More than 250,000 Serbs were expelled from the Republic of Serb Krajina during the Croatian Army aggressions in 1995. Weeks after the last aggression, Croatian troops were systematically destroying Serb property and murdering Serbs who stayed behind, mostly elderly, which has been criticised by the United Nations Security Council.

About 550,000 Serbs have been driven out or fled Croatia since it launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1991.

The Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Serbia has received 30,000 requests for return from Serb Krajina refugees. Other organizations say they have registered 50,000 refugees who want to return to Croatia.

According to reports of the Belgrade office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, only 200 persons have returned through the assistance of this organization.

A Croatian Government report says that the state bureau for diplaced persons and refugees has granted return to 1,841 persons, though about 5,000 requests have been submitted. Reports by competent Yugoslav authorities say that the Croatian bureau in Belgrade has received some 14,000 requests.

A Yugoslav Government committee registering property in Croatia of Serb Krajina refugees and Yugoslav citizens says it has received 30,811 claims.

Croatia has been constantly criticized by the international community over the past months because of its human rights violations and continued practice of destruction of Serb property.

Croatia has not ceased to practice its policy aimed at the creation of an ethnically pure state. It has not yet adopted two major laws, which are the immediate prerequisites for the return of refugees — the amnesty law and the abolition law — despite the fact that the Dayton peace accords binds it to do so.

Nevertheless, Croatia has passed a law on the provisional expropriation and use of property of Serb refugees and accelerated the procedure allowing displaced Croatians to occupy the apartments and houses owned, but abandoned, by Serbs.

It has also suspended a number of articles of the special constitutional law which gave autonomy to the municipalities with the predominantly Serb population.

According to the 1991 census, Serbs were a majority in 11 municipalities of the then Yugoslav Republic of Croatia.

Serb refugees from Pakrac, in western Slavonia, say that reconstruction projects in these municipalities have started, but not a single Serb has been given a loan for repairing or rebuilding a house.

Only one Serb refugee, aged 43, has returned to Pakrac so far, while 59 Serbs have left the town over the past several weeks.

Croatia: GLOBUS Poll Shows Tudjman Popularity Waning

AU0204202796

[FBIS Summary] Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian carries on page 8 of its 29 March issue an item titled: "President Tudjman's Popularity Is Waning," with two charts showing the results of a survey conducted by Snjezana Beros on a sample of 1,000 respondents. The results are presented in percentages as follows:

"Which presidential candidate would you vote for if elections were to take place now?" [answers in percentages]

Response	**16 Mar**	**23 Mar**
Tudjman	36.9	34.9
Tomac	17.7	16.0
I do not know	17.1	15.7
Budisa	15.8	13.5
Gotovac	0	8.5
Tomcic	6.6	5.9
I do not wish to answer	5.9	5.5

"Which party would you vote for if elections were to take place now?" [answers in percentages]

Response	**16 Mar**	**23 Mar**
HDZ	26.5	27.7
Democratic Alliance of the Center, New Sabor 95	22.7	21.5
HSLS	17.3	16.9
SDP	11.4	11.9
I do not know	12.1	10.7
I do not wish to answer	4.8	5.5
HSP	5.2	5.8

FYROM: Recognition by Belgrade a 'Question of Days'

AU0504102496 Skopje MIC in English 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Belgrade will recognize Skopje very soon," the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Milan Milutinovic stated.

According to the news published only by the independent newspaper NASA BORBA yesterday, calling upon a high-ranking official in the German Foreign Ministry, Milutinovic gave assurances that "the recognition between Belgrade and Skopje is a question of days," Makfaks reports.

Milutinovic's assurances that Belgrade will recognize Skopje soon followed after Germany announced that it had appointed an ambassador, but that he would not be sent to FRY until it recognizes Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

The Yugoslav foreign minister thereby renewed the official announcements about a recognition between Belgrade and Skopje very shortly. Milutinovic, however, did not specify when that would be accomplished.

FYROM: Miljovski Reports on Negotiations With EU

AU0404123096 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 3 Apr 96 p 2

[Article by S. Vukcevic: "A Number of Misunderstandings Overcome"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Now that the first phase of negotiations on associate membership for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] in the EU has ended, we can say that our stances and arguments are better understood in Brussels and a number of misunderstandings have been overcome. This is how Jane Miljovski, deputy premier with the responsibility for cooperation with the EU, assessed the negotiations of the Macedonian delegation with the EU at yesterday's news conference following the delegation's arrival from Brussels.

In a detailed briefing on the course of the discussions, he emphasized that the memorandum on cooperation proposed by the EU was more developed than those offered to countries that are a step closer to cooperation with the EU than ourselves, such as Slovenia and Bulgaria, because it covers a greater number of areas. Our delegation presented its position on this agreement. This, Miljovski pointed out, was generally related to regulating relations, obtaining free access to Western European markets, higher export quotas, and more substantial financial assistance for certain projects.

The Macedonian delegation had several criticisms of some points in the agreement, principally the curious overemphasis on the regional aspect, which was related to our cooperation in the region and to the development clause, which does not fully express our wishes for development and intensification of relations with the EU. Although regional cooperation is in line with the policy of our country, Miljovski said, our delegation was critical that it was mentioned too often in the agreement on bilateral relations, which arouses the fear of the possible re-establishment of old federations and new formal types of unions (customs, trade, etc.) being imposed as a condition for association with the EU. There is also the fear of the revival of old aspirations to form federations in the Balkans. However, another danger, which worries us the most, the deputy prime minister emphasized, is the possibility of there being a group assessment and of us being lumped together in the same basket with countries that lag behind our reforms.

The EU's answer was that such fears were unjustified, because the aim of this part of the agreement was to open our doors to our neighbors, to enable us to make agreements and more favorable arrangements than those that we have with the EU.

According to Miljovski, the EU representatives assured us that there was nothing wrong with the development clause on which Macedonia was insisting. The article in the agreement that says that Macedonia's aspirations for a greater level of cooperation with the EU will be taken into consideration presents no dangers, although it differs from similar articles in the agreements with other countries, in which a time scale is set down (for Slovenia it says that the agreement on association will be signed in four years, for Albania after the reforms, etc.). It simply means that the EU has become aware of the mistake of fixing time scales because it has transpired that the countries in question do not fulfill the conditions for starting negotiations on association. So, this formula gives Macedonia the same rights as other countries. For its part, our delegation said that we would not object to a formulation under which association would take place in phases depending on the extent of the changes in the country. We were promised that this issue would be subject to further review and would be presented to the Commission and to the Council of Ministers.

However, Miljovski emphasized that we should bear in mind the problems within the EU itself, which have a great influence on the negotiations.

Miljovski stressed that the agreement had been discussed clause by clause and that our criticisms and arguments had been noted by the EU representatives. The agreement is scheduled to be signed on 28 May, but, although Macedonia is keen to have it signed as soon as possible, it will be making every effort to make it as good as possible, even if this requires some prolongation. As Miljovski said, the negotiations will continue until nothing new and better can be accomplished. It is now very important that a number of misunderstandings have been overcome and Miljovski expressed his personal satisfaction with the work of our delegation in Brussels.

[Box, p 2]

Credit of 150 Million ECU's

In Brussels, Jane Miljovski announced at yesterday's government news conference, discussions were held on solving transport problems, products' origin (in this connection an EU delegation is expected to arrive in Skopje on 17 April), and financial arrangements. As for financial arrangements, credits of 150 million ECU's were offered until the year 2000. Our side had asked for more, but the explanation was that many countries had asked for more money, but it had later transpired that they did not have the cover programs. After lengthy negotiations, preferential interest rates were agreed, and it was said that the beneficiaries would be paid out of the EU Budget. The European Investment Bank proposed financing other good projects, if there were any, but without these preferential interest rates.

However, Macedonia's debts present a problem. Namely, the ZTO [Rail Transport Organization] and the Road Maintenance Company owe the European Bank $80 million, of which $30 million has to be paid immediately. Before any more credit is obtained, we have to pay off this debt.

[Box, p 2]

Jane Miljovski also said that he was intending to sue FOKUS for an article in which it was claimed that he was building a house near the St. Sofia Church in Ohrid; he said that this place belonged to his relatives and he had nothing to do with it.

FYROM: Liberals' Motion To Dissolve Assembly Defeated

AU0504101896 Skopje MIC in English 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] did not accept the proposal of the Liberals to dismiss the Assembly. 24 MPs from the Liberal Party and the Party for Democratic Prosperity of the Albanians voted in favor of the proposal, while 58 MPs from the Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia [SDSM] and the Socialist Party voted against. According to the Liberals' proposal, it was foreseen to dismiss the Assembly by September 15, after previously adopting the electoral laws and the Law on civil initiatives and referendum.

A number of MPs from the ranks of SDSM and PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] were quite suspicious of the sincerity of the initiative. MP Mersel Biljali suggested that the proposers (LP) and those who support this initiative (PDPA) submit their resignations, saying that he was certain that the Parliament could not function without 36 MPs. Not because parliamentary majority would not be provided, but because it would have political weight, Biljali said. Zoran Krstevski (LP) publicly resigned from his position director of the public company for airport services "Makedonija" from the speaker's platform. According to him, the need to dismiss the Assembly came up after the break up of the election coalition Alliance for Macedonia. The Liberals explained the proposal to dismiss the Assembly with the need for the MPs elected from the general list of the Alliance to confirm their legitimacy in front of the voters.

The initiative of the Liberals, according to the MP from SDSM Nano Ruzin is a pretty naive approach to policy. "They shouldn't hope that someone will just surrender the government over to them. The idea is worth welcoming, but it is naive to think it will succeed," Ruzin said.

The coordinator of PDP Ismet Ramadani stated that it is naive to initiate elections without a Law on electoral units.

The proposal of the Liberals to form a survey commission to determine the course of the investigation into the assassination attempt on President Gligorov was withdrawn by the initiators, because, as they emphasized, it was not taken as a well-intentioned proposal.

FYROM: National Convention Presents Goals

AU2203161796 Skopje National Convention Handout in Macedonian 19 Mar 96

["National Convention Program" obtained directly from the association in Skopje on 19 March 1996; date of issue not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Convention [Nacionalna Konvencija, NK] is a nonparty, nongovernmental, and nonprofit association of citizens.

The NK is institutionalized as an open citizens' initiative, and its characteristic function is to affirm the Macedonian national strategy on the basis of the economic, political, and cultural standards of a modern democracy.

After the break-up of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] the NK considers that it is essential and correct for the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to maintain the genuine position it adopted at the ASNOM (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Macedonia) on the foundations of the VMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) strategy for an independent state as the most appropriate solution in the interests of the Macedonian nation and all the citizens of Macedonia, regardless of ethnic, religious, language or other affiliation. This assumption was realized with the referendum on independent Macedonia in 1991 and with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.

The NK holds the following principles to be elementary strategic values:

1. Man as a free and inviolable individual has the right to political determination, economic initiative, and creativity in conditions of a democratic state under the rule of law.

2. The NK considers Macedonian citizenship an elementary condition for citizens' rights and duties;

3. The Republic of Macedonia is a nation state of the Macedonian nation in which equality is guaranteed to all citizens regardless of race, ethnic, religious, or language affiliation.

4. The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia are free to express their ethnic affiliation, religious confession, language, tradition, or culture. The particular identifications imply their identification as citizens.

5. Every citizen both as an individual and as a member of an ethnic, religious, or language group is guaranteed human rights and freedoms by the state in the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation] documents adopted in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.

6. The NK sees Macedonia as a civilized home with a full balance of all subsystems in the global social system.

As a nonparty, nongovernmental, and nonprofit association, the NK will engage its intellectual energy to accomplish the following goals:

First, it will work to prepare an integrated national program/strategy of the Macedonian state;

Second, it will defend the name of the nation (Macedonian) and the name of the state (Republic of Macedonia); it will study and affirm our history and culture, our ethnic genesis, our language, and literature;

Third, it will initiate and develop national reconciliation and a general amnesty for acts motivated by strategies that did not aim at the independence of the Macedonian nation state (except for those that are internationally classified as crimes against humanity). On this basis, the NK will engage in promoting a national consensus of all political and civil subjects, as well as of religious communities. The NK will qualify as detrimental all programs that encourage segmentation and disintegration, and it will fight them with all democratic means;

Fourth, it will promote the language of the Macedonian nation as a Macedonian literary and official language. Regarding the languages of the other ethnic groups, it will fully abide by the norms of international conventions;

Fifth, it will apply the experience of democratic societies in the construction of the state and its institutions;

Sixth, it will contribute to the construction of mechanisms of a political system under the rule of law in accordance with the principles of judicial and political science;

Seventh, it will promote the construction of an economic system based on private and state-owned enterprises (joint venture), on imminent economic laws and principles with a synchronized investment, taxation, and social policy (in this context, the NK will advocate privatization and reprivatization in conformity with the market economies of democratic societies).

Eighth, it will conduct a complementary ecological, demographic, and population policy that will secure a reasonable co-relation of economic, ecological, and social parameters, that is to say, a family planning and restrictive migration policy, in accordance with the regulations in modern democratic societies;

Ninth, it will plan development in territories and settlements with an integrated infrastructure and communications throughout the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, with the aim of revitalizing the village and achieving equitable regional development;

Tenth, it will form systems of science and education that will be dedicated to productive human and national goals, organized in special subsystems (natural, technical, biological, social, humanist), founded on concrete scientific strategies;

Eleventh, it will lay the foundations of a cultural system that will encourage creativity, taste, and high aspirations, with the aim of completing a strategy of real cultural education/cooperation between national traditions and universal human values, as a counterbalance to subcultures;

Twelfth, it will promote legal and moral awareness of respect for the law and democratic procedures, which is an essential condition for the functioning of the rule-of-law state and for the protection of human dignity;

Thirteenth, it will maintain a pluralist and competent information system;

Fourteenth, it will promote the values of the family as the basic unit of society; it will work to create positive conditions for socialization and culture of children and young people;

Fifteenth, the security of citizens and defense of the country will be organized in a rational and democratic way, so as to guarantee personal dignity and the sovereignty of the state.

Poland: Defense Minister Reviews Talks in Moscow

LD0404154696 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1238 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Apr—After his visit to Moscow, which ended on Wednesday [3 April], National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski did not note any progress in the matter of Russia's agreement to Poland's entry to NATO. The minister informed journalists on 4 April that there will not be any new Polish-Russian battalion; he only announced joint exercises by selected units from the two states.

Dobrzanski explained that there will be no new structure (a Polish-Russian battalion), there will only be exercises: "You select units on both sides which collaborate by training for such tasks as those carried out by our units in Bosnia." It is envisaged that these will be staff exercises. He emphasized that the costs of setting up a battalion would be too great.

Asked about plans for joint exercises, Dobrzanski reported that in July 1997 there will be multilateral exercises, with about a dozen countries invited to participate, to which Russia will also be invited. He denied that three exercises have already been planned for this year. He added that experts will deal with seeking the best opportunities for organizing exercises.

The national defense minister was also asked about the significance for Polish-Russian military cooperation of the 4 April agreement between the two states on mutual supplies of arms and military equipment and provision of military services. According to him, the agreement is mainly of economic importance but it is also of "tremendous significance" for the training of the Polish armed forces. He added that normal training requires regular supplies of spares for the equipment, about 90 percent of which originates from the former USSR or Russia. He also expressed the hope that the agreement will make easier not only the procurement of supplies but also the organization of servicing.

Asked whether the agreement guarantees that spares from Russia will reach Poland even after Poland's possible entry to the North Atlantic pact, the minister expressed the view that such supplies will arrive normally.

Asked how the agreement resolves the issue of re-exports of Russian-licensed arms, Dobrzanski said only that the agreement is very favorable for Poland, whereas as far as re-exports of weapons from Poland are concerned, he referred journalists to the minister of foreign economic relations.

Dobrzanski reported that Poland is implementing a pan-European and Atlantic strategy as regards cooperation with Russia. "Everything we are doing in the Russian direction is supposed to bring us closer to NATO, rather than further away," he added.

Poland: Press Reaction to Defense Minister's Russian Visit

WS0404145396

[FBIS Report] On 4 April two major Warsaw vernacular dailies carried reaction to Polish Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski's ongoing visit to Moscow.

The right-of-center ZYCIE WARSZAWY ran a 250-word front-page commentary by Grzegorz Jankowski entitled "Suicidal Compromises?" Jankowski believes that, on the one hand, "it is a good thing that we are trying to develop the best possible relations with Russia, our biggest neighbor and the main opponent of NATO's expansion to Poland." He notes, however, that "there are fears that Poland will once again become dependent on Russian technology. This will spell the end of our plans to adjust Polish armaments to Western standards. In addition, NATO will not very favorably evaluate the idea of establishing a joint Polish-Russian battalion or the idea of educating Polish officers in Russia." Jankowski adds that "not long ago our generals acquired their education in Moscow and Leningrad" and asks rhetorically: "Will the skills acquired in Russia be of any help in NATO?"

Jankowski mentions President Kwasniewski's upcoming trip to Moscow. According to the ZYCIE WARSZAWY journalist, "a lot will depend on President Kwasniewski. (...) He will not have to try to persuade the Russians to agree to Poland's entry to NATO. He will not change Moscow's stance anyway. However, he should not agree to any compromises to appease our eastern neighbors. This is because our goal, as Kwasniewski himself stresses himself, is to join NATO, and we will certainly not join it along with Russia." Jankowski wonders whether "in such a case the tactics of reaching agreements with Russia at any price is correct," and fears that "contrary to the intentions of Polish diplomats, we may eliminate ourselves from the group of future member-states of NATO."

The left-of-center GAZETA WYBORCZA carried on page one an untitled 150-word commentary by Janusz Onyszkiewicz, leading politician of the Freedom Union (UW) and former national defense minister. According to him, "the proposal to organize joint exercises is a very good move." He argues that "this initiative proves to the Russians that we are not pursuing an anti-Russian policy. It creates the image of a state which, while heading for NATO, is cooperating well with its neighbors, and it must be remembered that NATO is going to great lengths to prove that its expansion will not result in the isolation of Russia." However, Onyszkiewicz criticizes the idea of establishing a joint Polish- Russian battalion, which he believes is "unreal."

The idea of forming a battalion together with the Russians is also criticized by Bronislaw Komorowski, another UW politician and former deputy defense minister. In a 800-word report entitled "The Russian Ball Chained to the Leg," signed by "CEG, PAP" and published on page 2 of ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Komorowski is quoted as saying that "if we remember the non-sovereign relations between our states and the fact that the Soviet army was stationed on our soil for years, we would agree that this is an unfortunate proposal; it is also difficult to accept, first of all for the Polish public."

The same report carries an opinion by Longin Pastusiak, a politician linked to the governing Democratic Left Alliance. According to him, "this visit should be looked upon as part of the process of making our bilateral relations with Moscow more dynamic. It is a good thing, because so far satisfactory economic relations between our countries have been accompanied by a rather low-level political dialog." Pastusiak likes the idea of forming a joint battalion. He explains that "Poland's reputation in the UN is very good. The more countries we cooperate with, the better our image will be."

Poland: Article Says Steel Industry Earning Profits

96EP0037B Warsaw WARSAW VOICE in English 25 Feb 96 p 10

[Article by Tadeusz Markiewicz: "Strength in Numbers"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Polish steel industry had a good year in 1995, the result of the benefits of restructuring coinciding with a global steel-market upturn. Even though steel inventories have increased worldwide over the past few months, causing prices to slide, long-term forecasts for the sector's global development are optimistic. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Steel Committee believes that the favorable global trends should last at least until 2000, with consumption rising at 1.5-2 percent a year to about 750 million tons.

In 1990-1992, production in Poland had fallen by 40 percent, and steel consumption declined by more than 50 percent. Several plants shut down. Today, the Polish steel sector seems to have climbed out of its slump. The sector last year recorded its first profits since the fall of communism. Ministry of Industry and Trade data suggests that in the first nine months of 1995, the sector reported a zl.694 million gross profit and a zl.347 million net profit, with the year's profitability at around 4.5 percent.

The history of modern metallurgy in Poland dates back to the late 18th century. In 1796, John Baildon, a Scotsman, built Europe's first coke-fired steel foundry in Gliwice, in what was then Prussian Silesia. Six years later, a steam engine was installed at Chorzow's Royal Foundry. Steel mills were built in Silesia because the region boasted extensive coal resources for fuel and in metals processing. Today, most of Poland's 25 steel mills are located in the south.

After World War II, the metallurgical sector enjoyed special support from the state. For the communists, large industrial plants were a hallmark of the new system. In the early 1950s, construction began on steel-producing complexes at Nowa Huta in Cracow and in Warsaw; in the 1970s a steel conglomerate was built in Katowice. Polish mills had no problems selling steel they produced: Countries belonging to the then-East Bloc's Comecon trade zone ordered huge amounts. As recently as 1980, the Polish steel sector produced 19 million tons of pig iron and 13.5 million tons of rolled steel.

In the early 1990s, the metallurgical sector faced a major challenge. Recession engulfed the domestic market, thanks to the new economic system. Exports to former Comecon countries also collapsed. Statistics kept by the International Iron and Steel Institute show that steel production in post-communist countries plunged from 29.2 percent of global output in 1984 to 15.2 percent in 1994.

Polish steel mills and exporters, while undergoing restructuring, began an intensive search for new export markets. The new customers proved to be more exacting than the previous Comecon markets.

The first step toward restructuring was a 1992 sectoral study by Comecon consortium Hatch Associates, Ernst & Young Steltech. Total costs of reorganizing the Polish steel sector were projected to reach about $4.5 billion, including nearly $2 billion in capital investment, $1.8 billion in repairs and the remainder in debt reduction programs for enterprises and social security programs for steel sector employees. The consortium recommended liquidation of seven steel mills: two (Bobrek and Szczecin) to be dissolved completely and five to have assets transferred to the other mills remaining after the sector's restructuring. Hatch and Ernst & Young said that the Polish metallurgical industry's capacity should not exceed 11.7 billion tons of steel a year. Employment needed to be slashed from 140,000 to 43,000.

"The study was carried out at a time of deep recession," said Wiktor Laszczyk, chief coordinator of the steel industry team at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. "The Canadians assumed that the Polish economy would be overcoming the crisis with gross domestic product rising at 2-3 percent annually. However, in reality, we have recorded much better results."

Tadeusz Torz, chairman of the Metallurgical Chamber of Industry and Commerce (HIPH), expressed a similar opinion. "Our needs were underestimated," he said. "By 2000, we were expected to consume 6 million tons of rolled products; in reality we surpassed that level by 200,000 tons last year."

The government adopted the Hatch findings as an overall strategy without following all details. Only Bobrek was put into liquidation, while bankruptcy proceedings at Szczecin were converted into a recovery program because the mill, located in northwestern Poland, is the country's only plant producing pig iron for the founding industry. The Szczecin plant was taken over by a Stalexport-Pomorski Bank Kredytowy joint venture. All other mills eliminated unnecessary departments and gradually cut employment. Also, using both their own funds and bank loans, they invested in state-of-the-art metals-processing technology, primarily continuous-casting lines which allows a 15-percent increase in output while cutting production costs by $20-30 per ton. In 1992, only 7.7 percent of total Polish steel capacity was continuous casting, compared to Western Europe's 92 percent. Projects completed in 1995 boosted continuous-casting production capacity to 30 percent of the total.

"In the near future, we're opening continuous-casting lines at Baildon and at Tadeusz Sendzimir mill in Cracow," said Laszczyk. "All these investments will bring Poland's continuous-casting capacity up to 95 percent, a record level for the industry." To help fund the multimillion-dollar conversions, the State Treasury granted loan guarantees to Huta Katowice, Tadeusz Sendzimir and Stalowa Wola.

Seeing the upturn in worldwide demand for steel, industry managers have persuaded the government to raise production capacity from 11.7 million tons of steel a year to 13-14 million tons. But the plan's implementation may be derailed by the gradual liberalization of customs duties that Poland promised in its Association Agreement with the European Union. Import duty on steel will be reduced by 3 percent each year and will completely disappear in 1998. But industry insiders believe the sector's restructuring will probably last until 2002 and expect a steel-sector lobby to pressure the government to revise the EU accord. "Customs duty liberalization is unavoidable," Torz said. "Nevertheless, we believe the process should be delayed. I want to stress that this is not a Polish idea. In the 1970s and '80s, Western European countries undergoing restructuring acted similarly, as did the United States."

Polish steel producers are most seriously perturbed by constantly growing imports. According to a report published by RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE trade magazine in January, about 700,000 tons of metallurgical products were imported to Poland in 1993, rising to 800,000 tons in 1994 and 1 million tons in 1995. At the same time, exports totaled 3.2 million tons, 4 million tons and 3.8 million tons, respectively. The main export markets—accounting for almost 50 percent of Poland's metallurgical exports—were Germany, Taiwan and Thailand.

The Polish industry's prestige was enhanced by the January 9 signing of an associate-member status agreement with Eurofer, the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries. The agreement covers the Polish Metallurgical Chamber of Industry and Commerce and Poland's three largest exporters: Katowice, Czestochowa and Sendzimir mills. Under the agreement, the two sides will exchange statistical information, discuss steel industry restructuring problems, conduct market analyses and seek out opportunities for mutual investment programs. Poland's representatives, although without the right to vote, will participate in six committees comprising commercial directors, economic studies, environmental protection, raw materials, social-security matters and standardization.

Eurofer will provide an early-warning system for exporters to prevent EU anti-dumping procedures. European producers have twice accused Poland of dumping. Poland lost one case, started in 1991, involving its steel pipe exports. A second complaint concerned the alleged dumping of metal plates, but it was rejected by EU trade officials. Torz said that learning early on about an impending complaint makes it possible to settle the matter out of court.

In addition to conflict-resolution, Eurofer will give Polish managers access to valuable market data which could become a key to success.

For the time being, the two sides differ on the value of Polish exports. Eurofer contends that over the past several months, Polish steel sales have increase in the EU, while Poland's official statistical data show exports falling compared to the previous year. According to preliminary estimates, the share of Polish steel products in EU consumption (which totals 135 million tons) is 0.6-0.75 percent at the moment. This is one-fourth of Poland's total steel exports.

Metals industry executives are cautiously optimistic as they see steadily improving financial results and, both in Poland and abroad, rising demand. Domestic growth seems assured with the development of vehicle-making industries, construction of the freeway network and a recovering construction industry.

UPWARD CURVE

Production and utilization of metallurgical products (in millions of tons)

	1985	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995*
Steel production	16.1	15.1	13.6	10.4	9.9	9.9	11.1	11.8
Rolled products production	11.8	11.3	9.8	8	7.6	7.6	8.6	9
Exports	2.1	2.5	3.7	3.7	3.4	3.2	4	3.8
Imports	1.4	1.1	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.8	1
Utilization**	11	9.9	6.8	4.5	4.7	5.1	5.4/5.6	6/6.2

Source: Central Statistical Office (GUS) and Rynki Zagraniczne

* estimated data; ** differences stem from different calculating methods

Skeptics argue that privatization in the steel sector remains excessively slow. They cite Huta Warszawa, where Italy's Lucchini group took a controlling stake early in the 1990s, as an example of success that is only too rare. The skeptics are not only worried about import duty liberalization; they also note the huge steel-making capacity of Poland's eastern neighbors and the fact that these countries offer products that rival Polish products in price. Today, Ukraine alone has production capacity of 50 million tons of steel a year operated by an exceedingly cheap labor force.

Romania: Melescanu Reiterates NATO Adherence Goal

AU0204140296 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 26-27 Mar 96 pp 16-17

[Interview in two installments with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Anne Juganaru; place and date not given: "Interview"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

"The Conclusion I Reached After Prague Is That This Process of NATO Expansion Will Continue" [26 March, pp 16-17]

[Juganaru] [passage omitted] Mr. Minister, both the political class and the public at large are following with maximum interest the unfolding of the process of expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance. What should we retain—beyond the official speeches and statements—from the recent meeting you and your counterparts had with Warren Christopher in Prague [on 19-20 March]?

[Melescanu] Both in the public stances and private talks we had with Mr. Warren Christopher, the message was very clear—namely that NATO's opening will continue since the United States has decided to further play an important and primordial role in this process, as an expression of the determination of the U.S. Administration to stay involved in the European problems. I have deliberately used the expression "NATO opening" because I believe that what we are currently witnessing is an opening in three directions of action. First of all, this opening process includes the effective broadening of the Alliance through the incorporation of new member states. This is an expansion process in which the Partnership for Peace "vehicle" is one of the most important means of action. For us, this NATO expansion and Romania's inclusion in the Alliance's structures is one of our strategic political goals. In my opinion, the second element of this opening process is the development of a relationship of partnership between an enlarged NATO [which will include us and other Central European countries] and the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and other states, which have not expressed the desire to be part of the Alliance. This is a very important element which, I believe, should accompany the process of expansion and admission of new members into NATO. All of us have set the goal of ensuring that this expansion should not pose any dangers to the security of others and to that of the new demarcation line in Europe; on the contrary, it should mean the expansion of the area of security, stability, and prosperity in Europe. The third element of this opening process is the revitalization of the activity of the North Atlantic Treaty, which also included, among other things, the recent IFOR [Implementation Force] mission to ensure the implementation of the Dayton accords. This proves that NATO itself is in a process of revitalizing its entire activity, by expanding its spheres of action, involving other countries in its activities, and militarily cooperating with other countries, too, such as the Russian Federation, which also participates with troops in certain actions. The conclusion I have reached after Prague is that this process of NATO expansion will continue.

[Juganaru] The question that concerns us all is whether Romania will catch the first train to NATO.

[Melescanu] Of course, this is one of the problems. If we proceed from the idea that NATO's expansion is a process, then I believe we will have to accept that it should unfold gradually, deliberately, and openly. To paraphrase a colleague of mine, I would say that it is no tragedy if this process takes place in stages.

[Juganaru] Do you not think that Romania might be at a disadvantage if Hungary were to be admitted into NATO before us?

[Melescanu] Who said that? When I said that we accept the idea of a gradual expansion process, I did not say that Romania should be received in the second echelon.

[Juganaru] However, while paraphrasing Defense Minister Tinca—who said that it would not be a tragedy if Romania were not accepted into NATO—the question of whether we do not achieve an inferior position vis-a-vis the neighboring countries admitted to this alliance does arise.

[Melescanu] Our country's admission into NATO is a strategic target that we must achieve, because it is in accordance with our interests. Anyhow, I do not believe that we should proceed now from scenarios whereby Romania is not going to be admitted into NATO. Our only scenario is when and how our country is going to be admitted into NATO. Accepting the fact that NATO's expansion is a gradual process does not necessarily mean that Romania cannot belong to the first wave. [passage omitted] I believe that the countries with very complicated relations, which have great implications for the regional stability, should be received together. Here I am thinking of Hungary and Romania and I believe that the best solution would be for both to be admitted in the first wave.

[Juganaru] What about the statements of the communist leaders of Moscow and their message? [passage omitted]

[Melescanu] When it comes to very important countries, such as the Russian Federation, I believe we should think of the third point I mentioned before, namely the openness of the whole process and the fact that the NATO expansion should be made in broad daylight, with everybody being notified of developments; however, this does not mean that anyone outside NATO and the respective candidate country should have a right to veto the decisions. Therefore, without doubting the existence of a concern in this respect on the part of the Russian Federation, I do not believe and do not think that anyone can accept that it should have a right to veto. However, I am quick to add that we are very aware of the need for this expansion process to be accompanied by an effort to build a relationship of partnership between NATO and the Russian Federation, to which I would also add Ukraine.

[Juganaru] Romania is one of the few countries in the region that has not yet signed a treaty with the Russian Federation. When do you think we will be able to sign this treaty?

[Melescanu] The treaty has been agreed upon to a large extent. The problem is how it can reflect certain difficult moments in our common history. This is what we are working upon at this time. [passage omitted] I believe that we will soon be able to agree on certain solutions and prepare the treaty for signing. I do not rule out the possibility of signing this treaty in a relatively short period of time, provided, of course, that we find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem, the only one still left unsolved. [passage omitted]

[Juganaru] Mr. Melescanu, would you be so kind as to talk about the bilateral treaties that Romania intends to conclude with Ukraine and Hungary?

[Melescanu] We have recently held a round of talks with Ukraine here, in Bucharest, which allowed us to finalize a very important chapter both for us and our partners. The chapter deals with the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to the national minorities, and I believe that it was finalized in a satisfactory way. We profited from the fact that Ukraine has recently become a member of the Council of Europe, something that allowed us to tackle the respective issue in keeping with the highest European standards. In this stage, the treaty is already taking the shape of a legal instrument. The only thing left is to find the best way for it to reflect the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and certain aspects linked to our historical past. This is still a pending problem as far as our treaty with the Russian Federation is concerned. In the case of Ukraine, there is yet another practical problem, arising from certain yet unresolved matters, such as the delimitation of the maritime space between Romania and our neighbors. We will have to find a solution, which, in my opinion, implies the obligation of the two countries to negotiate this subject and establish certain parameters for the demarcation of the maritime space. [passage omitted]

"If We Were To Answer All the Foolish Things Being Published in the Newspapers of Hungary and Romania, the Personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Would Not Suffice" [27 March, pp 16-17]

[Juganaru] What is the stage of negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty with Hungary?

[Melescanu] To a large extent, the treaty with Hungary has reached a dead end over a matter of principle, which, however, has a direct impact on several practical agreements. From the start, our stand has been that this treaty should aim to create a system of bilateral ties between Romania and Hungary, which, proceeding from the current European standards, principles, and language, should sanction a certain type of relations and the basic obligation of the two countries to jointly look forward to the future and act to achieve their basic goal in matters of foreign policy—that is, their integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. During the negotiations, it has become obvious at times that our colleagues from Hungary wanted this bilateral treaty to contain dispositions that might go beyond certain European standards, at least in some very specific spheres, such as those linked to minorities. We are still working on a formula to please both sides. In our opinion, this formula can be found if one proceeds from the legal regulations presently in effect in Romania and Hungary—that is, from the Constitution, laws, and the basic documents adopted at the international and European level, including by the Council of Europe. I am primarily thinking of the framework convention on national minorities. If we carry this matter to its completion, by clearly agreeing on certain specifics and adjusting the overall international standards to certain situations specific to Romanian-Hungarian relations, and if we can add a provision that I suggested to our colleagues in Hungary, then we will surely find a correct moral and legal solution. What we are suggesting is that, to the extent that higher human rights standards, including the rights of people belonging to the national minorities, are being agreed upon at the European level, they should be incorporated in the bilateral treaty. We are working on such a solution and we have recently had talks in this respect, where certain progress was made, but several problems remained unsolved. We hope very much that this new stage of our bilateral talks, represented by the historic reconciliation initiative, should create a kind of mutual dynamics that will facilitate the faster finalization of the treaty.

Since you referred to the bilateral treaties currently under negotiation, I would like to add that they are only one element of Romania's relations with these countries. These relations are actually very good. We have a steady and intensive political dialogue with all of them, exchanges of visits, contacts, and very important economic relations. I would like to mention here that, of all our neighbors, Hungary is our most important economic partner. On the other hand, I would like to point out that, at this time, Romania's biggest investment in the world is in a neighboring country—Ukraine, namely in the Kryvyy-Ryh Combine. I do not think we should fall into the trap of thinking that Romania's relations with the neighboring countries are shaped by the conclusion of bilateral treaties. The latter are only a part of an ensemble, which, I would say, is a very encouraging and important factor for the very good evolution of Romania's overall relations with its neighbors.

[Juganaru] Mr. Minister, quite a few people accuse the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of apathy toward the attacks of certain Hungarian officials. Why do we not respond more incisively to such attacks?

[Melescanu] We make a very clear distinction between personal political opinions, even if they come from some important figures, and the official position. The official position of the Hungarian side is to negotiate the finalization of this treaty and not to engage in polemics through the press. Many things are also said in Romania, particularly by a few politicians, about the relations with Hungary. There were even some pretty strong requests that we should interrupt these negotiations.

[Juganaru] True, but let us not forget that the maps showing Transylvania as a part of Hungary are coming from Budapest. Should one not answer to these things?

[Melescanu] There are also maps of Greater Romania in circulation, but I do not believe that these things necessarily require a reaction from us, as long as they do not become the subject of certain governmental actions. As a matter of fact, we cannot enter into polemics with the press, because you are much stronger than us. You can write what you like, while we cannot do that. If we were to answer all the foolish things being published in the newspapers of Hungary and Romania, the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not suffice.

[Juganaru] Recently the State Duma voted a resolution calling for the restoration of the USSR. What is the position of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this document, which has caused such a pandemonium in the Western chanceries?

[Melescanu] Our position proceeds from an analysis—which we are striving to make as correct as possible—of the legal and political value of this stance and also from the official communications of the Russian authorities, which stated that this declaration of the State Duma has no practical effect on the foreign policy, decisions, or commitments assumed by the Russian Federation. Of course, leaving aside this assurance given to us by our colleagues under the form of an official position of the Government of the Russian Federation, I would say that the Duma statement reflects, nonetheless, a certain nostalgia shared by an important number of deputies—who seem to be in a majority—which obviously represents an element of concern for us, too. We are aware of the fact that practically the resolution can have no impact on the relations between the Russian Federation and the other independent countries, because a cancellation of such a decision must be made with everyone's agreement, not only of the Russian Federation. Of course, we are immediately thinking of the Republic of Moldova and then Ukraine. Consequently, this is also a reason of concern for us, too. I believe it all amounts to a rather awkward attempt to turn back the clock of history. However, the entire international practice has shown that history cannot be rewritten or turned back. Trying to turn back to the past is not the best way to tackle the future. However, there are very important forces in Russia which see these things in a totally different light. These are the democratic forces, that are continuing their evolution, which we want to be as ascending and positive as possible. As a matter of fact, the best guarantee against such efforts of a return to the past is the consolidation of these democratic forces, whom we should grant all our support.

[Juganaru] Do you think that the latest events in the Republic of Moldova were linked to this resolution voted by the Duma?

[Melescanu] Personally, I see no direct link. I would say that the events currently taking place in the Republic of Moldova actually prove—as if we did not know it already—that we are the same people and that many interesting ideas and things are being ventilated during an electoral campaign. I would link the current developments in the Republic of Moldova to the electoral campaign there, which, although not yet officially launched, it has been underway, like in our country, since the second day after the conclusion of the previous elections.

[Juganaru] Since you referred to the electoral campaign, I cannot miss the opportunity of asking you whether you intend to enroll in the Romanian National Unity Party, as a member of that party recently said.

[Melescanu] As any Romanian from Transylvania, I am a fervent partisan of the national ideas and of the importance of each party's position and ideology for the promotion of the national interest. Beyond this statement, I am not politically affiliated to any party. I believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should promote the national policy, not the policy of any party. [passage omitted] Therefore, the problem of acquiring a party membership card does not arise at all. As any Romanian, I bear the tricolor in my heart, but I do not need a piece of paper to corroborate that. [passage omitted]

[Juganaru] One last question, Mr. Melescanu. Please try to sketch for us a picture of Romania's image 10 years from now and of its foreign relations.

[Melescanu] If you asked me to make such a forecast for only 10 months from now, this would have been a more difficult task. It is much easier for me to forecast what is going to happen 10 years from now. Romania—as warranted by all extant conditions and its history—will be the most important country in the region. It will belong to the EU as one of the main EU actors in our region and it will become a full NATO member, one of the pillars of stability in this region. I am convinced that beyond our integration in these two important structures and our very active participation in other European structures—the West European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—Romania will become one of the countries of the old continent with the greatest opening and sensitiveness toward the rest of the world. [passage omitted]

Romania: Tinca on Hungarian Entry in NATO Before Romania

LD0404211596 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Romanian defense minister [Gheorghe Tinca] it would be a mistake if Hungary became a NATO member before Romania. In an interview to Duna TV, Gheorghe Tinca pointed out that in this case, Budapest could oppose Romania's accession or could make it subject to conditions.

[Correspondent Tibor Bogdan] Different treatment of the two countries could start complex processes, which could have a negative effect on the region's security and could lead to an armament contest. I do not even want to think about the effect it would have on the economies of our countries, said Gheorghe Tinca. He hopes that there is no competition between the two countries, only a political game, which is acceptable within certain limits. If we want to compete, let us do it in the fields of the finalization of the basic treaty, the expansion of bilateral relations and historic reconciliation, where we all can win, the defense minister told Duna TV.

Romania: Tinca Warns of 'Dangerous Extremists' in Hungary

AU0404150396 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 1 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Romul Biro: "The Covasna and Harghita Authorities Resolved the Housing Problems of the Military Men"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gheorghe Tinca [foreign affairs minister] believes that the relationship between the Army units and the local authorities in Covasna and Harghita Counties is "perfect, to a certain extent." The housing problem of the military cadres has been solved in these areas, which have a 70-80 percent Hungarian majority, unlike in other counties. He admitted that this achievement is not so much due to the special cooperation of the local authorities, but to the fact that the law is observed in Covasna and Harghita. Regarding the accusations of "militarization" and "forceful modification of the ethnic ratio" in the two areas, Gheorghe Tinca said that such allegations—that "1,000 soldiers can upset the ethnic balance"—are proof of weakness. He added that the state is sovereignly deciding, in accordance with its military doctrine, where to deploy its military units, which must establish very good and close relations with the local communities.

The defense minister believes that the Hungarian press and mass media, as well as the statements broadcast by certain unofficial radio stations and those made at various meetings, are at the root of the fears of the Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania. "There are some adroit and dangerous extremists in Hungary," Tinca said.

Slovenia: Debt Exchange To Go Through Despite Serb Suit

AU0504092196 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by Miha Jenko: "Slovenia Will Go Through With the Exchange of Its Debt Despite the Serb Lawsuit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 29 March—The Slovene side has still not received the wording of the Serb lawsuit at the London court, which is designed to prevent the exchange of the Slovene part of the debt [of former Yugoslavia]. The head of the Slovene team that is negotiating with the consortium of commercial banks, Dr. Mojmir Mrak, told us that "we have every intention of going ahead with the planned transaction and the exchange of part of the debt according to the New Financial Agreement [NFA] into bonds. It also depends on how the commercial banks act, but we are counting on the fact that they will act as they have done so far in accordance with the agreed statement and that the transaction will go through."

According to Mrak, "this deals with a lawsuit which is directed toward Slovenia, the Bank of Slovenia, the Slovene banks that were participating in the NFA, and all the creditors that gave their consent to a separate agreement with Slovenia. Their goal is the same: to prevent the transactions—the exchange of the debt. Their key argument is that the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ], as the paying agent, should have been asked whether such a transaction may take place or not. The question also arises whether they, as the NBJ, are the paying agent or not. According to their opinion, this is a violation of the agreement, and they are therefore suing all those that are ready to participate in such a "violation." The agreement of the creditors is seen as a document with which the creditor banks are violating the agreement. According to this logic they are suing them and us. This deals with a united front of those of us that were accused, so the defense should also be united and coordinated."

The Serb side already wanted to prevent the agreement between Slovenia and the creditors after the NFA, with its first intervention from the New York law firm Kirkland & Ellis. This was followed by a Slovene reply and a clear statement from the international creditors committee that they will not comply with Belgrade's demands. As today's FINANCIAL TIMES reported, only one bank (out of more than 300), the Tokai Bank of Japan, agreed with the Serb demands not to agree to an agreement with Slovenia. This clearly shows the point of view of the creditors. "When they noticed that the international financial community was completely supporting the position that the agreement between Slovenia and the creditors was correct, they decided on the next step—a lawsuit at the London court," Dr. Mrak said.

Another interesting question is why the Serb side has decided to issue the lawsuit in London (the other two applicable courts are New York and Belgrade, the latter as the "capital of SFRY" [Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia], but the matter must everywhere be dealt with in accordance with New York law). Together with their lawyers they probably assessed that such a decision is best for them from a geopolitical viewpoint.

"The Serb side does not want the court to prevent the realization of the transaction without it emphasizing the fact that the separate agreement between Slovenia and the creditors is in contradiction with the NFA," said Mrak. He warns that "it is not in accordance with the NFA." This is somewhat unusual from the legal standpoint.

The expert circles are mainly convinced that the Serb side, which has not wanted to negotiate about the debt for the past three years, sees a separate Slovene agreement with the creditors basically as a precedent that could threaten its concept of the political continuity of former Yugoslavia. We should not overlook the fact that the opinions in Belgrade also differ. The more reasonable and careful movement, led by NBJ Governor Dragoslav Avramovic, is losing ground to vultures from government and academic circles.

Slovenia: Negotiations on Physicians' Pay Fail

AU0404132596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 3 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The negotiations between the government negotiating team and the Fides trade unions [of physicians and dentists] have reached a dead-end following yesterday's break in the negotiations. Yesterday the government offered a 17 percent pay rise as of 1 April, taking into account the 0.9 quotient, and a 28-percent pay rise, which would equal a 0.6 quotient, from 1 October if the parliament fails to pass the law on physicians in the meantime.

According to Dr. Konrad Kustrin, such an offer is insulting to physicians. He said that the physicians themselves are under great pressure during the strike and are suffering as much as the patients. However, they will not yield for the sake of few thousand tolars.

[Begin Kustrin recording] We believe that the government has manipulated the physicians and instigated the continuation of the strike. We absolutely stand on the position that the government is to blame for the long duration of the strike and the suffering of the patients. [end recording] [passage omitted].

Slovenia: Investment Societies Protest Privatization Gap

AU0504101196 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 29 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Silva Ceh: "PIDs Are Proving That They Are Right"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 28 March—According to data of the union of societies that are administering authorized investment funds, the privatization gap is increasing and has supposedly reached 134 billion Slovene Tolars [SIT]. As stated at today's news conference of the union, the government's evaluations of the state capital deficit (SIT 86.5 billion) are professionally incorrect. Each society will individually decide whether it will attend the April auction of the development fund or not.

That is what Branko Pavlin, the director of KBM Infond and also the head of union of societies for the administration of investment funds, explained to the journalists. On 17 January, the union calculated the difference between the available capital and the vouchers that have been accepted by societies to be valued at SIT 129.36 billion. This difference had already reached SIT 133.88 billion by 13 March. According to them, that is the size of the deficit that deals with the vouchers that have been accepted by the authorized funds. However, there is supposedly a SIT 177.57 billion deficit with regard to all vouchers issued (SIT 563 billion). The calculations of the societies' union is based on the evaluation that the disposable state capital was worth SIT 675.6 billion, whereas the value at the privatization agency and at the ministry is SIT 732 billion (according to the official explanation the difference is SIT 56.6 billion, which is supposedly the value of the fund's companies). [passage omitted]

Now that even the state has admitted an error in the evaluation of state ownership, the authorized investment societies [pooblascen investicijski druzba—PIDs] emphasize that the equal distribution of the state ownership should be ensured, or it should be stated that this value does not exist and that the vouchers should be returned to the citizens. There was no clear answer as to why approximately 15 funds are still accepting vouchers (by the way: there were no data on the number of PIDs operating). They did state that they evaluate that there are apparently still SIT 50 billion worth of (uninvested) vouchers, and that the forecasted public sales of companies are worth only SIT 9 billion, according to their calculations. While mentioning the potential possibility of returning the vouchers, they also say that this is not possible until one of the PIDs collapses. This is because these are so-called closed funds. On the other hand, it still holds true that they are calculating their provisions on the basis of collected vouchers. As they explain it, these calculations are more like accounting calculations than real ones. Either way, it is clear that the PIDs, that is, their administrators, are trying to get the safe and profitable companies. When we asked whether they would be prepared to purchase the notorious Videm Krsko company, which was, according to some, sold below its value, we received no concrete answer. We were told that bad companies and bankrupt companies should be specially defined.

Slovenia: Government Issues Denationalization Report

96BA0246E Ljubljana SLOVENIA WEEKLY in English 2 Mar 96 p 15

[Unattributed article: "Denationalization Claims Amounting to 41,268 Filed in 4 Years" (Government/Denationalization)]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, 29 February—From 1991, when the Law on Denationalization took effect, until October, 1995, as many as 41,268 claims for denationalization had been filed, the government Information Office report said. The tenth report on executing the Law on Denationalization which was discussed at the government session Thursday, states that 26,159 denationalization claims, or slightly over one half, had been completed. Head of the Government Information Office, Borut Suklje, told a news conference, following the government sessions, that 18,371 court decisions had been issued since 1991. Claims in the amount of 4,448 had been discarded, 1,153 claims had been refused, and 12,264 granted, while in 506 cases, the procedure had been suspended.

During this period,a total of 23,893 hectares of agricultural land, 61,917 hectares of forests and 148 forms had been denationalized.

A total of 2,658 apartments with a total dwelling area measuring 152,134 square meters; 500 houses, 1446 business buildings and premises had also been denationalized.

The report also states that, over the past four years, 46 companies had been denationalized to full ownership, while 326 companies had been denationalized by according a share in the companies' assets. In 194 cases other modes of denationalization had been implemented.

Slovenia: Atlantic Council Discusses NATO

96BA0246C Ljubljana SLOVENIA WEEKLY in English 2 Mar 96 pp 9-10

[Unattributed article: "Restructuring of NATO in the Restructuring Process of Europe" (Slovenia-NATO/ Discussion)]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, 27 February—The end of the cold war in Europe brought forth a need for a new, all comprehensive, security structure in Europe, agreed the participants of the round table discussion entitled the Restructuring of NATO in the Restructuring Process of Europe, Tuesday, in Ljubljana. The round table discussion, gathering numerous Slovene and foreign diplomats and experts on security, was organized by the Atlantic Council of Slovenia.

The German Ambassador to Slovenia, Guenther Seibert, and the Military Attache of the USA, Colonel Dale Hollrah, attended the discussion as representatives of the NATO member countries, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation, Alexsei Nikiforov, as a representative of the countries opposing NATO expansion, and Hungarian Ambassador to Slovenia Istvan Balogh and the Head of the Slovene Foreign Ministry Department for Multilateral Relations, Vajislav Suc, attended as representatives of the countries striving to join NATO.

The Ambassador of Germany, Seibert and American Attache, Hollrah, agreed that the end of the cold war brought forth a threat of insecurity and instability to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, the need of a new security architecture which needs to be built through all the European organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others, the representatives of Germany and the USA agreed at the discussion.

Hungarian Ambassador, Balogh, and Head of the Slovene Foreign Ministry Multilateral Relations Department, Suc, underlined the need and the efforts of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to participate in building a new security structure. Mr Suc and Mr Balogh stressed the importance of the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme, especially as a form of cooperation.

Russian Ambassador Nikiforov reaffirmed the negative attitude of Russia towards NATO expansion. "The dynamics of events in Europe in the post cold war period makes Russia believe that a rapid NATO expansion is not safe," Mr Nikiforov said, expressing a positive opinion of the Partnership for Peace programme.

Federal

FRY: Parties Respond to Hague Tribunal's Criticism

AU0404194796

[FBIS Report] Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian in its 4 April edition on page 4 carries the reactions of three Serbian parties—the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS), and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)—to The Hague war crimes tribunal's complaint about FRY's uncooperativeness in the extradition of suspected war criminals.

SPO President Vuk Draskovic voices a fear of the possible reintroduction of sanctions against Yugoslavia, saying that if this happens "we are lost for the future" and the Serbian economy will suffer "a total collapse." Draskovic believes, however, that "the state television and press will convince the people that their misery and suffering is 'a patriotic act,' and Milosevic will consolidate his rule additionally.

"I believe that this is Milosevic's firm belief, and that to consolidate his rule he would deliberately invite the sanctions by refusing to cooperate with The Hague tribunal, regardless of the terrible price that Serbia and the Serbian people would pay."

In his statement, SPS Secretary General Aleksandar Vucic explains that "formally and legally speaking, the FRY would have been criminalized had it agreed to the cooperation with the international court as this would be contrary to the FRY Constitution, which is the highest legal act of our country, which cannot and must not be ignored." "It is clear that this constitutes a political disqualification and the desire to disqualify anyone who refuses to act on the instructions of the United States," Vucic adds.

In his brief statement, DSS spokesman Milorad Jovanovic says that this latest accusation by The Hague tribunal merely confirms the party's suspicion that the tribunal is playing a political rather than a legal role. He admits that Milosevic pledged to cooperate with the tribunal in Dayton and that he is not fulfilling his promises now. As for the sanctions, Jovanovic does not believe that any sort of legal sanctions can effectively be introduced against an entire nation.

FRY: JUL President Comments on Mira Markovic, SPS

96BA0189B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 96 pp 12-15

[Interview with JUL President Ljubisa Ristic by Jasmina Lekic; place and date not given: "Normal and Unusual"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The creator of the KPGT [expansion unknown] on Mira Markovic, Dusan Jovanovic, the Socialists, the affairs of Zoran Todorovic, privatization, and new members.*

Through a provocative and very attractively written article, the controversial Ljubisa Ristic has been promoted to the status of mythical figure on the Yugoslav political and theatrical scene.

[Lekic] You became chairman of the JUL [Yugoslav United Left] almost a year ago. At that time, considering the combination of you and Dr. Mira Markovic, I called that "the sound and the fury." The most bitter attack has come recently from an unexpected source, your Slovene friend Dusan Jovanovic. Although you never respond to attacks, would you nevertheless do so this time?

[Ristic] No. My best friends have the privilege of pestering me whenever and however much they need to. Without response. That is why they are friends. What my best enemies do, they do not do publicly, so it is not even possible to respond to them. The others, those in between, have no effect. That is why there is no "sound and fury" in connection with the JUL chairman, nor would I participate in such a spectacle.

[Lekic] Is there any difference between your authorities as JUL chairman and those of Dr. Mira Markovic, who also holds a similar high-ranking post?

[Ristic] There is a difference, and, as they say in France, "Vive la difference"!

[Lekic] Please be more precise.

[Ristic] When the French say "Vive la difference," they are talking about the difference between men and women and saying that this is the most valuable thing that exists between men and women. Even in that sense, the difference between Dr. Mira Markovic and me is something that brings added value to what we are doing. Professor Mira Markovic is unquestionably, unmistakably the founder of the Yugoslav left and its promotor. The entire concept of the Yugoslav left is her idea. Well, if it follows from that concept and idea that I should be the chairman of the JUL during its birth, development, and growth, then all the differences between the two of us obviously contribute to that.

[Lekic] Bogoljub Karic recently bragged in NIN about how often he has coffee with the Milosevic-Markovic family. Do you do that too?

[Ristic] I really do not see what is so interesting about who has coffee with whom. On our political scene, many people have coffee together in hiding, to make sure that other people do not see them together; Mira and I have coffee together because we think similarly about things and because we enjoy having coffee together.

[Lekic] You don't care to discuss visits to her home?

[Ristic] No, I don't because those are things that are not even worth talking about, especially publicly. After all, I am not a member of that otherwise conspicuously familial family. They have their own circle of friends, while I am from a different world and have my own circle of friends. Moreover, those are private relations, I beg of you. Surely you are not interested in that sort of intrigue?

[Lekic] Naturally because we are talking about a very powerful person and his very powerful wife....

[Ristic] I do not understand that connection. It is clear that an elected head of state is a very powerful figure. We have a president who is a very powerful figure even beyond our country's borders. And I admit that the fact that his wife is someone who exists at all is itself utterly strange, because the wives of very powerful people generally do not exist as public figures. Because of that, many people on our political scene are terribly confused by that fact. They are incapable of explaining the nature of that relationship to themselves.

[Lekic] All the same, it is a fact, or at least they say, that many people play up to Dr. Mira Markovic, almost more than to her husband. Do you know anything about this since you are together so often?

[Ristic] Well, that is in the very nature of power. However, I do not know why someone whom people regard as powerful should be blamed for that, unless he supported and encouraged such behavior. What I do know is that Mira not only does not encourage such behavior but is, in fact, often in a situation where at the very beginning of such an approach she interrupts and puts a halt to it—in her very feminine and very effective manner. In this sense, she is much more adroit and much more stern than many men whom I have met in my life.

[Lekic] You are certainly aware that in this country, people—with the notable exception of JUL members—talk about Dr. Mira Markovic with mixed feelings of fear and scorn. Do you still think "only the best" of her, as you did when you came to the JUL?

[Ristic] I think much better of her, but "fear and scorn" is more a state of mind that your publication perhaps considers obligatory than a "hellish terror at the facts." That is bad for your circulation because I see that "in this country" the circulation of publications like DUGA, for example, goes up whenever readers pick them up with "fear and scorn" but goes down every time the woman spends a week visiting China or Belarus.

[Lekic] Fine, let us get serious here. What are the basic differences between the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] and the JUL?

[Ristic] The SPS is a party, and it is in power while the JUL is a leftist movement and is not in power. This basic difference generates many other differences, the most important of which is that the SPS's main concern is the organization of the state, while the JUL's main concern and interest is the organization of society.

[Lekic] Why has the JUL not yet put forward its program?

[Ristic] The JUL program is a collection of documents, some of which have been made public, some of which are in preparation, some of which are under discussion, and some of which have already been realized. The socioeconomic program, for example, will be made public when it is time, no sooner and no later, while some parts of the program are such that they are passed down from one generation to the next, so that they are made public once they are gathered together, every hundred years. Others, in turn, look so far ahead that any hurry concerning them is pointless.

[Lekic] There are plenty of people who are firmly convinced that the JUL represents the elite, the brain trust of the SPS. Do you agree with that?

[Ristic] No, I don't. The JUL is not even the infantry of the SPS, much less its elite. There does exist a brain trust, but it does not pay off. All excessively firm convictions, like yours, prove to be suspect because they are bursting with firmness.

[Lekic] In recent days, in fact, it has been reported that Zoran Todorovic, also known as "Kundak" [Rifle Butt], has undertaken transactions in grain, natural gas, and petroleum, and thus the things looked after by Prime Minister Marjanovic. Todorovic is one of the most influential members of the JUL. What does that tell you?

[Ristic] Based on my understanding of this, which is not that great, but is adequate, the reports are being circulated by the very people who would like to cover their tracks in these interesting transactions. Just take a look around here, perhaps even at your own newspaper. Moreover, I am frightened by the possibility that the president and his government could relinquish control over the trade in goods that are strategically important to the country, and I hope that has not happened, even though your question is a portent of that very thing.

As far as Zoran Todorovic is concerned, he is very influential in the JUL, under his first and last name, while his nickname frightens those who, in fact, need to be frightened. As far as the grain, natural gas, and petroleum are concerned, what are traders supposed to do but trade? Zoran is a trader, and that is what he does every day from nine to five. As far as the rest of it is concerned, I think you will agree with the JUL that in a proper country and under normal circumstances state functions should be separated from economic functions by law, in which case everything is easy and clear. Traders trade, while ministers and others put regulations into effect and fill the budget with taxes and customs duty for hospitals, pensions, schools, theaters, day care centers. Only in capitalism, which is being introduced here, is everyone concerned more about banks earning higher profits than about pensions arriving on time. Which is fine for capitalism, but not for pensioners, actors, and children.

[Lekic] Most frequently, the talk in the JUL is in the context of its huge, and in no real sense deserved, presence in the media. Every step you take is recorded and documented, especially on state television. How do you explain that?

[Ristic] And how do you explain this interview? Maybe I just called up NIN and claimed that I "deserved" the attention of that particular media outlet? Or NIN has fallen under "state" control and now NIN has no choice but to enable the JUL chairman's "huge and in no sense deserved presence?" How would you explain your situation?

[Lekic] I would say that NIN is interested in everything that stirs up our political scene. And that is, in fact, where the main absurdity lies: that the JUL is not represented in parliament, but that it is seen everywhere and much more on state and quasi-state channels than any opposition party. That is what I mean.

[Ristic] I think this is a much simpler situation than you make it out to be with your questions. Specifically, it is obvious that the JUL generates more news than anyone in parliament. The JUL is not in parliament because it was founded after the elections were held. Nor could it have been. In general, this entire logic is a little shaky because the press and media that you distinguish from the state press and media are, in fact, the ones that write the most about the JUL. It is, in fact, the opposition press that gives the JUL the most publicity. It concerns itself with the JUL, it mystifies, exaggerates, fabricates, and schemes. There are few reports on the JUL on state television.

[Lekic] What?

[Ristic] Yes, very few really. Some events are mentioned on "Dnevnik" here and there; they say that such and such spoke here or there, but nothing more.

[Lekic] There is equal interest in you personally. What would be your impressions, feelings, and new realizations after one year as JUL chairman?

[Ristic] The interest in "me personally" is also "in no sense deserved" and has been part of my job for 25 years now. My impressions, feelings, and new realizations are exciting, erotic, and tiring, without any possibility of them making me any more of a politician or any less of a stage director than in previous exciting, erotic, and tiring years. The only difference is that in the past I did not even know when birthdays were, much less celebrate them. That means that I have gotten old.

[Lekic] Over the past year in particular, there has been an exceptionally strong drive to recruit new JUL members. The SPS is said to be doing the same thing almost by force. They send memorandums to schools, and dare them to refuse them. Is the JUL also engaged in this?

[Ristic] We keep the number of registered members a secret because we do not like being thought of as too big and "undeserved." We do not have old members and new members, just members. And they are terrific ones. The more of them there are, the better they get, and the further from the leadership they are, the better they get. The leadership too is getting better. The careerists are slowly fleeing because they see that they are more likely to remain unemployed because of the JUL than to get some position in the provinces; some of the thieves who were trying to hide are fleeing head over heels to other parties, which is where their place is. Things are increasingly agreeable with the others in the leadership, they are not tense, anyone can be chairman, the meetings are short, and no one argues. There is no panic. Our membership is constant. We are getting people from many parties who have had enough of parties, most of them saying that in the future they will vote for society. The JUL has not even begun a campaign to register members—this is simply the phase of forming an organization. Once that campaign begins, it will certainly amaze you. The Yugoslav United Left is a movement of charm and style to which no one is rushing because its idea is not power, but rather the power of ideas. In democracy, the question of who will implement these ideas is decided by elections and negotiations, not by violence and demonstrations. The Yugoslav left is a movement for normal and unusual people, and for that reason it is not concerned about membership. Normal and unusual people are predominant in our beautiful country, and just imagine, they are all leftists, which in the future world will be just as normal as it appears unusual in our present-day world. The left has always been obligated to voice merciless criticism of the existing order, if it is really the left. Only then does it have the right to say that its critics are critics of the existing order.

If you have noticed anyone engaging in political intrigues at schools, then you should report them to the police and public prosecutor's office immediately because that is prohibited by law. The same is true of factories under the same law. It is no use complaining to me, since I do not know anyone there, or only one person from rafting on the Ada, and even he is more interested in theater and women than in laws on political organizing. No, the JUL does not send memoranda to schools.

[Lekic] What do we do if the main people in the police and public prosecutor's office are from the ruling party?

[Ristic] I do not understand what you are asking me and I have nothing to add to what I have said. One must operate according to the law, that is all.

[Lekic] Elections will be held this year. How is the JUL preparing for that and what does it expect?

[Ristic] The JUL is preparing well for the elections and expects a sufficient number of seats in legislative bodies.

[Lekic] Will we see you in parliament too?

[Ristic] No, oh no!

[Lekic] The new important date in the near future is 9 March. That is when the opposition is preparing a strong attack. The SPS congress is being held around the same time. Does the JUL have some particular strategy in connection with that?

[Ristic] The JUL has the same strategy for the 9th as it does for the 8th or 10th of any month in any year. It regards the fury of powerlessness and the rage of power with equal distaste. Leave the streets to the street urchins, death to fascism, and freedom for the people!

[Lekic] Will the JUL join with the SPS in the upcoming elections in order to defeat the opposition more easily?

[Ristic] There are always plenty of candidates from the opposition who wait to join with the SPS in order to "defeat the opposition more easily" while getting into a heap of trouble and incurring enormous expenses. The JUL will join with anyone in the opposition and with anyone in the SPS who is working for the good of the country and its citizens. The rest is rhetoric and mass earnings, and there can be no associating with that.

[Lekic] It is known that those in the so-called hard wing of the SPS who were against the JUL had to go. Vucelic, Jovic, Mihailo Markovic.... Is some new purge on the horizon, or was that warning sufficient?

[Ristic] There was no purge, and the warning was not sufficient as far as I can tell from reading the newspapers. Nor was the money returned, nor is peace utterly certain, as far as I can tell from watching television.

[Lekic] The ownership issue cannot be avoided either. As the party of the wealthiest entrepreneurs, the JUL is opposed to private ownership. How would you explain this contradiction very briefly?

[Ristic] Very briefly, I could easily avoid the ownership issue because I own neither real nor movable property, nor do I have any intention of owning any. But I will not avoid it because I think that you too will agree with the JUL that all public officials should disclose what they own, based on a law that should be enacted, only twice—when they assume a public position and when they leave it. That would solve all sorts of problems, and at the same time we would get rid of many people.

Do not be angry, but your question is rather idiotic. The JUL is not "the party of the wealthiest entrepreneurs" nor is the JUL against private ownership. On the contrary, the parties vying for the wealthiest people are going crazy because some leftists have been successful in business without abandoning their political convictions. Like with little Djokica—a leftist has holes in his shoes, is sexually immoderate, and is dying of tuberculosis. On the contrary, a modern leftist differs from a rightist in terms of what he regularly buys, is aware of the question of safe sex, and knows how to read the stock market report. Not only does he go to the theater and to concerts; he also does not fall asleep there when his wife takes him.

The JUL is not only not against private ownership; it even believes that every public enterprise should become private if there is a source of private capital that can pay it more than it is worth or at least as much as it is worth, but certainly not less, as is the custom, or nothing at all as in Montenegro or Bulgaria. The JUL is not only not against privatization, it even agrees with the governor when he says that the process of transforming public property is unacceptably slow. Perhaps some people think this nation of ours is foolish, but they will have to learn that it is not foolish enough to allow the same thing to happen to them that happened to "intelligent" nations all over who are now rushing to vote for the left to save whatever can be saved amid the forced marking-time march of the new world order and the flea markets of colonial supermarkets. So much for the left and ownership. A few days ago I visited the Engels house in Wuppertal. Just imagine, he was a textile manufacturer and he supported Karl Marx. What depravity!

[Lekic] We also cannot overlook the charge leveled against you that you joined the JUL because of the money with which you would build the Sugar Refinery, your dream of a major complex for a new cultural center in Belgrade?

[Ristic] I acknowledge all the charges and ask for the most severe punishment for my crime. I admit that it is my dream to create a major cultural center in Belgrade, indeed, one that is bigger and more cultured than would be expected of me. The plan is for it to be so big that I cannot take it home with me. I feel especially guilty about the fact that it has been revealed that my affiliation with the JUL is connected to the previous crime; thus, these two crimes coincide. I ask that my sentence be immurement in the Sugar Refinery and that I not be let outside until I am finished.

[Lekic] From London, Rade Serbedzija recently showed understanding for your affiliation with the JUL, while Dusan Jovanovic repudiated his affiliation with the KPGT. Surely you have an explanation for these two moves?

[Ristic] I do not have an explanation, nor do I have understanding for Rade Serbedzija and Dusan Jovanovic; I am in fact an admirer of those great artists. If Dusan Jovanovic has said that his affiliation with the KPGT is a thing of the past, then all I can do is agree with that.

[Lekic] People often say that they might join the JUL but that they do not want to because of certain people in it whom they find "repulsive." There is no change here?

[Ristic] Those are the ones who find me "repulsive." It is because of others that people are joining the JUL. It is generally known that I am the ugliest person in the JUL. That is why I realized long ago that women like ugly and witty men. So I am making an effort.

[Lekic] My personal journalistic experience with you is exceptional, in contrast to the allegations made by your Slovene friend (or enemy) that you are a despot, a dictator. What do you think? Will someone else rise up on your behalf?

[Ristic] My experience with you too is exceptional after 15 interviews over the course of 15 years. That is why I know that you will publish all the questions and all the answers. As far as Dusan is concerned, he sent me his article 15 days before he published it. He asked in the letter whether I wanted to talk to him. I called him up and told him that it was "stupid Jovanovic" who asked that. He told me that is why he likes me. And I him. I have read that Tirnanic likes him the same, but he notices certain shortcomings. That is why Tirke is somewhat ill-humored, and always has been. It appears that there is no one to write to Dusan Jovanovic, as with Marquez. I certainly won't. And there is really no one else then. Colonel, colonel, just write—we will even work in the rain. If Jovanka writes too—we will work without pause!

[Lekic] When you joined the JUL, many people gave you two to three months. At the most. However, it has lasted....

[Ristic] Yes, that is why many people obviously do not know the JUL, nor Professor Markovic, nor me.

FRY: JUL's Markovic Addresses Future, Society, Crime

AU0404211896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The district committee of the Yugoslav Left for Branicevo district was elected in Kostolac this evening in the presence of a great number of citizens, and public and cultural personalities. Apart from the regional leaders of the Yugoslav Left [JUL] the members of the top leadership also spoke. Directorate Member Andra Milosavljevic spoke about agriculture while Dragan Kostic spoke about the economic program and privatization. Then spoke the president of the JUL Directorate, Professor Mira Markovic. Dejan Eric reports:

[Begin recording] [Eric] According to the president of directorate Mira Markovic, the Yugoslav Left champions the equality of all citizens, regardless of their religious and ethnic denomination and their political belief. The Yugoslav Left also champions the interest of the majority of citizens, Mira Markovic said and added:

[Markovic] I must say that numerous, more or less empirical research indicates that the left, science, and women will rule in the next millennium, in the 21th century.

[Eric] Important changes have taken place in our society over the past few months, such as the end of the war, the suspension of sanctions, and the changes to the demographic structure of the population. For all these reasons, Mira Markovic stressed, we must create a concept of a material and spiritual revival of the society on which all forces that want prosperity must be united. We are also fighting for the equality and presence of all forms of ownership in our society, Mira Markovic said, in the situation in which the interest of the majority of citizens would be primary.

The Yugoslav Left opposes violent and immoral process of privatization in which individuals would profit. We are also fighting, Mira Markovic continued, for a multiparty system because it is necessary. The political groups that instigate hatred are not political parties and the Yugoslav Left will advocated that they be denied the status of political parties.

The state should first be just and then also law-governed. The material erosion of the society that could not be avoided caused the spiritual erosion, especially in education. Education should be free and modern, and we should strike a balance between the domestic and foreign, traditional and modern in it. Health care should be humane, free, and modern. The media should be objective, constructive, and cultured.

Our avoiding the war does not mean that there are no forces in our society that favor it. They, according to Mira Markovic, justify this with their personal beliefs and interests. Any country that has been under embargo, received refugees, and was in a war encirclement is faced with crime, Mira Markovic said and added:

[Markovic] There is crime in industry and on the streets, in politics and in families. We are a country in which prostitution did not exist at all in the past, while now it is legalized, so to speak. Drug-addiction is expanding greatly, especially among the young people. I do not wish to enumerate all the levels and the forms of crime that are present in our society, however, I would like to say that because of all the levels that I have mentioned but not analyzed, and because of all the forms that I have mentioned and analyzed a little, crime has stopped being the responsibility of the police and the organizations and services that are, in the eyes of the majority of the citizens, responsible for it. The circle of responsibility is expanding to all institutions in the society and to all individuals in society who, by the virtue of their posts in these institutions, must assume this burden. [end recording]

FRY: Article Says Phone Contracts Awarded Without Bids

96BA0203E Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 96 p 23

[Article by Z.M.: "Soft Monopolies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the last several months, the company Braca Karic has managed to take a number of interesting positions in the telecommunications sector in Serbia evoking controversial interpretations among professionals. It all began with mobile telephony and a joint venture with PTT "Srbija" called Mobtel, and then the report came in that the Karices had taken over operation of 10,000 public telephones in Serbia! After that, the FRY finally became a member of the Internet, the world computer network, through a subsidiary of none other than Braca Karic, and then came Ericsson, and the Karices invested no less than 420 million German marks [DM] to develop the GSM [global system for mobile communications] in Serbia.

Directly or indirectly, the national PTT organization stands in the background of all these positions. The Karices are registered as a "foreign company" (BK Trade of Moscow), which is investing foreign capital in its own country, and it all has remained in our own house.

Prime Minister Radoje Kontic (FRY Government) recently announced the adoption of a new Law on Telecommunications allowing access in the telecommunications sector to other (foreign and private) operators. All of this will be prescribed in the law in March, in order to prevent the monopoly of national PTT organizations from offering telecommunications services.

There are at least two reasons why Kontic has announced the amendment of legislation in the telecommunications area. One is the FRY's interest in bringing its legislation into line with the European Community, and the other is the interest of the telecommunications industry itself, which does not tolerate monopolies in this expansive period of its development.

It is no accident that one of the first directives issued by the European Community was its so-called Green Book on Telecommunications, which urges its members to separate the mail from telecommunications. Nor is it an accident that this concept has later been followed by all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, using various models. In Europe at this moment, it seems that our country is the only one attempting to evade the reforms and liberalization in this sector.

When the telecommunications industry is spreading and growing with a profit rate of 15 percent annually, it is natural that monopolistic national PTT firms will be a brake and impediment in its development. It is in the interest of users and in the interest of the industry to have on the telecommunications market as many operators as possible competing in price and quality with one another and applying these technologies on the largest possible scale. There is no longer any doubt whatsoever that underdeveloped telecommunications are the greatest barrier to economic development, and that the business operation of more and more firms is based on the telecommunications support which they get from those countries.

Meanwhile, in the national public enterprise PTT "Srbija" there seems to be confusion about functions and objectives, and it seems that in combination with the Karices they think they can be managers and businessmen. Especially because they are the immediate possessors of such a valuable resource as telecommunications.

Instead of building the infrastructure of offices and connecting routes, instead of increasing the number of conventional TF [expansion unknown] connections and then deriving from that infrastructure future sources of revenue, PTT "Srbija" is becoming involved in the role of a paging and mobile telephone operator and is holding on to the pie of its monopoly position. At the same time, the infrastructure is in a terrible condition, and three and a half years of sanctions have totally plundered it. When you think about it, perhaps mobile telephony could replace and make up for the function of that plundered telephone network, but how many Yugoslavs will be able to indulge in a mobile telephone? Certainly not the everyday public at large.

The behavior of PTT "Srbija" toward the institutions of public competitions and letting contracts through public and international bidding is very significant in this regard. In the case of mobile telephony, for example, before this war and sanctions there were no fewer than 15 companies offering their projects and seeking licenses to operate in Serbia, but no public bidding was organized for that contract. Asked why, the people at PTT reply: "Why should we invite bids when so many of them have applied on their own?" When you mention concessions, then they come back with the question—Why should we make the mistake Hungary did and take only $100 million for the license, and then the foreigners earn twice or three times that much here?...

At the same time, the people at PTT are asking themselves with longing where they will find the capital of some $7 billion they need for the planned development of the infrastructure of telecommunications up to the year 2005. They cannot get it from the revenues generated by the fees for their services, because the government does not allow them to do that. It is difficult to obtain international loans for this, because the war and sanctions placed us rather far from world money, but concessions, PTT participation in ownership of foreign companies, are still a third alternative. This country's government is evading the latter as the Devil avoids the cross, and naturally nothing is happening....

In this whole rigmarole a soft, what we might call quasi-governmental, monopoly is being created on the market for telecommunication services, a monopoly embodied in the joint venture for mobile telephony. Braca Karic is only an interested party here, but the main threads lead back to the very top of this government. We will quote a top official of PTT "Srbija," who replied when asked how the Karices now come to have 10,000 public telephones: "Well, we went to the president of the republic, and he said the Karices should be given that, because the telephones are really in desperate condition...."

Instead of this hearsay, serious states long ago gave telecommunications priority in development of their infrastructures. Until this is done by the top federal leadership of our state, the managers of PTT "Srbija" will be totally confused, and even over a mobile telephone they will not get answers to the question of how to solve our teleproblem!

[Box, p 23]

A Mobile Telephone in Montenegro Costs DM700

A mobile telephone in Montenegro will cost about DM700, Herold Britsen, Norwegian director of the Montenegrin company for mobile telephony Pro-Monte GSM, said last week. The connection will cost about DM200, the telephone itself about DM500, that is, what those sets usually cost in the outside world, and another DM20 or so will have to be set aside for the monthly charge. By comparison, the Mobtel Company in Serbia is collecting about 19,000 dinars for the same services (and that after a 50-percent price reduction), or between DM5,000 and DM6,000, depending upon which exchange rate is used.

Pro-Monte GSM is a joint venture formed by the Greek-Norwegian firm European Telecom and the public enterprise PTT Crna Gora, in which the foreign company has the majority share. There were five firms in the competition for this contract, among them BK Telecom and also Bel Pagete Internacional of Budapest, but a special commission of the Montenegrin Ministry for Industry, Energy, and Mining selected European Telecom.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Receives Delegation of U.S. Senators

LD0504121196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1140 GMT 5 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Apr (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received a delegation of U.S. senators who arrived in the FRY on a visit, President Milosevic's office reported.

The delegation comprises Thomas Daschle, a Democrat from South Dakota; Orrin Hatch, a Republican from Utah; and Harry Reid, a Democrat from Nevada.

The U.S. senators were particularly interested in the implementation of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the most important aspects of the political situation in the region.

The talks also dealt with further development of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Yugoslavia.

President Milosevic used the occasion to offer his condolences on the tragic deaths of U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown and the U.S. delegation who were killed in a plane crash.

Milan Milutinovic, federal minister of foreign affairs, also attended the talks.

Serbia: Radical Party Leader Criticizes Hague Tribunal

LD0404202496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1651 GMT 4 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Apr (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, today said that "The Hague tribunal's addressing the Security Council with the aim to paint the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a pariah state is the latest blackmail by the world powers."

"The Serbian radicals have predicted such actions, because we knew that the big powers would not stop at the Dayton capitulation, but go to the very end looking for every possible way to prevent the realization of the Serbian national interests," Seselj said at a news conference in Belgrade.

According to Seselj, The Hague tribunal's request is timed most inconveniently for the Serbian people and the Belgrade regime.

"It is inconvenient even for Milosevic when certain questions are opened, such as the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of persecution of our citizens, of Kosovo, Metohija, Sandzak, and Vojvodina," Seselj added.

He warned that "the president of Serbia is failing to see anything and continuing with his undermining of the Serb Republic leadership and policies."

"Milosevic is seeking obedient people on the political scene of the Serb Republic who would succeed President Radovan Karadzic, so that he can expand his power and policies," Seselj concluded.

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